Essays On Corruption And Economic Development by Freille, Sebastian
Freille, Sebastian (2007) Essays On Corruption And 
Economic Development. PhD thesis, University of 
Nottingham. 
Access from the University of Nottingham repository: 
http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/10302/1/My_Thesis.pdf
Copyright and reuse: 
The Nottingham ePrints service makes this work by researchers of the University of 
Nottingham available open access under the following conditions.
· Copyright and all moral rights to the version of the paper presented here belong to 
the individual author(s) and/or other copyright owners.
· To the extent reasonable and practicable the material made available in Nottingham 
ePrints has been checked for eligibility before being made available.
· Copies of full items can be used for personal research or study, educational, or not-
for-profit purposes without prior permission or charge provided that the authors, title 
and full bibliographic details are credited, a hyperlink and/or URL is given for the 
original metadata page and the content is not changed in any way.
· Quotations or similar reproductions must be sufficiently acknowledged.
Please see our full end user licence at: 
http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/end_user_agreement.pdf 
A note on versions: 
The version presented here may differ from the published version or from the version of 
record. If you wish to cite this item you are advised to consult the publisher’s version. Please 
see the repository url above for details on accessing the published version and note that 
access may require a subscription.
For more information, please contact eprints@nottingham.ac.uk
Essays on Corruption and
Economic Development
Sebastian Freille, BA.
Thesis submitted to The University of Nottingham
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
March 2007
Contents
1 Introduction 1
1.1 Background and motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.1.1 Media freedom and corruption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.1.2 Decentralisation and corruption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.1.3 Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.2 Research Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1.3 Aims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1.4 Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2 A survey of the literature 13
2.1 Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.2 Main strands of the literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.3 Causes of corruption: The evidence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.3.1 Economic-related variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.3.2 Political variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
2.3.3 Other determinants: cultural, geographical and historical . . 39
i
2.4 Concluding remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
3 A contribution to the empirics of press freedom and corruption 42
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
3.2 Literature Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
3.3 Data and Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
3.3.1 Corruption and press freedom indicators . . . . . . . . . . . 50
3.3.2 Control variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
3.3.3 Econometric methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
3.4 Analysis of results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
3.5 Endogeneity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
3.6 Further robustness checks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
3.6.1 Alternative measure of corruption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
3.6.2 Fixed-eﬀects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
3.7 Concluding remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
4 Decentralisation, corruption and development 79
4.1 Background and motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
4.2 The Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
4.2.1 Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
4.2.2 Households . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
4.2.3 The Government . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
ii
4.2.4 Bureaucrats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
4.2.5 Firms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
4.3 The incentive to be corrupt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
4.4 Corruption and public ﬁnances . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
4.5 Regimes and development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
4.5.1 Centralisation and development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
4.5.2 Decentralisation and development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
4.6 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
5 Federalism, decentralisation and corruption 112
5.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
5.2 Decentralisation and theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
5.2.1 Federalism deﬁned . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
5.2.2 Theoretical literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
5.3 Data and sample characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
5.4 Empirical evidence: Fiscal decentralisation, federalism and political
institutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
5.4.1 Which aspects of decentralisation matter? . . . . . . . . . . 126
5.4.2 Multi-dimensional corruption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
5.4.3 Interaction eﬀects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
5.5 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
6 Concluding remarks 147
iii
6.1 Summary of ﬁndings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
6.2 Policy implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
6.3 Limitations and other considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
6.4 Directions for future research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
A Appendix 172
B Appendix 182
B.1 Additional tables and data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 182
B.2 Additional graphs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199
iv
List of Tables
2.1 Correlations between diﬀerent corruption indexes . . . . . . 23
3.1 Correlation between press freedom and its components . . . 53
3.2 Laws and regulations and political inﬂuences . . . . . . . . . 55
3.3 Laws and regulations and economic inﬂuences . . . . . . . . 56
3.4 Political and economic inﬂuences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
3.5 EBA results for press freedom using OLS: Aggregate index
and subcategories (CPI index) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
3.6 EBA results for press freedom using GMM with IV: Ag-
gregate index and subcategories (CPI index) . . . . . . . . . 66
3.7 EBA results for press freedom using GMM with IV: Ag-
gregate index and subcategories (ICRG index) . . . . . . . . 73
3.8 Results of press freedom index on corruption - 1995-2004 . 75
5.1 Decentralisation indicators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
5.2 Summary statistics for selected variables . . . . . . . . . . . 123
5.3 Pairwise correlations between selected decentralisation in-
dicators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
v
5.4 Baseline regressions - Cross Section (Year:2000) - Variable
subset of countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
5.5 Baseline regressions - Cross Section (Year= 2000) - Vari-
able subset of countries - Additional Decentralisation In-
dicators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
5.6 Signiﬁcance of decentralisation indicators . . . . . . . . . . . 133
5.7 Corruption on decentralisation and standard controls. Di-
rect Eﬀects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
5.8 Corruption on decentralisation and standard controls. In-
teraction Eﬀects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
A.1 Summary statistics for selected variables . . . . . . . . . . . . 173
A.2 Correlations between selected variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . 174
A.3 Variable description and data sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175
A.4 Selected Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180
B.1 Pairwise correlations among selected decentralisation indi-
cators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183
B.2 Baseline regressions - Cross Section (Year= 2000) - Com-
mon subset of countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 184
B.3 Baseline regressions - Cross Section (Year= 2000) - Com-
mon subset of countries - Additional Decentralisation In-
dicators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185
B.4 Variable description and data sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 186
B.5 Selected Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 190
vi
B.6 Rolling regressions - EXP and WBC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 196
B.7 Rolling regressions - REV and WBC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 197
B.8 Rolling regressions - UNITARYHIS and WBC . . . . . . . . 198
vii
List of Figures
3.1 Aggregate press freedom and bureaucratic corruption . . . 59
4.1 Corruption and development. Parameter values: α = 0.4, A =
3, λ > 1, m = 0.6, n = 0.2, g = 1.4, b = 0.6, ν = 0.3, p = 0.5,
δ = 0.5, β = 0.2, σc = 0.7, θc = 0.25 and θd = 0.75. . . . . . . . . . 103
4.2 Decentralisation, corruption and development. Parameter
values: α = 0.4, A = 3, λ > 1, m = 0.6, n = 0.2, g = 1.4, b = 0.6,
ν = 0.3, p = 0.5, δ = 0.5, β = 0.2, σc = 0.7, θc = 0.25 and θd = 0.75. 107
4.3 Decentralisation, corruption and development. Parameter
values: α = 0.4, A = 3, λ > 1, m = 0.6, n = 0.2, g = 1.4, b = 0.6,
ν = 0.3, p = 0.5, δ = 0.5, β = 0.2, σc = 0.7, θc = 0.25 and θd = 0.3. 108
5.1 Fiscal and constitutional decentralisation . . . . . . . . . . . 127
5.2 Rolling regression for exp and wbc . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
5.3 Rolling regression for rev and wbc . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
5.4 Rolling regression for unitaryhis and wbc . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
5.5 Partial regression plots - Model 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
5.6 Partial regression plots - Model 7 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
viii
B.1 Rolling regression for exp and cpi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199
B.2 Rolling regression for rev and cpi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199
B.3 Rolling regression for unitaryhis and cpi . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199
B.4 Rolling regression for exp and icrg . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 200
B.5 Rolling regression for rev and icrg . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 200
B.6 Rolling regression for unitaryhis and icrg . . . . . . . . . . . . 200
ix
To my parents, Maria Cristina and Jose.
x
Abstract
This thesis addresses two central questions in the ﬁeld of corruption: the relation-
ship between corruption and some of its main determinants and the eﬀect that
these relationships have on economic development. The research presented in this
thesis extends the literature on corruption in several directions.
The third chapter studies the empirical relationship between press freedom and
bureaucratic corruption. As one of the main democratic checks and balances, press
freedom is thought to impose a curb on corruption. We investigate two related
aspects. The ﬁrst considers whether there exists a robust empirical relationship
between press freedom and corruption. The second investigates the detail, by
exploring which types of restrictions to press freedom are robustly related to cor-
ruption. Using robust regression techniques on a panel of countries we conclude
that restrictions to media freedom are robustly associated to higher corruption.
Also we ﬁnd that both political and economic restrictions to press freedom are
strongly related to corruption while legal and administrative restrictions are not.
The fourth chapter studies the relationship between decentralisation, corruption
and development in a dynamic macroeconomic model. We assess whether corrup-
tion is always harmful to development, whether decentralisation is always beneﬁ-
cial for development and the eﬀect that corruption produces on the relationship
between decentralisation and development. Our main ﬁnding from this model is
that if corruption is absent, decentralisation is the best alternative for develop-
ment but may not be preferable to centralisation if corruption is widespread in
the economy.
xi
The ﬁfth chapter examines the empirical relationship between decentralisation and
corruption. This chapter has two main goals. First, to reconsider the available evi-
dence in light of some newly assembled data. The second goal is to incorporate into
the analysis several dimensions of decentralisation simultaneously. We ﬁnd that
the inconsistencies in the empirical literature arise due to the frequent omission
of multiple measures of decentralisation. Secondly, that both ﬁscal decentrali-
sation and constitutional centralisation are simultaneously associated with lower
corruption. Finally, we ﬁnd that certain forms of political decentralisation -local
elections- weaken the positive eﬀect of constitutional centralisation -unitarism- on
corruption.
xii
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Background and motivation
Public sector corruption is an institutional disease that is often diﬃcult to detect
and to control. It typically involves a transaction between three actors: an agent
(i.e. a public oﬃcial), a principal (i.e. the government) and a corrupter (i.e.
individuals, ﬁrms, unions, etc.)1. The conﬁguration of the corrupt transaction
may adopt several forms with diﬀerent outcomes for the intervening parts. This
makes corruption a complex and multifaceted concept. Although it is present in
all countries in some way, corruption is most pervasive throughout the developing
world. In 2006, Transparency International noted that corruption was rampant in
nearly 50% of the 163 countries ranked in their widely known index [Transparency
International (2006)]. The obvious relationship between corruption and the level of
economic development has led to the growing belief that the extent and persistence
of public corruption is the greatest obstacle to achieving steady growth in the
developing world. The World Bank (2001), for instance, has identiﬁed corruption
as the single most important obstacle to development. Recently, Paul Wolfowitz,
the reigning president of the institution, showed commitment to this by holding
1As opposed to many other crimes which typically involve two parties, the criminal and the
victim. In a corrupt exchange, there is an implicit or explicit relation of trust while this relation
is generally absent in other types of criminal activity. See Varese (2000) for more details
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up loans to India, Bangladesh, Kenya and Chad and by allocating additional
funds to the Bank's anti-corruption unit. A host of international organizations
and think tanks have also recognized the relevance and urgency of the problem
for international development.
To develop policies aimed at reducing corruption, the study of this phenomenon
requires an examination of its nature, eﬀects and determinants. In this research,
the main interest is to explore some of the determinants of corruption2. In order
to analyse the causes of corruption we must ﬁrst acknowledge that corruption is
a broad concept and it can refer to several diﬀerent things. Therefore, it is con-
venient to make clear at the outset what we understand as public corruption in
the context of this thesis. For our purposes, public corruption is deﬁned as the
abuse of public oﬃce for private gain. This deﬁnition of corruption is generally
associated with what is known as bureaucratic corruption. Under this deﬁnition,
we leave out a large number of situations that are regarded as involving acts of
moral corruption yet perfectly legal (examples of these are lobbying contributions,
inﬂuence-peddling activities, some instances of legal blackmailing, etc)3. In addi-
tion to bureaucratic corruption, there are other types of public sector corruption
that aﬀect a society, of which political corruption -involving political decision-
makers- is possibly the most important. To put it another way, whereas political
corruption takes place mainly at the decisional level, bureaucratic corruption sur-
faces at the implementation level [Amundsen (1999)]. It is, perhaps, these two
types of corruption that have received the most attention by academic researchers
and international organizations in recent decades. Although we will occasion-
ally refer to political corruption, the present research is primarily concerned with
bureaucratic corruption.
Bureaucratic corruption is generally thought to generate negative eﬀects on eco-
2Analyzing the nature of corruption goes beyond the scope of this research and in any case
is a complex issue that spans across several disciplines. In relation to the literature regarding
the consequences of corruption, there is a growing body of knowledge from which the main and
almost uncontested premise is that corruption is bad for development.
3Some authors suggest that these less evident forms of corruption may be more prevalent
than more outright forms of corruption such as bribery and embezzlement. See Kaufmann and
Vicente (2005) for a more detailed discussion.
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nomic, political and social outcomes. Despite some optimistic theories about
eﬃciency-inducing corruption -eﬃcient grease theory or speed money- originated in
the 60's [Leﬀ (1964), Nye (1967), and Huntington (1968)], there is overwhelming
evidence that this type of corruption impacts negatively on economic develop-
ment. A number of factors underlie this negative impact, including the damaging
impact on local and foreign investment, taxation, foreign aid and also the mix
of economic activities. It has also been suggested that these detrimental eﬀects
are worsened if corruption is disorganized and uncoordinated [Shleifer and Vishny
(1993), Prud'homme (1994) and Bardhan and Mookherjee (2000)]. In other terms,
if everybody knows who to bribe and by how much in order to be granted a public
service, then the level of aggregate corruption may be lower than if otherwise the
case.
The political consequences of corruption are dependent on the extent and organi-
sation of corruption but involve distortions to the decisions that politicians make.
In general terms, corruption weakens the government institutions and therefore re-
duces political legitimacy. There are two related characteristics that inﬂuence the
way corruption aﬀects the polities of a country. The ﬁrst is the position of the rul-
ing government relative to the other actors (rival parties, interest groups, unions,
etc.). Strong states are thought to be better able to control bureaucratic and
political corruption compared to weak states since they have the power to set the
social norms. The second characteristic is the form of government. Democracies
are in general better equipped to reduce the level of corruption due to existence of
several checks and balances. In authoritarian regimes, corruption takes place at
the will of the ruler and there are no institutional safeguards against it. Corruption
may also aﬀect a society through a reduction in trust, the deterioration of moral
standards and the rise of social and group tensions in heterogeneous societies.
Having recognised the detrimental eﬀects of corruption on economic development,
understanding the causes of corruption becomes of critical importance to elaborate
policies to detect and to deter corruption. As it stands however, while the litera-
ture is large, it is often at odds regarding its ﬁndings and implications. Although
3
this is not entirely surprising due to the complexity of the problem at hand, it
suggests that any contribution to the literature should carefully explore the ro-
bustness of the conclusions drawn and recognise that heterogeneity or multiple
equilibria might exist. This represents one of the key motivations for this thesis.
Fortunately, the data and methods used for this kind of research are becoming
richer and more suited to this task. In all, over the last 15 or 20 years a large
number of causes have been identiﬁed and proposed as causing corruption to diﬀer
across countries ranging from economic variables to religious and cultural inﬂu-
ences. For the sake of simplicity, we may group them into two broad categories,
economic and non-economic determinants.
The main economic reason why countries diﬀer in their corruption levels is the
grade of economic development. Put it simply, poor countries tend to have higher
corruption levels [La Porta et al. (1997), Ades and Di Tella (1999), Treisman
(2000) and Serra (2006)]. In later sections we also review evidence that sug-
gest that corruption both inﬂuences and is inﬂuenced by economic development
yielding two-way causation between them. Academic research has found greater
diﬃculty however in establishing the channels and the intermediate variables -
other economic variables directly aﬀected by corruption that aﬀect ultimately
development- that are behind this negative relationship.
Of the non-economic variables, long-standing democratic institutions, Protestant
majority, political stability, British colonial heritage and unitary tradition are
among the most important proposed elsewhere in the relevant literature. In most
cases these are associated with lower corruption levels [La Porta et al. (1997), Treis-
man (2000), Adsera et al. (2003), Brunetti and Weder (2003) and Serra (2006)].
Compared to these economic and non-economic determinants, the two potential
determinants of corruption that are the focus of this thesis, the existence and ex-
tent of freedom of the news media and the power-sharing arrangements between
diﬀerent levels of government, have received in comparison less attention. The
following sections discuss why this is the case, how these topics are important and
4
the way they are approached in this thesis.
1.1.1 Media freedom and corruption
Although it is clear that corruption aﬀects both democracies and non-democracies,
there are reasons to expect the incidence of corruption to be lower in the former.
This is due to the existence of the diﬀerent checks and balances in democratic
systems that should, in principle, act as deterrents of corruption. A potentially
important democratic control is the freedom of the press. For over two centuries,
political thinkers such as Alexis de Tocqueville, Thomas Jeﬀerson and James Madi-
son have attributed utmost importance to the liberty of the press as a fundamen-
tal democratic right. More recently, some empirical and theoretical developments
have come to support this view [Van Belle (1997), Besley and Burgess (2001), and
McMillan and Zoido (2004)]. As McMillan and Zoido (2004), p.91 remark ``The
news media are the chief watchdog. The checks and balances work as a system, so
an independent judiciary and genuine political competition are important. But the
media can provide oversight of the government even where the other checks and
balances have broken down. Safeguards for the media -ensuring they are protected
from political inﬂuence and are credible to the public- may be the crucial policies
for shoring up democracy.
At the same time, the eﬀectiveness of the media in fulﬁlling this role can be
called into question. Graber (1986) discussing the shortcomings of the media
wrote that when an institution whose functions seem so essential to the public
interest performs these functions far less than anticipated, one ought to look at the
reasons, assess the consequences, and determine the public implications. There are
numerous reasons why media performance deviates from expectations. A number
of press freedom watchdogs have alerted that the levels of media freedom have
slightly worsened in recent years with the danger of a worldwide downward trend
looking increasingly possible. For instance, Reporters Sans Frontiers (RSF) stated
in a press release that press freedom worldwide has taken a beating in the western
5
hemisphere in 2005 and the early months of 20064. Similarly, Freedom House
reports Press freedom saw modest gains in a number of key countries, including
Ukraine and Lebanon, which received status upgrade in 2004... ...However, these
improvements were outweighed by a worsening in the overall level of press freedom
worldwide as measured by the global average score, continuing a three-year trend
of decline.5. More recently, Besley and Burgess (2002), Hillman (2003), and
Vaidya (2005) have suggested that the media's role in deterring corruption may
be limited and the relation is in fact much more complex. In the presence of
corruption the press may be deliberately constrained from acting in its role as a
deterrent of corruption. It is these contrasts that provide the motivation of the
study of press freedom and its relationship to public corruption in Chapter 3 of
this thesis. We provide strong evidence of a negative relationship between press
freedom and corruption. Our ﬁndings also suggest that economic and political
restrictions to media freedom are signiﬁcantly associated with higher corruption
while other forms of restrictions -legal and administrative- are not.
1.1.2 Decentralisation and corruption
In the remainder of the thesis we concentrate on a diﬀerent aspect of the socio-
political structure of society and its relationship with corruption. This relates to
the decentralisation of government functions. The issue of the relationship be-
tween schemes of power-sharing between diﬀerent levels of government and public
corruption has emerged as one of the key aspects in the successful design, elab-
oration and implementation of decentralisation programmes. As many authors
note, in the last 20-30 years decentralisation has been a fashionable idea and for
many developing countries it has been all but inevitable since reforms to the public
sector and to the intergovernmental relations have been pushed by international
organizations.
4Reporters Sans Frontieres Press Release 10th May 2006, http://www.rsf.org/article.
php3?id_article=17632
5See Freedom House, Press Freedom in 2004 available at http://www.freedomhouse.org/
template.cfm?page=131&year=2005
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The beneﬁts attributed to decentralisation -mainly of an economic nature- by
the early theories of ﬁscal federalism have been argued to be oﬀset by new prob-
lems and ineﬃciencies -mainly of a political nature- in the more recent literature.
As Bardhan (2002) notes: The traditional theory of ﬁscal federalism is now be-
ing extended to a political economy setting, with the introduction of transactions
costs in the political markets or political agency problems between the ruler and
the ruled, between the politicians/bureaucrats and the electorate, and for reasons
mentioned above these transactions and agency costs may be much more serious
in the context of developing countries [Bardhan (2002), p. 190-191]. There has
been a reinterpretation of the economic theory of federalism, and several compli-
cations were taken on board (transaction costs, imperfect information, political
decision-making, etc.). Several authors have suggested that certain forms of de-
centralisation may introduce perverse incentives and as a consequence it may be
associated with higher corruption in certain conditions. For example, local cap-
ture, over-budgeting in sub-national jurisdictions, soft-budget constraints, infor-
mation asymmetries between agents of diﬀerent levels, and deﬁcient monitoring
mechanisms may encourage bureaucratic corruption.
Research on these issues is relatively recent and has been addressed at both the
empirical and theoretical levels resulting in novel ways of thinking about the re-
lationship between these variables. Nevertheless, the approaches of these papers
vary too often and it is diﬃcult to compare results, models and policy implica-
tions. Motivated by this lack of a systematic approach, present both in theoretical
as well as empirical research, Chapter 4 considers these issues from a theoretical
perspective and Chapter 5 empirically. In relation to theoretical research on de-
centralisation and corruption, there is a noticeable bias in favour of microeconomic
approaches to this question. In order to understand the eﬀect of corruption and
decentralisation on economic development we propose a macroeconomic approach.
Using an over-lapping generations endogenous growth model with corruption and
the presence of multiple equilibria and development traps [Ehrlich and Lui (1999),
Mauro (2004) and Blackburn et al. (2006)], we derive some results regarding the re-
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lationship between decentralisation, corruption and economic development. Our
model suggests that the eﬀect of decentralisation on development depends cru-
cially on the extent of corruption and on the interaction of eﬃciency (economic)
and informational (political) elements.
The situation in terms of empirical research on corruption and decentralisation
is similar to that of the theoretical case: there is a growing literature that yields
mixed and even contrasting results. A review of the literature suggests that this
may be because studies are often partial, they concentrate on only one aspect
of decentralisation at a time, and do not account for the interdependencies be-
tween aspects of corruption. We agree with Manor (1999) when he writes: If it
is to have a signiﬁcant promise, decentralisation must entail a mixture of all three
types: democratic, ﬁscal and administrative. The problem is, empirical research
says very little about what the right mixture is. As we will later describe, the
empirical literature in this area is still in its infancy and there is a growing need
for more thorough and integrated approaches. Our research in Chapter 5 is a pre-
liminary attempt to gaze critically at the available evidence and at the same time
to overcome some of these shortcomings by exploring additional characteristics of
this relationship.
1.1.3 Policy
We also provide an evaluative assessment of our results and attempt to draw some
implications for policy. The design of policies aimed at tackling corruption should
consider the diverse and varied nature of its determinants. In our research, we put
emphasis on two important determinants of corruption which can be inﬂuenced
directly and indirectly by policy changes. And the results of our research can
provide some insights to the policy discussion. The two determinants of corruption
we study are subject of much policy debate and discussion. In this sense, it has
been made clear that the ﬁght against corruption should be part of a broader
agenda involving the strengthening of democratisation processes and sustained
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economic growth. We will see in this research that one of the most important
democratic check and balances has a signiﬁcant deterrent eﬀect on corruption.
In particular, we suggest attention should be given to protect certain aspects of
media freedom which are strongly associated to corruption. Even if the other
democratic checks on corruption are not fully operational, there is still room for
the media to act as an eﬃcient watchdog on the government. Similarly, we will
also derive some implications regarding the eﬀects of decentralisation on corruption
and try to determine the conditions and aspects that need to be considered when
implementing decentralisation programmes and reforms. One of the implications
of our analysis is that the eﬀects of ﬁscal decentralisation on corruption are aﬀected
by the existence and extent of other dimensions of decentralisation in the economy.
1.2 Research Methodology
The literature on the determinants of corruption and development is not explicit
about which particular methodology should be applied to this question. It rather
comprises a combination of theoretical and empirical methods to explore several
related aspects. The present research follows in this line and exploits the diversity
of research techniques used in the literature.
Chapter 3 addresses the relationship between freedom of the press and corruption
using an empirical methodology that explicitly explores the issue of robustness.
This topic was ﬁrst addressed by Leamer and Leonard (1983); Leamer (1983,
1985) in a series of papers warning about the fragility of regression estimates.
The methodology derived from those papers, known as extreme bounds analysis,
was conveniently adapted by Levine and Renelt (1992) and used in the context
of cross-country growth equations. More recently, Serra (2006) implemented a
similar analysis for corruption. We use sensitivity analysis in our study of the
empirical relationship between press freedom and corruption and also introduce
some extensions to the methodology. As we describe, the mixed evidence calls
for a thorough and comprehensive approach to explore this relationship. We also
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use diﬀerent regression techniques in order to capture diﬀerent characteristics of
the data. Some of the techniques used are pooled ordinary least squares (OLS),
generalized method of moments (GMM), and ﬁxed-eﬀects panel-data estimation.
The theoretical model of corruption, decentralisation and development uses the
recent dynamic macroeconomic approaches previously applied by Blackburn et al.
(2006), Ehrlich and Lui (1999) and Mauro (2004). This class of dynamic macroe-
conomic models are able to generate multiple equilibria, an agreed characteristic
of the relationship between corruption and development and one not appropri-
ately captured with the more common microeconomic approaches. Mauro (1995)
identiﬁes the need of a more general approach that takes into account not only the
causation from corruption to development but also the reverse causation. This is
precisely what the previous studies do and what we are set to do in Chapter 4.
Our next chapter addresses the relationship between decentralisation and corrup-
tion. We use an empirical approach to deal with this topic. As we will later
analyse in more detail, there are several papers tackling the empirical relation-
ship between decentralisation and corruption [Treisman (2000), Fisman and Gatti
(2002a), Fisman and Gatti (2002b), Barenstein and de Mello (2001), Treisman
(2002b,a), Enikolopov and Zhuravskaya (2006)]. Although these papers use sim-
ilar methodologies the results and predictions they arrive at are often diﬀerent
and in some cases they are not comparable. Furthermore, in most cases the anal-
ysis of decentralisation is limited to a particular dimension and other aspects of
decentralisation are not considered. In light of the mixed evidence and several the-
oretical presumptions in both the political science and economics literature, we
believe that there are grounds to justify the inclusion of multiple dimensions of de-
centralisation in the econometric model. The theoretical literature is not explicit
about the interrelations between these diﬀerent aspects of decentralisation (i.e.
whether ﬁscal decentralisation is helped or hindered by political decentralisation).
Given this situation, we try to follow a sensible approach to dealing with these
apparent inconsistencies in the empirical literature and to explore additional and
alternative hypothesis. We explore several plausible interrelations between diﬀer-
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ent dimensions of decentralisation and analyse their relationship with bureaucratic
corruption. While our aim is not in testing robustness as in the press freedom case,
we try to be as exhaustive and comprehensive as possible in order to explain why
the existing results diverge. Additionally, we test new and more reﬁned hypotheses
in order to understand better the empirical relationship between decentralisation
and corruption.
1.3 Aims
Since our priority is to study the causes rather than the consequences of corrup-
tion, this research is aimed at making an original contribution to literature on
determinants of corruption. As already suggested and explained in more detail in
the next chapter, this strand of the literature is plagued by controversies. We set
somewhat ambitious goals which we are able to achieve to some extent. One of
these goals is to characterize the relationship between press freedom and corrup-
tion using a methodology that allows us to obtain robust results and conclusions.
Another goal is to contribute to the literature of decentralisation and corruption.
Our purpose regarding the relation between decentralisation and corruption is
three-fold. First, we aim to introduce multiple dimensions of decentralisation into
both the theoretical and empirical analysis. Second, we endeavor to explain why
the controversies in the empirical literature arise and suggest ways that contribute
to increase our understanding of the subject. Finally, we aim to ﬁll an evident gap
in the literature by modelling the relationship between corruption, decentralisation
and development in a macroeconomic setting. The next section summarises the
organisation of the thesis and the contents of each chapter.
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1.4 Structure
In the next section we review the scholarly literature on determinants of corrup-
tion placing emphasis on the main themes of this thesis. We review a number
of studies dealing with the causes of corruption and provide an assessment of the
main contributions and shortcomings in the literature. This chapter extends and
reinforces some of the points made in this Introduction. In addition to this gen-
eral literature review, we also provide a brief survey of the literature in each of
the corresponding chapters. Chapter 3 introduces our ﬁrst empirical investigation
related to the relationship between press freedom and corruption. We provide a
brief survey of the literature, explain the econometric methodology, and describe
the results drawing some policy implications. The next chapter, Chapter 4, in-
troduces a theoretical model of corruption, decentralisation and growth where we
explain why corruption is endogenous to the economy, the eﬀect of corruption on
alternative decentralisation regimes and the implications these have on economic
development. Chapter 5 presents our second empirical exploration into the re-
lationship between decentralisation and corruption. We provide a reassessment
of the empirical literature, present our hypothesis and carry out the econometric
analysis. We analyse the results and provide some discussion. Finally, Chap-
ter 6 presents the main conclusions of each chapter, an overall assessment of the
contribution of this thesis and a discussion of some avenues for future research.
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Chapter 2
A survey of the literature
2.1 Background
As Wesson (1968) notes, opportunities for corruption have existed ever since the
ﬁrst manifestations of the huge, elaborate and self-serving apparatus of the state
sprung into life as far back as the Egyptian Old Kingdom. Widespread bureau-
cratic and political corruption are often considered to have triggered the demise
of great civilizations of the past, eroding the main institutions of the res publica
and dilapidating resources, ultimately tainting the ethical and moral roots of the
society. Many autocratic and tyrannic regimes in the past kept the possibility of
corruption latent by resorting to a host of ill-advised practices and activities. In
more recent times, corruption still ranks as a major concern among national gov-
ernments, international agencies and academics. This phenomenon has been the
subject of observation and study during many centuries and it still receives much
attention. Despite this long period of study and countless attempts to eradicate or
at least control some of its eﬀects, corruption has managed to survive and perpet-
uate itself. Although its forms, extent and manifestations have changed through
the centuries, its present incidence and persistence is its deﬁning feature.
In this chapter our aim is to place the research topics of this thesis in a broader
context, stressing the relationship to diﬀerent strands of the literature. We intend
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to review these branches of the literature in order to highlight potential sensi-
tivities of our main variables of interest. In fact, there are several studies which
utilise some of the variables discussed here. To the extent that there are diﬀerent
conclusions and implications regarding the relationship between these variables
and corruption, it is important to review and acknowledge them and to describe
how we deal with these mixed predictions. Finally, we also endeavour to exam-
ine the literature in order to justify the choice of our conditioning variables. As
we see later in this chapter, of the many variables proposed as determinants of
corruption, only a small subset of these have been consistently found to have a
signiﬁcant and robust association to corruption.
Although economists and political scientists have always been concerned with
corruption, there has been a recent surge in academic interest on the topic and
particularly in the study of its relationship to development. There are several
reasons that help explain this renewed enthusiasm on the topic. Firstly, the sig-
niﬁcant growth experienced in the political economics literature has triggered an
increase in the number of studies in the economics of corruption. Secondly, the
recent experiences of many developing countries which have found corruption to
be not only an obstacle to economic development, but also a cause of political
and social distress. Thirdly, the involvement of international organizations in the
ﬁght against bad governance and corruption has also promoted new research in
this area. Fourthly, the use of new approaches and recent analytical and empirical
techniques has also contributed to improve the quality of both theoretical and
empirical research. Last but not least, the growing availability and reliability of
data has also been a major force behind this trend.
There is now a large number of studies that constitute this fast growing literature
on corruption and development. In the last 20 years researchers have studied
diﬀerent aspects of corruption and development and have produced important
theoretical and empirical contributions. Scholarly research has examined several
microeconomic aspects of corruption. For example, the topic of corruption as an
eﬃciency-enhancing element has been revisited using queuing and auction models
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to show the role of bribes as an allocative tool [Lui (1985), Beck and Maher (1986)].
Similarly, the role of eﬃciency wages in determining the mix of corruption and
talent has also been analysed [Acemoglu and Verdier (1998), Acemoglu and Verdier
(2000)]. Other research points to agency problems and government failures as
inevitably linked to bureaucratic rent-seeking and corruption [Banerjee (1997)].
Another important fertile research area is that of the industrial organisation of
corruption. It has been argued that uncoordinated (competitive) bribe taking
may cause the aggregate level of corruption to be higher than if bribe taking is
coordinated (monopolistic) [Shleifer and Vishny (1993)] or may not cause it to
be lower [Bliss and Di Tella (1997)]. Similarly, there are studies showing the
role of hierarchical structures in posing additional social costs to the economy
under certain conditions [Hillman and Katz (1997)] and in stimulating individual
incentives to accept bribes [Carbonara (1998)].
Another area that has been of research interest is that related to the political econ-
omy of decentralisation. Under certain conditions, the existence of local elections
and local interest groups may jeopardize the positive eﬀects of greater accountabil-
ity due to political decentralisation [Bardhan and Mookherjee (2000)]. Likewise,
according to some, the beneﬁts associated with federalism may crucially depend
on some form of political centralisation; otherwise opportunities for rent-seeking
and corruption are signiﬁcant at the local level [Blanchard and Shleifer (2001)].
There are several analyses of the relation between political institutions and cor-
ruption, including those related to the electoral system [Persson et al. (2003)], the
judiciary [Osborne (2002)] and media freedom [Besley and Prat (2002)]. Finally,
there are a number of macroeconomic models that analyse the joint determination
of corruption and development that predict the existence of several development
regimes [Ehrlich and Lui (1999), Mauro (2004) and Blackburn et al. (2006)].
The availability of new data has also stimulated a ﬂurry of empirical research. As
a consequence of this, there has been a sharp increase in the number of studies
dealing with particular aspects of the relationship between corruption and devel-
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opment. As discussed later most of this new research has focused on the empirical
analysis of the causes and consequences of corruption. Regarding the latter, al-
most unanimously the main ﬁnding is that bureaucratic corruption has a negative
eﬀect on economic growth [Mauro (1995), Ades and Di Tella (1999) and Treisman
(2000)]. In comparison, there is greater controversy regarding the causes of cor-
ruption. In particular, the results from this large literature often vary because of
the method applied, and the variables and data used. As this is one of the main
research themes of the thesis, I devote a great deal of attention to this strand of
the literature in this chapter.
2.2 Main strands of the literature
The study of corruption faces several problems right from the outset. One of these
is related to the deﬁnition of corruption. We have already discussed this issue in
the Introduction and deﬁned corruption as the abuse of public oﬃce for private
gain1. Another problem is related to the detection of corruption and its mea-
surement. In general, the existence of corruption is only indirectly revealed to us
via the actions of the media, whistleblowers, NGOs for instance. Admittedly, this
may give rise to inaccuracies, omissions and misleading information. Similarly, it
is quite diﬃcult to obtain reliable and representative data on the diﬀerent aspects
of corrupt transactions. Most data on corruption come from opinions, perceptions
and assessments of the level of corruption in diﬀerent regions and countries. Fi-
nally, there is the problem of comparability of any such data. Apart from the
subjective measures which are available as indexes or rankings, it is diﬃcult to
ﬁnd comparable indicators measuring diﬀerent aspects involved in these activities.
Despite these obvious limitations, there have been important developments in the
1Andvig and Fjelstad (2001)provide an excellent and comprehensive review of the literature
on corruption and also devote a section to examining diﬀerent and alternative deﬁnitions of
corruption. Bardhan (1997) also has a detailed discussion with some illustrations of the several
concepts of corruption.
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type and quality of cross-country and time-series corruption data2. Examples of
this are the various corruption rankings -based on perceptions and polls- available
elsewhere which have become standard tools of analysis. In principle, these indexes
are not able to capture the precise levels or amount of aggregate corruption, but
are nevertheless useful to trace patterns, elaborate trends and compare across
countries. The availability of these indexes allows one to take a closer look at
the problem and to identify recent patterns and trends in world corruption. For
example, the latest edition of the Global Corruption Report [TI (2006)] puts the
problem in context by stating that the trend analysis elaborated by Lambsdorﬀ is
the ﬁrst rigorous eﬀort to establish trends in the perceptions of corruption that are
based on `real' perceptions of change, and not on methodological adjustments to the
CPI itself. It ﬁnds that robust trends do emerge in nearly 30 countries, of which
about half made real improvement, while the other half deteriorated over time.
A study by the World Bank [Kaufmann et al. (2005)] using its own corruption
index (WBC) shows that while there is little evidence of a global improvement
in governance, there are dramatic improvements (declines) in certain countries.
It is also worth mentioning that while several advanced countries exhibit better
corruption ratings over time, only a few developing countries show signs of an
improvement in this trend3.
We have already acknowledged the existence of two main strands in the litera-
ture of corruption and development. One of these is related to the study of the
eﬀects and consequences that corruption pose on economic variables and more
generally on development. The other strand is concerned with the analysis of the
determinants of corruption and typically involves the consideration of economic
and non-economic factors. Essentially, it addresses a number of related questions:
what are the forces that make corruption more pervasive in Africa and Latin
America than in Western Europe? Why is bureaucratic corruption or other form
2We discuss these in more detail further below.
3Taking Lambsdorﬀ's study, the countries which show an improving trend in their corruption
ratings are: Australia, Bulgaria, Colombia, Costa Rica, Estonia, Finland, Hong Kong, Iceland,
Italy, Mexico, Russia, Spain and Taiwan. On the other hand, the countries which exhibit a
robust downward trend are Argentina, Canada, Czech Republic, Ecuador, Indonesia, Ireland,
Malaysia, Philippines, Poland, Slovenia, Turkey and Zimbabwe.
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of corruption present in almost every corner of the globe? Is it likely a society will
experience improvements in government performance as a result of policy changes
to the factors that increase corruption? Is there anything societies can do to avoid
the piercing eﬀects on the socioeconomic system of growing and expanding corrup-
tion? Although this strand of the literature has given several answers to most of
these questions, there remains many doubts regarding the direction, signiﬁcance
and robustness of these relationships.
Although this thesis is mainly concerned with the causes of corruption, it is con-
venient to make a brief summary of the literature related to the consequences
of bureaucratic corruption. Within this strand, it is possible to identify three
diﬀerent theoretical positions. First, there are the theories developed by both
economists and political scientists in the 1960's whose central idea was that bu-
reaucratic corruption may have a positive eﬀect on development. If the economy is
plagued by cumbersome and pervasive regulations then corruption may well be the
grease required to ease the activities of a rigid administration. These views, held
by Leﬀ (1964), Nye (1967), and Huntington (1968) among others, relied on cer-
tain assumptions regarding pre-existing distortions, perfectly competitive markets
and full information. These theoretical ideas were later adopted and formalized
with the introduction of strategic considerations and imperfect information in the
context of auction bidding [Beck and Maher (1986)], queuing models [Lui (1985)]
and the informal economy [Sarte (2000)]. However, Bardhan (1997) argues the
theoretical views of eﬃciency-enhancing corruption and its positive impact on de-
velopment have several problems4. Furthermore, the available empirical evidence
has consistently found that corruption has a strong negative eﬀect on develop-
ment5.
4These theories assume that the distortions corruption is supposed to correct are exogenous
but may in fact be endogenous and inherent to the system. Also, these models do not take into
consideration the eﬀect that failure to commit to the corrupt contract has on both eﬃciency and
development. Finally, these theories do not explicitly consider the role of institutional checks
and balances on the existence and incidence of corruption.
5Most notably, a study by Kaufmann and Wei (1999) using ﬁrm-level data ﬁnd that ﬁrms
paying high bribes tend to spend more time negotiating regulations than ﬁrms paying low bribes.
This ﬁnding would seem to support Myrdal's argumentation that bureaucrats may end up de-
laying procedures purposefully rather than speeding them up.
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Another view is that corruption aﬀects key economic variables and ultimately has
a negative eﬀect on economic development. Several authors, using both theoretical
and empirical approaches, have contributed to this strand. Murphy et al. (1991,
1993) have suggested that the allocation of resources (talent) to rent-seeking activ-
ities cause slower growth. Romer (1994) has also suggested that corruption viewed
as a tax on ex-post proﬁts may obstruct certain forms of investment. These the-
oretical ideas have been statistically conﬁrmed by cross-country empirical work.
For instance, Knack and Keefer (1995, 1997) and particularly Mauro (1995) en-
deavor to assess the eﬀect of bureaucratic corruption on investment and economic
growth6. The results support the theoretical view that corruption is detrimental
to economic development. The main channel of inﬂuence is through the negative
eﬀect that corruption produces on investment. Other references in the same line
and yielding rather similar results are Brunetti (1997), Hines (1995), Kaufmann
et al. (1999), Davoodi and Tanzi (1997) and Wei (1997).
In recent years, several authors have proposed that corruption not only aﬀects
development but that also the level of development may have an eﬀect on corrup-
tion. While an extension of the previous strand, this view has characterized the
relationship between corruption and development as essentially bi-directional and
endeavors to explain the incidence and persistence of corruption using dynamic
macroeconomic models. For example, Ehrlich and Lui (1999) argue that the eﬀect
of corruption on development is to be viewed as an endogenous interaction of so-
cially unproductive and growth-enhancing activities. Mauro (2004) introduces a
model with strategic complementarities leading to good and bad equilibria. Black-
burn et al. (2006) analyse the joint determination of corruption and development
and show that the level of corruption not only aﬀects but is also aﬀected by the
level of development. Aidt et al. (2005) predict the existence of multiple equi-
libria in the relationship between corruption and development when corruption
and growth are highly complementary. These theoretical predictions have been
6Knack and Keefer (1995, 1997) investigate the eﬀect of institutions on investment as well as
on economic growth. They focus especially on inadequate institutions of several types that can
be obstacles to economic performance.
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conﬁrmed by a few empirical studies that explore heterogeneity and interaction be-
tween these variables. For example, Haque and Kneller (2004) have used threshold
eﬀects and found signiﬁcant evidence of an inter-relationship between corruption,
culture and development. Similar results have been obtained by Aidt et al. (2005)
and Mendez and Sepulveda (2006). Our work in chapter 4 is aimed at extending
this literature by focusing on the joint determination of corruption and develop-
ment under regimes of centralisation and decentralisation. Using the framework
introduced by some of the theoretical models described above we aim to develop a
model of decentralisation, corruption and development and to derive implications
regarding the eﬀect and extent of institutional changes.
The second area where research on corruption has been signiﬁcant is usually re-
ferred as the literature on the determinants of corruption. The main objective
of this literature is to ﬁnd which are the relevant factors that account for cross-
country diﬀerences in corruption. Although there are a number of theoretical
works in this area, the vast majority of the studies adopt an empirical methodol-
ogy. This is probably due to several reasons. First, as we already mentioned, the
growing availability of corruption data has made possible such an analysis. Second,
while the empirical literature on the consequences of corruption is overwhelmingly
consistent with the result that corruption is harmful to development, there are
many theoretical presumptions -some complementary, some contradictory- regard-
ing the nature and importance of diﬀerent causes. Naturally, this has resulted in
a large number of empirical studies yielding often contradicting results. Finally,
it is also important to note that, both in research and policy circles, the emphasis
has gradually shifted from the study of the consequences to the examination of
the causes of corruption. This is a result of the need to provide relevant empirical
evidence to act as the basis for policy-making.
Most of the empirical studies share some common features regarding the methodol-
ogy and their use of indicators. A large number of these studies use cross-country
data in their analysis. Using panel-data in addition to cross-section would be
advantageous but there are diﬀerent obstacles to the use of such data. Another
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shared characteristic is that these studies produce several testable hypotheses on
the basis of theoretical presumptions or general theories from diﬀerent disciplines.
As a result, most of the studies adopt an ad-hoc speciﬁcation that quite often
makes results diﬃcult to compare7. Another common feature is the use of sub-
jective measures of corruption in order to proxy for the level of corruption or the
estimated perceived corruption. Several authors have discussed that hard-data
measures are scarce and they are often misleading and unreliable [Mauro (1995),
Treisman (2000)]. Although these subjective ratings may not be able to capture
the overall amount of corruption, they are, however, useful to compare countries
based on the perceptions of diﬀerent agents8.
It is important to stress that most well-known corruption indexes -the CPI, WBC
and Political Risk Services' ICRG- are actually measuring perceptions of corrup-
tion and are not intended to capture actual or experienced corruption. While the
ICRG is compiled on the basis of expert assessments, the CPI and WBC aggregate
several surveys of experts and business people. As noted in Treisman (2000), the
subjects covered by these surveys included: spread and amount of corruption in
public and private busines, the frequency of irregular, additional payments con-
nected with import and export permits, business licenses, exchange controls, tax
assessments, police protection or loan application, improper practices (such as
bribing or corruption) in the public sphere, degree of misuse of public power for
private beneﬁts and other related subjects. While Transparency International's
CPI aggregates over more than 10 diﬀerent surveys and polls, the World Bank's
WBC incorporates other sources in addition to those included in the compilation
of the CPI9. Considering the way these indexes are compiled and acknowledging
previous empirical studies, we believe that both the CPI and the WBC are best
7As we noted, there are few theoretical model exploring the causes of corruption that produce
testable implications. Some exceptions to this are Ades and Di Tella (1999), Leite and Weidmann
(1999), Ellis and Dincer (2004) and Emerson (2005) where they develop a simple theoretical
model and test the implications empirically.
8We provide a detailed explanation of these ratings in Chapter 3.
9It should be noted that the WBC does not include the CPI as a source but rather the original
sources compiled by Transparency International. Given the larger number of sources, the WBC
is available for a larger sample of countries.
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suited to capture perceptions of bureaucratic corruption10. Another strength of
both the CPI and WBC is that the surveys include opinions of residents and non-
residents and both assessments are highly correlated. Another advantage of using
either the CPI or WBC is that they include a measure of the dispersion of dif-
ferent component surveys and one can take this into account when analyzing the
ranking. One potential shortcoming of these indexes is that they change slowly
over time and this is partly due to the methodology that the score for one year is
based on data for the previous two years. This means that substantial changes in
perceptions of corruption are only likely to be reﬂected in the index over longer
periods of time.
Another reason that has been argued in favour of the use of these indexes is the
fact that these rankings are highly correlated among themselves (see Table 2.1).
To some extent, this is evidence that the perceptions of corruption, regardless of
whether they are accurate or not, are widely shared. As has been pointed out, if
the ratings used in this paper reﬂect bias, it is a bias that seems to be shared by
the populations of the countries studied [Treisman (2000), p.412]. From the table,
there is evidence of what we argued in the previous paragraph concerning the little
variation across time. The correlation between diﬀerent years of a given index are
generally very high at 0.95 and 0.83 for the CPI and the WBC respectively and
slightly smaller for the ICRG at 0.63. On the other hand, the correlations across
diﬀerent indexes are diverse. While the CPI seems to correlate highly with all
the indexes, the correlation between the WBC and the ICRG is relatively low.
Finally, the lowest correlations are those between the ICRG and BI and the other
indexes. One reason behind the high correlation between the CPI and WBC may
be due to the fact they are both compiled using similar methodologies and they
use certain common sources. As the empirical analysis in this thesis is primarily
concerned with the study of relationships using cross-sectional data, both the CPI
and the WBC are suited to this purpose and will be our main corruption indexes
10Note that although the surveys include certain aspects that may be closer to capturing
political rather than bureaucratic corruption, political corruption has diﬀerent nature and im-
plications which are not well captured by these indexes. This is one of the reasons why these
indexes have been used in previous studies as representative of perceived bureaucratic corruption.
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throughout.
Table 2.1: Correlations between diﬀerent corruption indexes
Variables cpi96 cpi00 icrg90 icrg00 wbc96 wbc00 bi80
cpi96 1.00
cpi00 0.95 1.00
(0.00)
icrg90 0.83 0.81 1.00
(0.00) (0.00)
icrg00 0.78 0.83 0.63 1.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
wbc96 0.84 0.75 0.39 0.42 1.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
wbc00 0.82 0.79 0.53 0.47 0.83 1.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
bi80 -0.86 -0.79 -0.78 -0.60 -0.57 -0.65 1.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Note: cpi is the Corruption Perception Index, icrg is the International Country Risk Guide
Corruption Index, wbc is the World Bank Control of Corruption Ranking and bi is the
Business International Corruption index.
Many potential determinants of corruption have been analysed by the empirical
literature. Economic development, religious aﬃliation, colonial history, federal-
ism, democracy, political instability, press freedom, degree of openness, and the
form of the electoral system are among these. Similarly, the scope and depth
of these empirical studies are diverse, going from those emphasizing a particular
relationship to those including a large set of variables. This thesis is primarily
concerned with the study of speciﬁc determinants of corruption rather than with
exploring which determinants of corruption are important and relevant. Knowing
that previous work has recognised the important role that both press freedom and
decentralisation have as determinants of corruption, the present research tackles
these two determinants. Given the sensitivity of many of the variables in the
current literature, this thesis focuses on the robustness of these relationships.
While there is some agreement amongst academics regarding the causes of corrup-
tion and their relative importance, there are still many open issues and unanswered
questions. There are also some discrepancies in the ﬁndings of diﬀerent authors.
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As we will discuss later in this research, these diﬀerences arise due to a variety
of reasons, including the methodology used, the variables controlled for and the
choice of the corruption indicator among others. In order to understand and justify
the empirical and theoretical strategies adopted in this research, it is convenient
to provide a brief survey of the main determinants of corruption that have been
proposed in the literature. The next section is devoted to this purpose.
2.3 Causes of corruption: The evidence
The determinants of corruption, in line with the multifaceted nature of the phe-
nomenon, are diverse and heterogeneous. The existence and extent of corruption
may be the result of a complex interaction of many diﬀerent historical, cultural,
economic, political and social factors. Naturally, these factors may have diﬀerent
incidence on corruption and they may also be responsible for its persistence. The
relevant literature has addressed a large number of these determinants and come
up with diﬀerent results. As a result of this research, several variables have been
identiﬁed as signiﬁcantly correlated with corruption. We group these into three
main types.
2.3.1 Economic-related variables
Many economic variables have been proposed as potentially related with bureau-
cratic corruption. Standard variables such as economic development, total public
spending, openness to trade, proportion of fuel and mineral exports in total ex-
ports have been used as also have other variables such as military spending, foreign
direct investment, trade distance, measures for public wages, and the amount of
foreign aid. There are in principle several reasons to believe that economic vari-
ables may cause corruption. One important reason is that certain activities or
markets are prone to an increase in rent-seeking behaviour. This is for example
the case of natural monopolies (gas, oil, telecom, etc.) where the environment
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for corruption is ripe. Another reason is that certain types of investments, ex-
penditures and payments are likely to generate opportunities for corruption. For
example, one may think of restrictions to international trade and special conces-
sions to foreign direct investment. Another example are public tenders to award
service or infrastructure contracts. Finally, it may be the case that poor soci-
eties, with low levels of infrastructure, literacy and health care, are more likely to
experience high levels of corruption.
Economic development
Perhaps the most robust empirical ﬁnding is that of the strong association between
economic development and corruption. Higher levels of economic development
are correlated with improvements in many economic, structural and institutional
aspects of a society, which are in turn correlated with lower corruption. For
example, it is generally accepted that public infrastructure increases in quantity
and quality with economic development. This in turn reduces the margin for
corruption and illegal behaviour. According to the economic theory of institutions,
economic development also involves a gradual vanishing of traditional relations
between the agents and organizations. With the establishment of a new set of
institutions and relations the incentives for public oﬃcials to engage in corrupt
practices may be reduced.
The expected negative correlation between economic development has been doc-
umented by empirical research. Most studies on the determinants of corruption
include economic development as an independent variable. Although the pur-
pose of some studies may be to focus on determinants other than development,
they typically include some proxy of economic development, most commonly GDP
per capita. The results for this variable are quite consistent: Ades and Di Tella
(1999), La Porta et al. (1997, 1999), Treisman (2000), Fisman and Gatti (2002a)
and Persson et al. (2003) all ﬁnd a strong negative correlation between corruption
and development, meaning that low-income countries are associated with high cor-
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ruption levels. The same result is replicated by other studies [Goldsmith (1999),
Rauch and Evans (2000), Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2001), Adsera et al. (2003),
Tavares (2003), Graeﬀ and Mehlkop (2003), Brunetti and Weder (2003), Broad-
man and Recanatini (2002), Serra (2006)], although the size of the coeﬃcient for
economic development is signiﬁcantly smaller. Only a few studies in the liter-
ature question or contradict these results [Braun and Di Tella (2004), Fréchette
(2004)] arguing that income increases corruption specially when using ﬁxed-eﬀects
models11.
In almost all cases, the inclusion (exclusion) of economic development increases
(decreases) the explanatory power of the pertinent regressions. The size of the re-
gression coeﬃcient varies between the studies and also due to diﬀerent corruption
indexes used. For example, using Transparency International (hereafter TI) in-
dex, the coeﬃcient ranges from -0.4 to almost -4. Another characteristic of these
studies is that, in general, when included as the only explanatory variable, the
level of development explains from 50% to 70% of the variability in corruption
across countries (depending on whether Business International or Transparency
International index is used).
More diﬃcult has been establishing the direction of causation between economic
development and corruption. In order to control for potential endogeneity most
authors perform some tests to limit this possibility. Using a suitable instrumen-
tal variable (distance from the Equator) to deal with the endogeneity problem,
Treisman (2000) claims that higher levels of economic development result in lower
levels of perceived corruption. A similar strong negative correlation between eco-
nomic development and corruption is obtained by La Porta et al. (1999). Ades
and Di Tella (1999) recognize the fact that the relation also ﬂows in the opposite
direction, perceiving economic performance itself as being aﬀected by the quality
of institutions. Serra (2006) and Seldadyo and de Haan (2005, 2006) introduce
11See Seldadyo and de Haan (2006) for a very detailed and comprehensive literature survey on
the causes of corruption. The authors cite a larger number of papers than we have here. With
very small diﬀerences, the qualitative results are the same and the quantitative results are very
similar.
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robust methodologies to control for sensitivity of the regression estimates to al-
terations in the information set. While Serra (2006) and Seldadyo and de Haan
(2005) ﬁnd strong evidence that economic development is robustly associated with
lower corruption12, Seldadyo and de Haan (2006) in contrast ﬁnd that only certain
proxies of economic development -primary school enrolment and illiteracy rate- are
robustly correlated with corruption. Somewhat surprisingly, the sign of the coeﬃ-
cient on illiteracy rate suggests that this variable is counterintuitive, meaning that
high illiteracy rates are associated to low corruption. Although the authors do not
elaborate on this result, it contradicts the ﬁndings in the empirical literature.
Summing up this literature, it appears that low development is signiﬁcantly and
strongly associated with high corruption. Indeed, according to the evidence, de-
velopment appears to be the single most important factor associated with bu-
reaucratic corruption. On the other hand, the literature is less clear regarding
the direction of causation. Does economic development reduce corruption levels
or is it that lower corruption promotes development or both? Although research
regarding this point is relatively new, the empirical side of the question has yet to
provide an answer to the endogeneity problem13.
Other economic variables
Some theoretical arguments have suggested that trade-related variables may have
an eﬀect on perceived corruption. For example, there are certain reasons to expect
a negative correlation between the degree of openness of a country and its corrup-
tion rating. Exposing the country to foreign competition is generally followed by
a decrease in the opportunities for rent-seeking. This is so because trade restric-
tions (i.e. import licenses) may foster bribe-taking and rent-seeking behaviour
[Krueger (1974)]. Other sources of variability in corruption levels across countries
have been suggested and include diﬀerent endowments of valuable raw materials,
12The coeﬃcients in her study range from -0.83 to -2.0 for all the regressions calculated.
13Contrarily, some recent theoretical studies propose the existence of a bi-directional relation-
ship between corruption and development. We have already mentioned a few studies and we will
return to them later in this chapter.
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the distance to the main exporting centers and diﬀerences in FDI ﬂows14.
The results presented in Ades and Di Tella (1999) suggest that certain trade
variables are signiﬁcantly associated with corruption. In particular, they ﬁnd
that greater openness and higher import share are signiﬁcantly associated with
lower corruption levels. Other studies have obtained the same qualitative ﬁnding
[Treisman (2000), Fréchette (2004), Persson et al. (2003) and Herzfeld and Weiss
(2003)].
In comparison, little or no signiﬁcant association between these variables is re-
ported in Treisman (2000), Fisman and Gatti (2002a), Adsera et al. (2003), Broad-
man and Recanatini (2002), Brunetti and Weder (2003) and Serra (2006). Interest-
ingly, Wei (2000) and Gatti (1999) ﬁnd evidence (albeit rather weak) that greater
openness not only causes corruption to decrease but is also a consequence of lower
corruption. Similarly, countries with a high export share of raw materials such as
minerals, fuels and metal, are found to have higher corruption levels [Herzfeld and
Weiss (2003), Tavares (2003), Adsera et al. (2003), Fréchette (2004) and Seldadyo
and de Haan (2006)] while other authors found an insigniﬁcant or very small eﬀect
[Treisman (2000), Serra (2006)]. Finally, there is mixed evidence regarding the as-
sociation between foreign aid and corruption. While Tavares (2003) ﬁnds that
increases in aid help to reduce corruption, Ali and Isse (2003) show the opposite
result. It is important to note that in several cases the signiﬁcant relationship
tend to disappear when other variables are included in the regression, most no-
tably economic development. This is mainly due to the high correlation between
economic development and most of the trade variables.
Certain characteristics of the public sector may be important in the explanation
of the diﬀerences in corruption across countries. After all, bureaucratic corruption
may be inﬂuenced not only by bureaucratic structures but also by more general
14Ades and Di Tella (1999) have suggested that the larger the endowment of these materials,
the greater the potential gain to public oﬃcials in charge of allocating the rights of exploitation.
In relation to geographical conditions, they argue that if there is a big enough trade distance to
the world leading exporters, local ﬁrms may beneﬁt from this `protection' in terms of transport
costs. If this is the case, it is reasonable to expect more rent-seeking activities in countries
enjoying this type of cost advantage.
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features of the government. One obvious factor to consider is the relative size of
the government. It is reasonable to think that the larger the relative size of the
public sector the larger the likelihood that corruption will appear. On the other
hand, it has been suggested that larger governments may have associated higher
public wages which, in turn, will lower the incentive to take bribes.
The lack of consensus regarding the predicted eﬀect of government size on corrup-
tion is also reproduced at the empirical level. While Fisman and Gatti (2002a)
and Adsera et al. (2003) report a signiﬁcant negative relationship (larger gov-
ernments are associated to better governance), Goel and Nelson (1998) and Ali
and Isse (2003) report that higher public spending is associated to higher corrup-
tion. Corruption levels may be also inﬂuenced by the structure and level of public
wages. The intuition for this is straightforward: ceteris paribus the incentive to
get involved in corrupt activities should be smaller the higher the wages paid to
public servants as the opportunity cost of corruption increases [Becker and Stigler
(1974), Ul Haque and Sahay (1996)].
How well has this prediction fared in empirical research? Most of the empirical
studies investigating this relation have failed to ﬁnd any signiﬁcant association
between the variables [La Porta et al. (1999), Treisman (2000), Rauch and Evans
(2000), Van Rijckeghem andWeder (2001) and Serra (2006)]15. Along similar lines,
Rauch and Evans (2000) also ﬁnds that recruitment along meritocratic principles
leads to improved bureaucratic performance. Other eﬀects such as the presence of
internal promotions and career stability have only marginal eﬀects on corruption.
Others have focused on particular types of public spending. One such component is
that related to spending on military and defense activities. Again, the hypothesis
is often contradictory since some argue that certain categories of military spending
15While the ﬁrst two papers use the ratio of average wages of central government to per
capita GDP, Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2001) opt for the ratio of public sector wages to
wages in the manufacturing sector. Although the coeﬃcients have the predicted negative sign,
meaning that higher wages are associated to less corruption, the poor performance in terms of
statistical signiﬁcance is notorious. This result has been attributed to problems of endogeneity
of the independent variable. As Treisman (2000) notes, if corrupt politicians allocate themselves
higher wages, then this could be blurring the expected negative relation
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are highly open to corrupt practices [Hines (1995)], whereas others consider the
possibility that governments are the only providers of military and defense services
and this may encourage rent-seeking activities [Gupta et al. (2001)]. Additionally,
one may argue that defense and military spending, unlike many other types of
public spending, is often surrounded by a veil of secrecy. Gupta et al. (2001)
test the hypothesis and they ﬁnd a positive association between corruption and
military spending. In a more general approach Mauro (1998) investigates the
relation between corruption and the composition of public spending and ﬁnds no
evidence of a signiﬁcant relationship.
Finally, a number of diﬀerent socio-economic factors have been also proposed as
potential determinants of corruption. These have included human capital [Van Ri-
jckeghem and Weder (2001) and Ahrend (2002)]; educational indicators [Persson
et al. (2003), Ahrend (2002), Seldadyo and de Haan (2006)]16; economic freedom
[Goldsmith (1999) and Treisman (2000)]; and demography [Swamy et al. (2001),
Tavares (2003), Fisman and Gatti (2002a), Persson et al. (2003) and Freille et al.
(forthcoming)].
2.3.2 Political variables
Diﬀerent political and institutional arrangements may be important when it comes
to explaining the diﬀerences in corruption levels. This issue has been tackled by
researchers who have produced contributions at both the theoretical and empir-
ical level. Again we identify two main strands: democracy and decentralisation.
A key point that is often stressed in both of these literatures is that many of
these diﬀerent political and institutional determinants observed may be the result
of pre-existent corruption conditions. In other words, the analysis of the polit-
ical determinants of corruption is made more diﬃcult by the likely existence of
endogeneity problems.
16Fréchette (2004) obtains a stark counterintuitive result for this relationship since improve-
ments in schooling seem to be associated to improvements in corruption. We argued earlier this
same counterintuitive result had been obtained by Seldadyo and de Haan (2006)
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Democracy and corruption
Political institutions shape the conditions under which the economic activity takes
place. A particular dimension of these arrangements is the characteristics of the
political system. There are several reasons to think that countries where demo-
cratic and open political systems prevail, are likely to experience lower corrup-
tion17. If democracy is in practice associated with the existence of more trans-
parency and checks and balances on the chief executive, then it is reasonable to
think that these institutions may contribute to curb corruption. Likewise, thriv-
ing democratic conditions represent institutional safeguards of basic political and
civil rights. Furthermore, citizens may become more involved in the political pro-
cess and therefore exercise a closer monitoring and control on the government. In
addition, freedom of the media and an independent judiciary may help to keep a
strong check on government corruption. In systems with free and periodic elec-
tions, people may vote out corrupt incumbents and rival politicians may also be
encouraged to ﬁnd evidence against them [Andvig and Fjelstad (2001)]. These the-
oretical relationships between democratic institutions and corruption have been
explored by several authors in the context of the political science literature [May-
hew (1986), Graber (1986), Friedrich (1989), Wittman (1989), Przeworski (1995),
Lijphart (1999), McMillan and Zoido (2004)] and also in the more recent polit-
ical economics and corruption literature [Myerson (1993), Persson and Tabellini
(2000), Treisman (2000), Persson et al. (2003), Adsera et al. (2003), Kunicova and
Mattes (2006)]
The description of democracy associated with lower corruption is again not a
universal opinion. For example, Rivera-Batiz and Rivera-Batiz (2002) note that
under certain conditions democracy may be a potential source of government mis-
conduct and ineﬃciency. In particular they refer to the proliferation of interest
17There are also some ideas suggesting that controlled authoritarian systems may be asso-
ciated to low corruption levels. The main intuition behind these theories is that the rulers have
strict control over the politics and the economy implying a control over corruption. This is in
line with the ideas suggesting that coordinated corruption is less detrimental than uncoordinated
corruption.
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groups and their inﬂuence in government decisions. Other authors have suggested
that corruption may actually be encouraged by enhanced electoral competition
through raising campaign funds, promising biased political measures, etc. [Ged-
des (1999), Goldsmith (1999)]. Barro (1996) has also recognised that democracies
have inherent growth-retarding and rent-seeking features.
Empirical research produces a more robust result than its theoretical counterpart.
Overwhelmingly, empirical studies conclude that democratic features in a coun-
try are associated with lower levels of corruption18. Treisman (2000) for example
reports a signiﬁcant negative association between exposure to democracy and cor-
ruption, implying that long-standing democratic institutions are associated with
better governance. Knack and Omar Azfar (2003), Chowdhury (2004), Fréchette
(2004), and Serra (2006) all ﬁnd the same negative relationship and importantly
that this is robust to additional tests and alternative speciﬁcations.
However, while Paldam (2002), Goldsmith (1999), Fisman and Gatti (2002a),
and Adsera et al. (2003) ﬁnd evidence of a negative relationship, they show the
eﬀect is quite sensitive to the inclusion of other important variables. Somewhat
surprisingly, Ades and Di Tella (1999) have reported a positive correlation between
the lack of political rights and good governance, although they note it may be due
to the existence of several outliers19.
Checks and balances
To some extent, researchers have tried to incorporate and control for diﬀerent
democratic institutions in their relationship to bureaucratic corruption. Rather
18One aspect that has been subject of debate is what proxies are best suited to capture the
level of democracy or the existence and extent of democratic conditions. The literature has
seen the use of many diﬀerent variables such as dummies, democracy indexes and proxies for
the number of years that countries have been democracies. One sensible approach is to use a
country's exposure to democratic conditions. By using this variable, Treisman (2000) argues,
one is able to capture better the idea that democracies produce not only short but also long-term
important eﬀects on the country.
19The large majority of these studies use either a democracy index or a dummy controlling
for the persistence of democracy. In other cases, authors use other measures as proxies for
democratic conditions such as a dummy for democratic countries.
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than using an aggregate democracy indicator, these studies focus on particular fea-
tures of the democratic system of government. This is important since as McMillan
and Zoido (2004) correctly argue that, for a democracy to work eﬃciently, all the
checks and balances should work. Among these, we can mention the electoral
system, political competition, an independent judiciary and a free media. Accord-
ingly, a great deal of the empirical work on political institutions and corruption is
concerned with the examination of these issues.
Electoral system. One ﬁeld where there has been much interest is that related
to the relationship between corruption and the characteristics of the electoral sys-
tem20. Myerson (1993) formalized the idea that in electoral systems with low
barriers to entry, citizens are more able to control and make corrupt incumbents
accountable. Given that barriers to entry are higher in single-member districts,
these models predicted that larger electoral districts and lower thresholds for rep-
resentation should be associated with lower corruption. Persson and Tabellini
(2000) and Kunicova and Rose-Ackerman (2005) also introduce a distinction be-
tween plurality systems and proportional representation systems. Their analysis
suggests that corruption incentives should be more signiﬁcant in proportional rep-
resentation (party lists) systems where an incumbent's probability of reelection is
less linked to performance.
The main empirical contribution to test the relationship between characteristics
of the electoral system and corruption is the paper by Persson et al. (2003). They
use speciﬁc data for these electoral indicators and also include a measure of basic
political rights as a proxy for the existence and extent of democracy. They ﬁnd
signiﬁcant evidence that voting over party lists is associated with higher corrup-
tion levels. They ﬁnd no signiﬁcant evidence of a negative association between
district magnitude and corruption. Another ﬁnding is that countries with majori-
tarian electoral systems are less corruption-prone than countries with proportional
representation. According to their study, endogeneity should not pose a problem
20See Cox (1997) for an overview of the characteristics of diﬀerent electoral systems.
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for both party list and district magnitude, given that electoral reforms are few
and far between.
Independent judiciary. Another important democratic control is the existence
of an independent judiciary. Even if democracy is a long-standing institution and
other checks and balances are operating, it is possible that the judiciary is con-
trolled by the chief executive or by the legislative and in these conditions it may
not fulﬁll one of its roles as a balance on government activity. Salzberger (1993)
notes the existence of a view of separation of powers and portraying the judiciary
as one mechanism that operates to balance and control the legislative and execu-
tive branch, and hence as an obstacle to rent-seeking activity and interest-group
legislation [Salzberger (1993), p.350]. This issue has received relatively less at-
tention in recent years but there are two studies that explore this relationship to
some extent. La Porta et al. (2004) have analysed the judicial checks and balances
in great detail. Although they have not directly analysed their relationship with
corruption, they ﬁnd that judicial independence is signiﬁcantly and positively as-
sociated with economic and political freedom. The only paper that has explored
the relationship between corruption and judicial checks and balances is Alt and
Lassen (2005). Using data on American state governments, they ﬁnd that lower
corruption is associated with greater judicial independence, as proxied by the exis-
tence of elected, rather than appointed state supreme court judges. Additionally,
they ﬁnd evidence that this eﬀect is stronger if the government cannot control
itself21. Although these recent studies suggest that the judiciary may be an im-
portant check on government corruption, it may be advisable to remain prudent
regarding this relationship22.
21This is the case when the executive and legislative are controlled by the same party. When
the executive and legislative are controlled by diﬀerent parties, then the government can control
itself and therefore the role of the judiciary should be less important
22There are several nuances that may be incorporated to this analysis blurring the predicted
relationship. For example, there are diﬀerent procedures to elect judges, there may be diﬀerent
implications concerning the retribution and pay schemes to judges and ﬁnally, there are likely
to exist certain constitutional subterfuges and other provisions to bypass judicial decisions.
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Political instability. Healthy democracies are generally associated with more
political stability. Several authors have noted that political instability, which is of-
ten signiﬁcant not only in authoritarian regimes but also in new and recent democ-
racies, may be associated with higher corruption. This is the view of Treisman
(2000) and Persson et al. (2003) who argue that bureaucrats may be more induced
to engage in rent-seeking and corruption in a politically unstable environment. On
the other hand, Fredriksson and Svensson (2003) have argued that the net eﬀect
of political instability on corruption depends on the overall level of corruption.
The issue has been investigated empirically and the evidence seems to support the
idea that political instability and corruption are positively associated23. Despite
the theoretical insights, most authors have not found evidence of a signiﬁcant pos-
itive relationship between these variables. This is the case of Treisman (2000) and
Persson et al. (2003) who ﬁnd an expected positive but insigniﬁcant coeﬃcient.
Only Adsera et al. (2003) ﬁnd signiﬁcant evidence of a positive relationship. The
studies concerned with sensitivity analysis of the causes of corruption have ob-
tained mixed evidence. While Serra (2006) concludes that corruption is higher
in politically unstable countries, Seldadyo and de Haan (2005, 2006) do not ﬁnd
political instability to be a robust determinant. This mixed evidence may be due
to the use of diﬀerent proxies, to the inclusion of highly correlated democratic
controls in the speciﬁcations and to the use of a diﬀerent set of control variables.
Freedom of the press. In the opening paragraph to Chapter 2 of his treaty On
Liberty, John Stuart Mill wrote that the time, it is to be hoped, is gone by when
any defence would be necessary of the `liberty of the press' as one of the securi-
ties against corrupt or tyrannical government24. The existence of a free press as
a check against government activity is one of the centerpieces of the democratic
system. The theoretical reasons for expecting a free press to be a check on misgov-
23One of the usual measures used to proxy for political instability is the ratio of the number
of government leaders in a recent period in relation to the length of this period. Depending on
diﬀerent political regimes, the deﬁnition of leader varies accordingly. For instance, the prime
minister is deﬁned as such in parliamentary systems; the president is the leader in presidential
systems and the head of state or ruler in non-democratic systems.
24Mill (1998), p. 20
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ernance and corruption are straightforward. Countries where freedom of press and
speech are not only enshrined in the Constitution but also eﬀectively fulﬁlled are
expected to exert an important control on their oﬃcials and bureaucrats. Broadly
speaking, the media perform two types of activities: news reporting and investiga-
tive journalism. The media (or at least some sectors) will undertake investigations
with the aim of unveiling corruption and illicit acts of public oﬃcials. Brunetti
and Weder (2003) argue that a free press can be a mechanism to ﬁght both ex-
tortive and collusive corruption25. Independent journalism will always be willing
to investigate and expose any kind of oﬀences26. More recently, a few papers have
echoed the views of Graber (1986) and argued that the role of press freedom as
a watchdog on government corruption may be limited or restrained under certain
conditions [Besley and Burgess (2002), Besley and Prat (2002), Hillman (2003)
and Vaidya (2005)]. In light of these developments, it should be clear that, al-
though there are grounds to expect a negative relationship between press freedom
and corruption, there may be particular aspects that introduce some uncertainty
about the sign of the predicted association.
We provide a more detailed revision of the empirical literature in our analysis
of the relationship between press freedom and corruption in Chapter 3. For the
moment, we note that although most studies ﬁnd an expected negative correlation
between press freedom and corruption, this relationship appears to be sensitive to
diﬀerent speciﬁcations and indicators used in the analysis. Our study in Chapter
25The case for extortive corruption is very clear since both parties involved have diﬀerent
bargaining power. Governments with discretionary power can exert several types of inﬂuences
on various types of agent in order to collect bribes and other special payments. The case for
licenses and permits are examples of this type of corruption, where the oﬃcials can extract
payments from the contractors depending on the pervasiveness and extent of the corruption
networks. On the other hand, ﬁrms and contractors can threaten to reveal the aﬀair to the press
and therefore the probability of being detected increases. The existence of free and independent
media could therefore act as a channel available to private contractors or ﬁrms in order to expose
inappropriate behaviour. Collusive corruption presents diﬀerent incentives, because both parties
have a mutual interest in the bargaining. The incentive to investigate in this case does not stem
from the abused agent but from the independent involvement of the media. The authors even
suggest that a free press is probably the most eﬀective institution to control collusive corruption
[Brunetti and Weder (2003), p. 1805].
26In their paper, they rule out the possibility that all the media and independent journalists
become involved in a sort of cartel that is paid by bureaucrats in order to conceal their illicit
activities. For anecdotal evidence regarding the rare occurrence of this situation see McMillan
and Zoido (2004).
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3 is aimed at making a contribution to this ﬁeld by testing this relationship for
robustness focusing primarily on press freedom and by analyzing the relationship
between diﬀerent aspects of press freedom and corruption. We provide several
strong tests for the robustness of the eﬀect of press freedom on corruption which
diﬀer signiﬁcantly from the tests found in the current literature. Moreover, we
add detail, as well as information on robustness and causation to that literature.
Decentralisation and corruption
Is decentralisation associated with more or less corruption? This question has
no clear answer either at the theoretical or empirical level. Decentralisation is a
multifaceted concept and any analysis of the relationship between these variables
should recognise the existence of diﬀerent dimensions of decentralisation. In this
section we provide a brief review of the theoretical background, the empirical
evidence and the conﬂicts existing in the literature. The objective is to place
our research topics within the relevant literature. We include a speciﬁc and more
detailed survey of the literature in chapters 4 and 5
The theoretical underpinnings lying behind the relation between decentralisa-
tion and corruption are diverse. The early theories of Samuelson, Musgrave and
Tiebout later formalized by Oates (1972) gave form to the ﬁscal federalism lit-
erature which predicted signiﬁcant eﬃciency eﬀects of decentralisation on public
service delivery. These ideas were reinforced by similar views which regarded
centralised power as creating opportunities for corruption to arise and thrive [Kl-
itgaard (1988), Weingast (1995), and Goldsmith (1999)]. It was argued that inter-
jurisdictional competition would curb the opportunities for corrupt behaviour. On
the other hand, some authors introduced political economy considerations to the
analysis and warned about the overall eﬀects of decentralisation [Banﬁeld (1975),
Prud'homme (1994), and Shleifer and Vishny (1993)]. Some of these ideas are
based on arguments of capture of local oﬃcials [Bardhan and Mookherjee (2000)],
information asymmetries [Aghion and Tirole (1997), Carbonara (1998)], yardstick
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competition [Besley and Case (1995), Ellis and Dincer (2004)], interjurisdictional
competition [Cai and Treisman (2004)] and uncoordinated bribe-taking [Shleifer
and Vishny (1993), Waller et al. (2002)]27. Despite this large literature on the
relationship between decentralisation and corruption, there is a surprising lack of
macroeconomic approaches that address this relationship.
The empirical literature on this topic has been very active in recent years al-
though there are limitations in the availability and reliability of data. One im-
portant aspect to consider here is what dimensions of decentralisation should be
considered in the econometric model. As we mentioned, there are several aspects
of decentralisation and they may have diﬀerent eﬀect on corruption. In general,
the empirical literature has focused on ﬁscal decentralisation [Fisman and Gatti
(2002a), Fisman and Gatti (2002b), Barenstein and de Mello (2001)]. The main
ﬁnding is that ﬁscal decentralisation is associated to lower corruption. Other stud-
ies [Goldsmith (1999), Treisman (2000), Adsera et al. (2003), Wu (2005) and Serra
(2006)] have used a federalism dummy instead28, obtaining opposing results for
the eﬀect of federalism on corruption. More recently, there have been attempts to
include and control for other aspects of decentralisation testing for the interrela-
tions between these aspects [Barenstein and de Mello (2001), Treisman (2002b,a),
and Enikolopov and Zhuravskaya (2006)]. For instance, Barenstein and de Mello
(2001) ﬁnd that corruption is aﬀected by the way in which sub-national expen-
ditures are ﬁnanced. Enikolopov and Zhuravskaya (2006) ﬁnd support for some
long-standing theories of political centralisation.
As many authors point out, the fact that very few comprehensive empirical studies
on decentralisation exist advise against drawing strong conclusions about the spe-
27There are several other references analyzing the relationship between decentralisation and
corruption from a theoretical perspective although they do not explicitly introduce welfare or
growth considerations. See for instance Besley and Case (1995), Canavese (2004), and Ellis and
Dincer (2004).
28The deﬁning line between federal and non-federal states has been subject to a big debate
among political scientists. There is agreement, however, that federal states have some primary
deﬁning characteristics. Among these are the existence of an agreed division of power between
diﬀerent tiers of government and the fact that the diﬀerent levels of government rule over the
same citizens but have some degree of autonomy over certain and exclusive areas.
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ciﬁc and overall eﬀects of decentralisation29. After all, both recent cross-country
evidence and case studies produce mixed evidence. However, the idea that the po-
litical and administrative dimensions of decentralisation may aﬀect the outcome
of ﬁscal decentralisation seems to have gained acceptance among researchers and
needs to be incorporated in both theoretical and empirical modelling. In a similar
fashion, the suggestion that decentralisation is associated with higher corruption
should be seriously addressed considering the eﬀect this may have on economic
development. Our analysis in chapters 4 and 5 is meant to capture these ideas
and contribute to this recent research literature.
2.3.3 Other determinants: cultural, geographical and his-
torical
Researchers have also suggested the potential eﬀect of religious traditions, geo-
graphical conditions, historical institutions and other cultural factors on bureau-
cratic corruption. For example, interpersonal relations and trust among citizens
may be very diﬀerent among countries with diﬀerent colonial history. Similarly,
diﬀerent traditions in legal matters probably shape the way the law is created and
administered. The role of diﬀerent religious aﬃliations has also been suggested
as a potential determinant of corruption. The empirical literature has addressed
these issues to some extent and a large number of diﬀerent cultural, geographical
and historical factors have been tested as potential determinants of corruption.
These have included ethnolinguistic fractionalisation [La Porta et al. (1999), Led-
erman et al. (2005), Persson et al. (2003), Ali and Isse (2003)]; protestant religion
[La Porta et al. (1999), Treisman (2000), Adsera et al. (2003), Persson et al.
(2003)]; colonial history [La Porta et al. (1999), Treisman (2000), Persson et al.
29Several case studies analyzing the impact of speciﬁc decentralisation programmes ﬁnd evi-
dence of a positive relation between these programmes and certain eﬃciency and welfare indi-
cators. Bardhan (2002) surveys some interesting studies most of which reveal positive eﬀects of
decentralisation programmes targeting speciﬁc goals on eﬃciency and welfare. Fjelstad (2004)
also reviews available empirical evidence and several case studies where the focus is on the ef-
fects of decentralisation on corruption. In any case, although the authors recognise the important
conclusions of these studies, one should not be tempted to draw general implications.
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(2003), Herzfeld and Weiss (2003)]; and legal origin [Gatti (1999), La Porta et al.
(1999) and Fisman and Gatti (2002a)]. The evidence for all these variables is
mixed and the eﬀect of most of these factors on corruption is quite sensitive to
the other variables included in the regression equation.
2.4 Concluding remarks
The empirical literature on the determinants of corruption is quite large and of-
fers mixed predictions. To some extent this is a consequence of the existence a
variety of ways in which the relationship between corruption and its determinants
is modelled. Additionally, this may be due to the variables being very sensitive
to the inclusion of other important determinants and to the possible omission of
strong tests of robustness of the estimates. In the presence of model uncertainty, it
becomes important to use sensible approaches to modelling the empirical relation-
ships. One such approach proposed in the literature is known as extreme bounds
analysis [Leamer (1983, 1985)]. This analysis is one way of addressing model un-
certainty in the context of multiple regression and, as noted by Temple (2000),
can be carefully presented to address the most common objections made in the
past. We use this analysis in our investigation of press freedom and corruption.
It seems appropriate to provide a summary and assessment of the main ﬁndings
of the empirical literature. In order to do this, we focus on the ﬁndings obtained
by four comprehensive and detailed studies [Treisman (2000), Serra (2006), Sel-
dadyo and de Haan (2005, 2006)]. While Treisman (2000) does not provide a
global sensitivity analysis of the estimates (unlike the other papers), his investiga-
tion is quite relevant and introduces several important robustness tests. All these
studies ﬁnd that economic development is a robust determinant of corruption.
Furthermore, all the papers ﬁnd evidence that democracy is robustly associated
with lower corruption. While Treisman (2000) and Serra (2006) ﬁnd that long-
standing democratic traditions is a robust determinant of corruption, it is certain
democratic institutions such as political freedom and the judiciary system [Sel-
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dadyo and de Haan (2005)] and political stability [Seldadyo and de Haan (2006)]
that are robustly associated with lower corruption in the other papers. In relation
to other important determinants, these studies obtain mixed evidence. Protes-
tant religion is robust according to Treisman (2000) and Serra (2006) but does
not pass the robustness tests in Seldadyo and de Haan (2005) and Seldadyo and
de Haan (2006). A measure of freedom of information is robust only in Seldadyo
and de Haan (2005). Measures of decentralisation are not rendered robust in
any of these studies30. Finally, while both Treisman (2000) and Serra (2006) ﬁnd
that colonial heritage is robustly associated with corruption, this variable has not
been rendered robust in Seldadyo and de Haan (2005) and Seldadyo and de Haan
(2006).
In light of this evidence, it appears that only two variables have been consistently
found as signiﬁcant and robust determinants of corruption: economic development
and democratic institutions and traditions. Our work in Chapter 3 and Chapter
5 takes these ﬁndings into account and incorporates a measure of these variables
into the regression equation. We believe this is a sensible way of approaching the
study of the relationship between corruption and its determinants. In each of these
chapters the relationship between our main variables (press freedom and decen-
tralisation) and corruption is modelled considering the strong evidence in favour
of the inclusion of economic development and democracy as standard controls in
the corruption equations.
30Treisman (2000) does ﬁnd a positive association between federalism and corruption which
has not been supported by the studies of robustness.
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Chapter 3
A contribution to the empirics of
press freedom and corruption
Were it left to me to decide whether we should have a government without
newspapers, or newspapers without a government, I should not hesitate a
moment to prefer the latter (Thomas Jeﬀerson)
3.1 Introduction
The decision to participate in corruption, like any crime, depends upon a combi-
nation of the size of the payoﬀ received, the probability of detection and the size
of any punishment upon being caught. A commonly held belief is that a free and
independent press can, along with other agencies, form an important part of the
detection process and therefore act as a deterrent to corruption. This view has
found support in a few recent papers that consider the relationship between aggre-
gate press freedom and corruption. Ahrend (2002), Stapenhurst (2000) and Peters
(2003) all discuss the essential role of the (free) press in monitoring, reporting and
denouncing oﬃcial abuses for example. While using regression analysis Ahrend
(2002), Brunetti and Weder (2003) and Chowdhury (2004) ﬁnd that low levels of
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freedom of the press are associated with high levels of corruption, controlling for
other important determinants of corruption.
While most accept that the press plays a role in detecting corruption, there are
reasons to suggest that its eﬀectiveness may be overstated however. Graber (1986),
for example, notes that press freedom carries both beneﬁts and costs and the com-
mon belief that the net eﬀect is positive does not survive deeper analysis. As she
writes close examination of several recent instances of press sleuthing with widely
heralded payoﬀs indicates that the media often deserve less credit than previously
believed for detecting public wrongdoing and fostering correction [Graber (1986),
p. 271]. Similar concerns are described in Pharr and Putnam (2000) regarding
the ephemeral nature of public reaction to reports of corruption. Or, using a
game theoretic approach to allow for collusion between the press and government
Vaidya (2005) ﬁnds that the potential beneﬁcial eﬀects of press freedom on cor-
ruption are reduced. This may be because the media may orchestrate and release
false campaigns and accusations against the government if these stories are likely
to capture public attention and increase sales. Or as importantly, journalists and
the press may themselves be corrupted and choose not to report their evidence1.
Alternatively it is also likely that the eﬀect of press freedom on corruption simply
picks up wealth eﬀects and the institutional environment more generally. Rich
countries can aﬀord a free press and are likely to be liberal across a wide range of
activities not just media activities. Similarly, the detection of corrupt activities
is likely to be a function of monitoring spending by the government, quality of
governance, greater competition, the salaries paid to bureaucrats, the quality of
the legal system, and democracy, all of which are directly or indirectly related to
the level of development.
Finally, there are also a great number of very diﬀerent ways in which the media
are controlled across countries and which may lead to very diﬀerent outcomes
1[Peters (2003), p.52] oﬀers an accurate description of this problem when stating that 
Corruption also exists within the structure of media organizations and in the way journalist
carry out their reporting tasks. Many engage in a host of corrupt practices, ranging from
'chequebook journalism' to news tailored to suit advertising or commercial needs.
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for corruption. Restrictive legislation, threats, physical harassment, verbal abuse,
ﬁnancial extortion, censorship, media concentration, intimidation, violent assaults,
high entry costs and access restrictions to the media market are some of the most
common restrictions to press freedom. The following story about the ordeal of a
journalist from Kazakhstan illustrates some of these restrictions to media freedom:
Irina Petrushova, founder and editor-in-chief of the Almaty-based op-
position newspaper Respublika and winner of CPJ's 2002 International
Press Freedom Award, endured a sustained campaign of harassment for
her reporting on government corruption and criticism of oﬃcials. The
newspaper was forced to change its printer numerous times after gov-
ernment oﬃcials intimidated printing companies into cutting oﬀ their
services to the publication. On May 19, Respublika staﬀ found a de-
capitated dog's corpse hanging from an oﬃce window with an attached
note that read: There won't be a next time. Three days later, as-
sailants threw Molotov cocktails into the oﬃce, destroying much of the
building and technical equipment. The courts, meanwhile, prosecuted
Respublika, citing a number of legal technicalities. On July 4, an Al-
maty court handed Petrushova an 18-month suspended prison sentence
for violating a rarely enforced labor code. And on July 24, another Al-
maty court ordered the liquidation of the ﬁrm PR-Consulting, which
published the newspaper, because it continued printing the newspaper
despite an April 10 court ruling suspending Respublika for a minor ad-
ministrative infraction. Amid growing security risks, Petrushova ﬂed
Kazakhstan, but she continues to edit the newspaper from Moscow.
(Source: Committee to Protect Journalists, www.cpj.org)
Yet there is nothing to suggest that the eﬀect of these restrictions is homoge-
neous, or that the eﬀect of any one restriction would be equal in all situations2.
2Some notable examples can be found in Diario La Nacion, Online Edition, (Archive, 26th
January of 1997 at http://www.lanacion.com.ar/archivo/Nota.asp?nota_id=62655)
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In a similar vein, whilst it is generally true that these measures of economic, po-
litical and legal control over the media are reasonably highly correlated across
countries there are exceptions to this. For example, a very restrictive regulatory
environment exists alongside relatively mild economic and political control of the
media in Indonesia and Malaysia, while the opposite is true in Colombia, Russia,
and Ukraine3. Or in Italy the economic and political control over the media is
high compared to other developed countries, but compared to this the legal and
regulatory environment is less restrictive.
In this chapter we take seriously the issues raised above to provide a rigorous
examination of the correlation between press freedom and corruption. Our ap-
proach has several parts. First, we consider the robustness of the eﬀect of press
freedom on corruption to changes in the conditioning set of variables using a mod-
iﬁed form of extreme bounds analysis (EBA) [Leamer (1983, 1985), Levine and
Renelt (1992)]. As highlighted above, press freedom might be highly correlated
with other aspects of the institutional environment and development. The use of
error bounds analysis allows us to consider whether the eﬀect of press freedom has
a robust independent eﬀect on corruption or not. Second, in addition to testing
for the relationship between the aggregate indicator of press freedom and corrup-
tion used in previous studies we use new data on the relation between diﬀerent
forms of restrictions to press freedom. This disaggregated measure considers eco-
nomic, political and legal restrictions on the media separately. Third, in order
to avoid some well-known criticisms of standard EBA being too restrictive for a
potentially important variable to pass as robust [Sala-i Martin (1997)], we take
into account some suggestions regarding the implementation of this methodology
[Temple (2000)]. We carefully screen the regression models for potential problems
of similarity, collinearity and ﬁt that may help to explain why a variable is not
robust. Fourth, out of concern with potential problems of endogeneity we use
a GMM approach in combination with EBA. Finally, we consider diﬀerent data
on corruption to see whether the results are robust to using data from diﬀerent
3Source: Freedom House, Freedom of the Press (2004) and other years
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sources. This set of strong tests for the robustness of the eﬀect of press freedom
on corruption diﬀers signiﬁcantly from that found in the current literature and
adds detail, as well as information on robustness and causation to that literature.
Our results support the theoretical view that restrictions in press freedom lead to
higher corruption levels. Furthermore, we obtain that both political and economic
inﬂuences on the media are strongly and robustly related to corruption, while
detrimental laws and regulations inﬂuencing the media are not strongly associ-
ated with higher corruption. In all cases, there is indicative, albeit not conclusive,
evidence that the direction of causation runs from a freer press to lower corruption
and some suggestion that press freedom may capture aspects of the political en-
vironment more generally. The chapter is structured as follows. The next section
reviews the existing literature. In section 3.3, we describe the data, econometric
methodology and the proposed robustness checks. Section 3.4 shows the main set
of results using the panel data evidence, while section 3.5 explores the endogeneity
problem. Section 3.6 deals with the use of alternative measures and the sensitiv-
ity of the results to changes in data sources and econometric method. Section 3.7
concludes.
3.2 Literature Review
Interest from academic economists in investigating the causes of corruption has
followed largely from the inﬂuential work of Mauro (1995). In that paper, the
author presents evidence regarding the negative eﬀects of corruption on economic
performance. As we have already noted in Chapter 2, while the number of cross-
country comparative empirical studies on the determinants of corruption has in-
creased, there appears to be little consensus on the eﬀect of any variable on cor-
ruption apart from economic development and democracy. To give an example:
the variables that have received most attention as determinants of corruption in
the literature are British colonial heritage, uninterrupted democracy, protestant
religion, electoral rule, and ﬁscal decentralisation [see Ades and Di Tella (1999),
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La Porta et al. (1997, 1999), Treisman (2000), Persson et al. (2003), and Ad-
sera et al. (2003)]. Yet, these studies have obtained mixed ﬁndings on the same
explanatory variables, possibly due to the use of diﬀerent corruption indicators,
diﬀerent samples of countries, and perhaps most importantly the use of a diverse
set of conditioning variables within their empirical speciﬁcations. Despite this
sensitivity of the results there remains within the literature little systematic re-
search on the robustness analysis of the determinants of corruption. Some recent
exceptions are the global sensitivity analysis by Serra (2006) and Seldadyo and
de Haan (2005, 2006). They use Extreme Bounds Analysis (EBA) as modiﬁed by
Levine and Renelt (1992) and other versions [Sala-i Martin (1997)], to perform
an analysis of the sensitivity of the regression estimates to changes in the pool of
control variables. Our present study focuses on a variable used in those papers,
press freedom, uses time series-cross section data and suggests some further modi-
ﬁcations to EBA. We also examine the relationship between particular restrictions
to press freedom and corruption.
The study of press freedom as a determinant of corruption has, compared to the
prominent variables mentioned so far, been largely absent in the literature4. At-
tempts to introduce the topic have come from a group of papers whose main focus
has been placed exclusively on press freedom, rather seeing this as one determi-
nant of corruption amongst many others. Brunetti and Weder (2003) test the
hypothesis that a free press should a priori be associated with lower corruption.
The authors use a press freedom measure compiled by Freedom House (who also
publishes the popular indexes of political rights and civil liberties). The index
ranks countries according to a 0-100 scale, with low values meaning a high de-
gree of press freedom. Using this and other alternative measures for both press
freedom and corruption, they ﬁnd that the empirical evidence suggests a strong
negative relation. Their result is robust to controlling for alternative speciﬁcations
and econometric methods. They conclude that in countries where the media is
4Adsera et al. (2003) used a proxy for the diﬀusion of newspapers and found a signiﬁcant and
large coeﬃcient. As others and we have discussed, this proxy does not appropriately reﬂect the
freedom that journalists and reporters enjoy.
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reasonably free from any kind of restriction on their activities corruption levels are
likely to be low. Although the authors acknowledge that the problem of causality
may be dealt with instrumental variables and using some panel-data techniques,
the choice of the instrumental variable for which they obtain their main ﬁndings
is somewhat debatable5.
Similarly, Ahrend (2002) examines the relationship between the variables from
a wider perspective. His objective is to study the relationship between human
capital, press freedom and corruption. He notes that a high degree of press freedom
acts as a channel through which education decreases corruption. Additionally, the
author ﬁnds evidence suggesting that high corruption levels are associated with
low levels of press freedom. The causal direction, according to his work, runs from
a freer press to lower corruption. Chowdhury (2004) presents a concise treatment
of the topic. The objective is similar to Brunetti and Weder (2003) but also
incorporates the eﬀects of democracy on corruption. In his view, the media's role
as an informative device and the standing of democracy as a punishing mechanism
should both help towards limiting corruption. The empirical ﬁndings of the paper
support this conclusion: both press freedom and democracy are powerful and
signiﬁcant controls on corruption and this result is robust to diﬀerent settings. The
author remains cautious regarding the direction of causality. Finally, Lederman
et al. (2005) examine the relationship between several political institutions and
corruption. They ﬁnd evidence of an association between freedom of the press and
corruption. However, the coeﬃcient on press freedom becomes insigniﬁcant when
they include a control for economic development in the corruption regression.
While all these studies reach the same conclusion that press freedom is bad for
corruption, they use an aggregate measure of press freedom. Additionally, the
variables included in the base speciﬁcation are not always those suggested by the
5They use an index controlling for political rights. This variable, although highly correlated
with press freedom, is also correlated with corruption measures as we have described earlier,
which violates one of the conditions required for a variable to be a good instrument. The
authors acknowledge this may be a problem but they argue that it is reasonable to assume that
it is a good and valid instrument. In other section of their paper, they use diﬀerent instruments
and their main ﬁndings are conﬁrmed.
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empirical literature as robust predictors6. Finally, most of the empirical literature
does not include strong tests for robustness and those which do found mixed
evidence. For example, Serra (2006) and Seldadyo and de Haan (2006) have used
proxies for press freedom in their studies using sensitivity analysis. They ﬁnd that
press freedom is not robust according to the EBA methodology, implying that the
relationship between this variable and corruption is sensitive to changes in the
speciﬁcation.
In the present chapter, in addition to testing for the robust relationship between
the aggregate press freedom and corruption, we use previously unexplored data on
diﬀerent forms of restrictions on press freedom and to test the robustness of their
individual relationships with corruption. Further, from a broader perspective, our
chapter may be seen as an extension of the literature on Extreme Bounds Anal-
ysis (EBA) that has been originally proposed by Leamer (1983, 1985) and made
popular by Levine and Renelt (1992) in the context of cross-country growth re-
gressions. In order to avoid some well-known criticisms of standard EBA being
too restrictive for a potentially important variable to pass as robust [Sala-i Martin
(1997)], we carefully screen the regression models for potential problems of simi-
larity, collinearity and ﬁt that may help to explain why a variable is not robust.
We describe these modiﬁcations later in this chapter.
3.3 Data and Methodology
This section describes the data on corruption and press freedom along with the
other control variables used in the empirical analysis, and explains the econometric
methodology used.
6For example, Lederman et al. (2005) only ﬁnd that the association between corruption and
press freedom becomes insigniﬁcant when they include a control for GDP in the regression.
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3.3.1 Corruption and press freedom indicators
We measure corruption using Transparency International's Corruption Perception
Index (CPI)7. The CPI is available annually from 1995 for a varying sample of
countries. Countries are ranked in a 0 - 10 scale where low scores represent high
and pervasive (perceived) corruption and high scores indicate low levels of corrup-
tion.
We use the Press Freedom Index as the main indicator of the degree of press
freedom, which is compiled by Freedom House8. This index is available from
1994 to 2004, although Freedom House has been assessing the degree of press
freedom across countries since 19809. The index ranks countries according to
their degree of press freedom in a scale ranging from 0 (total freedom) to 100 (lack
of freedom). To provide some assessment of various values of the index within
this range Freedom House describe countries scoring from 0 to 30 as of having free
media, while countries with scores from 31 to 60 and from 61 to 100 are regarded
as partly free and not free respectively.
In order to assemble the aggregate measure, Freedom House evaluates and rates
three aspects of press freedom violations10. These are the legal, political and
economic environments. The legal environment subdivision encompasses both
and examination of the laws and regulations that could inﬂuence media content
as well as the government's inclination to use these laws and legal institutions in
order to restrict the media's ability to operate [Deutsch Karlekar (2004)]. In this
category, Freedom House assesses several issues such as legal and constitutional
guarantees of press freedom, penalties for libel and defamation as well as penal
7See Transparency International website at www.transparency.org for an in-depth descrip-
tion of the source data, methodology and procedures used in the construction of the CPI
8The index is constructed from several diﬀerent sources including press organizations, oﬃcial
reports on the state of the media, country-based correspondents, expert opinions and local and
international news services. The complete methodology used in the compilation of the index is
available at http://www.freedomhouse.org.
9The data for the early years are not available as a numerical index but instead in the form
of categorical divisions
10From 1994 to 2001 the press index is compiled evaluating and rating over 4 separate aspects.
From 2002, Freedom House only uses three categories (two of the former has been grouped into
one), which we will be analyzing over the present article.
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codes, the independence of the judiciary and others. This form of harassment is
typical (but not exclusive) of developing countries. The situation of the media in
Eastern Europe and Central Asia is a clear example of this type of restrictions11. In
Kyrgyzstan, the media faces innumerable laws and regulations, including criminal
punishment for libel and slander. The situation is rather similar in other CIS
countries. Furthermore, most developing countries still preserve certain forms of
restrictive laws and regulations on the media. In general, these type of inﬂuences
over the media, though not as obvious and explicit as other forms, may represent
a serious challenge to the operation of a free and independent press.
The political environment category, on the other hand, evaluates the degree of
political control over the content of news media [Deutsch Karlekar (2004)]. Among
the most relevant aspects examined here are the editorial independence of the
media, intimidation and threats to journalists, the access to informational sources,
and also repressive actions such as arrests, imprisonment, physical violence and
assassinations. The infamous corrupt administration under President Fujimori
in Peru stands out as a striking case of political inﬂuence over the news media.
While running the government in the 1990's, Vladimiro Montesinos, president
Fujimori's secret-police chief, devised and supervised a vast network of corruption
and power involving politicians, bureaucrats, judges and news media. There were
intimidations, threats, kidnappings and all sorts of pressures on the several actors
involved. Another famous case where political inﬂuences to the media run high
is Italy12. An industrialized country with exceptionally high levels of corruption,
Italy has a highly concentrated media sector. The Italian media are known to have
had close ties to political power and the fact that the media are highly concentrated
increases the likelihood of the existence of political pressures and inﬂuence. It is
reasonable to think that these factors may threaten editorial independence of the
media and therefore that these political restrictions on the media are associated
11There are other regions where media legislation suﬀers from these characteristics and many
countries in Africa and Latin America are examples of this. Cuba, for instance, is an extreme
case in that any criticism of Fidel Castro's rule is catalogued as an oﬃcial crime.
12Economic inﬂuences are high too and they are closely linked to and probably develop as a
consequence of political inﬂuences; still, the main source of restrictions to the press in Italy stem
from the political sphere.
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to high levels of corruption.
Finally, under the economic environment category, the characteristics exam-
ined are related to the economic considerations that can inﬂuence the media's
activities. The relevant factors to consider within this category are the existence
of competitive pressures leading to biased press reports and investigations, the ex-
tent of sponsoring, subsidization and advertisement and its eﬀect on press coverage
and content, the impact of bribery by several self-interested actors on what is pub-
lished and the structure and concentration of media ownership. Examples of such
inﬂuences are common in African and Eastern European countries. Ethiopian lo-
cal publications, for instance, are facing signiﬁcant increases in printing costs and
an increased level of cumbersome bureaucratic requirements. A similar situation
is observed in Uganda, where new licensing fees for radio operators were imple-
mented by the government in 2000 adding to the mounting ﬁnancial burden on
the companies. A slightly diﬀerent situation prevails in Ukraine where the news
media have become more ﬁnancially dependent on the ruling elites, political par-
ties, and relatives of government oﬃcials since 1999. This situation reﬂects the
events in post-Soviet Russia where journalists used to supplement their low legal
earnings with bribes received from local businessmen in exchange for nice com-
plimentary articles about their ﬁrms and activities. Another practice, not always
obvious, is the provision of gifts and `freebies' to journalists and media workers.
This proceeding, usually known as cheque-book journalism, is gradually expanding
in both the developed and developing world and it can seriously threaten editorial
independence and accurate coverage.
Within our index, both the `legal' and `economic' categories vary from 0 (complete
freedom) to 30 (lack of freedom) while the `political' sub-index ranges from 0 to
40. A country's overall press freedom score is simply the sum of the scores in each
of the sub-categories13.
13Freedom House introduced some alterations to the weights for the diﬀerent categories and
to the value range of the index from 1997. In order to work with homogeneous series for the
separate categories, we rescaled the original index for 1995 and 1996. These changes introduced
no alterations in the orderings of the rankings but did change the scores for that year.
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Although each of the sub-indexes measure diﬀerent aspects of press freedom it is
likely that they are correlated with each other. Table 3.1 shows the correlation
matrix for the aggregate index and the sub-indexes along with their standard sum-
mary statistics. All the correlations are signiﬁcant at the 5% level and it can be
observed that each of the sub-indexes correlates very highly with the aggregate
index. Furthermore, the diﬀerent sub-indexes are also highly correlated among
themselves, suggesting that in general diﬀerent forms of restrictions to press free-
dom move together and in the same direction. The correlation between the politi-
cal inﬂuences and economic inﬂuences is the highest at 0.769 and that between the
laws and regulations and the economic inﬂuences the lowest at 0.637. This might
be because the most common restrictive laws and regulations are libel, defamation
and slander laws which are in general less related to economic-type pressures than
to political inﬂuences on the media such as civil and criminal charges, prosecution
and threats.
As suggested by this correlation there exist in the data a number of examples
where countries score highly on one part of the press freedom index but not on the
other. For example, in Russia there are strong political inﬂuences over the media
Table 3.1: Correlation between press freedom and its components
Variable Mean Sd Min Max
Press Freedom 35.01 21.98 5 97
Laws and Regulations 10.17 7.74 0 30
Political Influences 15.36 10.73 0 40
Economic Influences 9.47 5.67 0 27
Correlations Press
Freedom
Laws and
Regula-
tions
Political
Inﬂu-
ences
Economic
Inﬂu-
ences
Corruption
Press Freedom 1
Laws and Regulations 0.8879* 1
Political Influences 0.9545* 0.7606* 1
Economic Influences 0.8578* 0.6370* 0.7690 1
Corruption -0.7503* -0.6391* -0.7429* -0.6300* 1
Note: The aggregate Press Freedom Index (from 0 to 100); the Laws and Regulations Subindex (from 0
to 30); the Political Inﬂuences Subindex (from 0 to 40); the Economic Inﬂuences Subindex (from 0 to 30).
Source: Press Freedom Index (various years) available from Freedom House.
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but milder economic and legal pressures. Or in Jordan and Turkey the economic
environment is less restrictive over the media (economic inﬂuences are minor in
Turkey and average in Jordan) yet the legal environment is highly restrictive.
Finally, in Italy the economic and political inﬂuences over the media are high
compared to other developed countries, but the legal and regulatory environment
is similar. In order to provide a more detailed examination of the relationship
between the diﬀerent subindexes, we cross-tabulate the press freedom data. The
results are presented in Tables 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4.
From all the tables we can observe what was hinted earlier: there is a strong
positive correlation between the subindexes (this was also evident from Table
3.1). As can be seen from Table 3.2, political inﬂuences and laws and regulations
inﬂuencing the media go hand in hand (i.e. criminal defamation and libel laws
should be in principle associated to an increase in the harassment and prosecution
of journalists). One case where this is not true is Russia where a highly oppressive
political environment lives alongside mild economic and legal pressures on the
media. Although there is a positive legal and regulatory environment, there are
relatively high economic and particularly political restrictions on media freedom
that often lead journalists to remain silent or to undertake investigative journalism
at a very high cost.
Economic inﬂuences are also positively associated with legal inﬂuences as can be
seen in Table 3.3 (i.e. ownership structure and entry to the media market is likely
to change with new regulations and laws allowing or restricting certain types of
actions and procedures). Again, a few cases are worth mentioning particularly
since the relation between these two types of restrictions is weaker. On one hand,
there is the case of Jordan and Turkey. The economic environment is not par-
ticularly oppressive for the media in these countries; on the contrary, economic
inﬂuences are relatively minor (Turkey) or average (Jordan) yet the legal environ-
ment represents a big obstacle leading to self-censorship. Innumerable restrictions
to press freedom can be found incorporated in legal codes, regulatory procedures,
codes of practise and conduct and so on. It is not about taking direct actions or
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Table 3.2: Laws and regulations and political inﬂuences
Laws and regulations subindex [Not free=30; Free=0]
30-24 24-18 18-12 12-6 6-0
40-32 China - - - -
Egypt
Indonesia Bangladesh
32-24 Cameroon Kenya Colombia
Jordan Malaysia Pakistan Russia -
Turkey
Argentina
Ecuador Brazil
24-16 - Uganda India -
Venezuela Mexico
Philippines
Political Bolivia
Influences Chile
Subindex Czech Republic France
[Not Free=40; Greece Hungary
Free=0] 16-8 - - Thailand Israel Italy
Poland Japan
South Africa Spain
South Korea
Australia
Belgium
Canada
Denmark
Austria Finland
8-0 - - - Portugal Ireland
UK New Zealand
Norway
Sweden
Switzerland
USA
For each subindex, the press freedom score for a country is a 10-year average of the annual measure compiled
by Freedom House. The countries are divided in quintiles according to their score and those which lie by more
than one quintile away from the diagonal are in bold. We list those countries included in the dataset containing
the CPI index.
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Table 3.3: Laws and regulations and economic inﬂuences
Laws and regulations subindex [Not free=30; Free=0]
30-24 24-18 18-12 12-6 6-0
30-24 - - - - -
Cameroon Egypt
24-18 China Nigeria Bangladesh
India
Indonesia Colombia Mexico
18-12 Jordan Kenya Pakistan Philippines Italy
Malaysia Russia
Argentina Australia
Brazil Denmark
Economic Ecuador Chile Finland
Influences 12-6 - Turkey Thailand Czech Republic France
Subindex Uganda Greece Hungary
[Not Free=30; Venezuela South Africa Ireland
Free=0] South Korea Japan
UK Spain
USA
Austria Belgium
Bolivia Canada
6-0 - - - Israel Germany
Netherlands New Zealand
Poland Norway
Portugal Sweden
Switzerland
For each subindex, the press freedom score for a country is a 10-year average of the annual measure compiled
by Freedom House. The countries are divided in quintiles according to their score and those which lie by more
than one quintile away from the diagonal are in bold. We list those countries included in the dataset containing
the CPI index.
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exerting inﬂuence through bribes; it is more of a psychological threat imposed on
journalists and refreshed every time a new restrictive law is brought to life.
Another case where the relationship between the legal and economic subindexes
is not as expected is Italy. As a long-standing democracy, one would expect that
most of the checks and balances on the government should be operating eﬃciently.
It is however when it comes to analysing the situation of the press in Italy that
we identify several diﬀerences with its European counterparts. Italian media are
widely regarded as under the inﬂuence of particular economic and political in-
terests. According to the data, the legal and regulatory environment in Italy is
mostly press-friendly, similar to other developed countries. But the economic
and political inﬂuences on the Italian media are above the average for industri-
alized countries. While the legal and regulatory environment present almost no
obstacles for journalists and inﬂuences from the political side are mainly limited
to warnings, harassment and editorial independence, the structure of media own-
ership presents one of the biggest threats to independent journalism and unbiased
coverage14. The media are highly concentrated and political pressures are increas-
ing alongside the new economic conditions. In this way, the editorial independence
of the Italian press as well as media plurality are severely jeopardized.
Finally, Table 3.4 shows that the correlation between the economic and political
subindexes is relatively high without any signiﬁcant outliers. This is not partic-
ulary surprising given the way Freedom House categorizes the types of activities
included in each of these two subindexes and the similar nature of both types of
restrictions. In fact, one may think that in most cases, political restrictions entail
some form of economic restrictions and viceversa.
Figure 3.1 provides a scatter plot of press freedom and the corruption index for
45 countries. The high correlation between the aggregate index of press freedom
and its sub-components means that a similar graph is valid for the relationship
between the subindexes and corruption, although the corresponding correlations
14One famous media empire has expanded to control the three largest private television sta-
tions, one newspaper and a substantial portion of the advertising market
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Table 3.4: Political and economic inﬂuences
Political influences subindex [Not free=40; Free=0]
40-32 32-24 24-16 16-8 8-0
30-24 - - - - -
Bangladesh
24-18 China Cameroon
Egypt
Nigeria
Colombia
Indonesia
Jordan India
18-12 - Kenya Mexico Italy
Malaysia Philippines
Pakistan
Russia
Chile
Economic Czech Republic
Influences Argentina France Australia
Subindex Brazil Greece Denmark
[Not Free=40; 12-6 - Turkey Ecuador Hungary Finland
Free=0] Uganda Japan Ireland
Venezuela South Africa UK
South Korea USA
Spain
Thailand
Austria
Belgium
Canada
Germany
Bolivia Netherlands
6-0 - - - Israel New Zealand
Poland Norway
Portugal
Sweden
Switzerland
For each subindex, the press freedom score for a country is a 10-year average of the annual measure compiled
by Freedom House. The countries are divided in quintiles according to their score and those which lie by more
than one quintile away from the diagonal are in bold. We list those countries included in the dataset containing
the CPI index.
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Figure 3.1: Aggregate press freedom and bureaucratic corruption
are lower than that for the overall index. As is made clear from this ﬁgure the
correlation between the variables is strong and negative. Developed countries have
both high levels of press freedom and good governance while developing countries
are mostly situated on the bottom right corner of the graph with high corruption
and low press freedom.
3.3.2 Control variables
In addition to our main variables described above we use a wide set of variables to
serve as control variables in the regressions. Following previous empirical work we
consider economic, political, cultural, institutional and historical factors among
those likely to aﬀect corruption. Due to our speciﬁc econometric technique we
arrange these variables into two groups. The ﬁrst is a subset of three control vari-
ables to be included in all the speciﬁcations, formed by those variables consistently
found to be robustly related to corruption by previous empirical studies [Treisman
(2000), Serra (2006)]. In our study, these are a measure for economic development,
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an index of political rights, and a dummy for the persistence of democracy15. In
the second group, we include all the other variables. A full description of the data
and the description of the variables is contained in appendix A.
3.3.3 Econometric methodology
Careful model building requires that the empirical relationships on which any the-
oretical model is based are robust. We adopt Leamer (1983, 1985)'s extreme bound
analysis (EBA) as modiﬁed by Levine and Renelt (1992) to provide a strict test
of the robustness of the relationship between press freedom and corruption. The
basic idea of this approach is to understand whether the relationship between the
variable of interest and the left hand side variable is speciﬁc to certain speciﬁca-
tions of the regression equation or holds more generally. The general speciﬁcation
of the EBA is given below:
yt = βiI + βmM + βzZ + ut (3.3.1)
where yt is the dependent variable (corruption), I is a set of (ﬁxed) variables in-
cluded in all the speciﬁcations, M is the variable of interest (press freedom) and
Z is the subset of (changing) variables taken from a pool of additional covari-
ates. Both the I-variables and the M -variable remain unchanged throughout the
entire analysis. The EBA procedure involves changing the variables included in
the subset Z in each regression (in combinations of three) until every possible
combination of the pool of candidate Z variables is used. Once all the possible
regressions have been performed we will have as many β′s as speciﬁcations tested.
The variable M will be considered to be robust if the extreme upper bound and
15It should be noted that of the three conditioning variables economic development (gdp) passes
the EBA test, while there are a small number of occasions when our measure of political rights
(pri) and the existence of long-standing democratic traditions (d50 ) do not. This is particularly
so when we use disaggregated data on press-freedom. While this result does not undermine the
main focus of this chapter, press freedom, given the I -variables were chosen on the basis of their
robustness in previous studies using EBA it is clearly worthy of further investigation. Further
details on the results from this exercise are available from the authors on request.
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the extreme lower bound estimates are statistically signiﬁcant at the conventional
level and have the same sign. The extreme bounds are deﬁned as the estimated
coeﬃcients corresponding to the highest (lowest) value of β plus (minus) twice its
standard error as in equation 3.3.2. The variable is considered fragile otherwise.
βm ± 2σβm (3.3.2)
Despite its potential beneﬁts in terms of model selection, the EBA has been
strongly criticized for being very diﬃcult for any variable to pass as robust [Sala-
i Martin (1997)]16. These criticisms relate to absence of diagnostic tests when
reporting the outcome, a problem of collinearity, omitted variable bias and that
simply labeling a variable as robust or fragile overlooks other useful characteris-
tics of the data. Following these criticisms we make several modiﬁcations to the
general EBA approach, in the manner by which the results are reported and their
discussion.
Firstly, we might be concerned that the results are driven by an omitted variable
bias. To control for this we use a large number of potential covariates in the Z-
matrix (we use twenty-two additional variables). Secondly, we might conclude that
a variable is non-robust because it has been included with a variable that captures
similar variation in the data; robustness in traditional EBA analysis is likely to
be conditional on their being no collinear counterpart in the dataset. To know
whether this is a problem in our dataset we use only a subset of the potential pool
of Z-variables in any one regression (a set of three rotating Z-variables), identify
those Z variables that are likely to measure similar aspects of corruption to press
freedom and identify speciﬁcations with high variance inﬂation factors (VIF)17. To
16See Temple (2000) for a detailed review and discussion of the main critics and objections to
the EBA and some recommendations to overcome them.
17The variance inﬂation factor (VIF) is an indicator designed to detect the presence of multi-
collinearity. To obtain the deﬁnition of VIF, we start from the expression of the variance of the
estimator
V ar(βˆi) =
σ2
Sii(1−R2i )
and assuming that there is no linear relation between xi and the other explanatory variables
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provide further insight we also consider carefully the regressions where insigniﬁcant
coeﬃcients on the variable of interest are found to search for potential patterns.
Finally, as in Seldadyo and de Haan (2005), in order to identify variables that
are highly correlated with press freedom as an initial step we analyse the pairwise
correlations among all the variables. Amongst these we identiﬁed one variable
that was highly correlated with press freedom, an index of democracy, where the
correlation was 0.82. Given the high correlation of this variable with press freedom
but also with the other measure of political rights used in the list of I-variables
(pri) -the correlation here is 0.92-, the decision was made to omit this variable18.
The correlation of this latter political rights indicator with press freedom was 0.65.
To provide a cautious interpretation of the ﬁndings of this chapter we recognize
that our measure of press freedom may capture aspects of the political environment
more generally and we condition the conclusions on this possibility.
A third criticism of traditional EBA analysis is that robustness is measured against
both well-speciﬁed and poorly speciﬁed models so that the bounds may come from
ﬂawed models. We make two adjustments. Firstly, in order to concentrate only
on well-speciﬁed models we adapt the suggestion of Granger and Uhlig (1990) and
reject all the speciﬁcations with adjusted R2 lower than that of the base speciﬁca-
tion19. The base speciﬁcation consists of only four variables, the three I-variables
(always included) and the variable of interestM , press freedom. Secondly, we con-
sider the robustness of our results to problems of endogeneity, which we discuss
in the model, then R2i=0 and V ar(βˆi) = σ
2/Sii. Dividing this into the above expression for
V ar(βˆi), we obtain the formula for the VIF as
V IF (βˆi) =
1
1−R2i
The VIF can be interpreted as the ratio of the actual variance of βˆi to the variance that would
have been obtained if xi were to be uncorrelated with the remaining x
′s. The higher the VIF the
more likely the existence of severe multicollinearity. Although there is no theoretical suggestion
regarding a threshold value, it is usually considered that a VIF higher than 10 indicates the
existence of severe multicollinearity.
18We note also that the eﬀect of this variable is likely to be already captured by the measure
of persistence of democracy (labeled d50) included as one of the I-variables in the analysis.
19As noted by Granger and Uhlig (1990), the adjusted R2 may not be an ideal measure of the
quality of the model, but can still serve as a useful statistic to provide some insights about the
speciﬁed model.
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further below.
The regression equation actually estimated is therefore of the following form:
yit = β1pressit +β2gdpit +β3d50it +β4priit +β5Z1it +β6Z2it +β7Z3it +uit (3.3.3)
where y is the corruption indicator given by the Corruption Perception Index;
press is the variable of interest, measured by the Press Freedom Index; gdp is the
logarithm of GDP per capita; d50 is a dummy measuring the existence of unin-
terrupted democracy over the last 50 years; pri is an index measuring the extent
of political rights in a society; and Z1, Z2 and Z3 are the three additional covari-
ates included until all combinations are exhausted. The log of GDP per capita,
the measure of uninterrupted democracy and the measure of political rights are
included as the I-variables (the non-rotating control variables). These have pre-
viously been found to be robustly correlated with corruption by Treisman (2000)
and Serra (2006), the latter using Error Bounds Analysis. We run the regressions
by pooled OLS using robust standard errors20.
3.4 Analysis of results
We perform EBA on an unbalanced panel of 51 countries over the period 1995
to 2004. The EBA results without controlling for endogeneity are given in Table
3.5. The ﬁrst column shows the EBA results for the aggregate press freedom
index, while the second, third and fourth columns contain the results for each
of the subcategories. The table reports the estimated values of the upper and
20Neither of the two main methods for analyzing panel data was considered appropriate for
our analysis. It is clear that the use of ﬁxed eﬀects is not a valid alternative since we include
both time-variant and time-invariant controls in our regressions and the inclusion of the latter
rules out the ﬁxed eﬀects method. The use of random eﬀects, on the other hand, was strongly
rejected on the basis of the Hausman test. We do however test the robustness of the results to
the use of ﬁxed eﬀects below.
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lower bounds for press freedom as well as the base; the Z-variables included in the
regressions generating these bounds, the adjusted R2; the number of observations
and the total regressions estimated and identiﬁed based on the pre-determined
selection criterion.
It is worth noting to begin with that the base regression (including the three I-
variables and the press freedom variable) ﬁt the data very well, suggesting little
room for important omitted variables. The regressions explain around 70 to 80
per cent of the variation in corruption across countries.
Dealing next with the ﬁnal rows of the Table 3.5 we see that of the 4560 (1140*4)
regressions estimated in the production of Table 3.5 some 273 are identiﬁed as fail-
ing to pass the pre-selection criterion outlined in section 3.3.3. This would appear
due primarily to the ability of the additional regression to ﬁt the data compared
to the base regression, although there is some evidence of collinearity problems
also. Comparing across the diﬀerent measures of press freedom these problems are
more severe for the components of the main index than the aggregate index itself
and for the law and regulation part of this index in particular. Upon investigation
it would appear that the failure to pass the VIF test occurs when two of the
measures of openness to international trade, speciﬁcally tra (the ratio of exports
and imports to GDP) and imp (the ratio of imports to GDP) are included in the
Z-matrix at the same time. That is, there is a problem of collinearity amongst the
Z-variables rather than being a collinearity problem with press freedom. Including
these regressions in fact has no impact on the results for press freedom found in
our analysis.
The failure to pass the adjusted R2 criteria occurs when a number of variables are
included, but across the four sets of regressions most commonly when the measure
of ﬁscal decentralisation is used, exp. For example, of the 133 regressions excluded
using the laws and regulations sub-index 81 include ﬁscal decentralisation. To put
that in context the next most common variables are majoritarian electoral systems
(maj appeared in 43 of the excluded regressions); exports (fue appeared in 33);
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Table 3.5: EBA results for press freedom using OLS: Aggregate index and subcategories (CPI index)
Results of press freedom index and subcomponents on corruption (CPI) - Data: 1995-2004 - Method: Pooled OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Aggregate Press Freedom Laws and Regulations Political Inﬂuences Economic Inﬂuences
Variable of interest (M) β t β t β t β t
Upper bound -0.0415 -6.56 -0.0053 -0.38 -0.0691 -7.71 -0.0684 -4.53
Base -0.0609 -8.83 -0.0518 -3.28 -0.1002 -9.57 -0.0962 -5.37
Lower bound -0.0843 -7.25 -0.1049 -4.93 -0.1303 -7.22 -0.1755 -5.82
Z-variables (upper) eng, ger, prod fue, prod, plist ffc, fbc, prod soc, fre, prod
Z-variables (base) − − − −
Z-variables (lower) interv, exp, plist interv, exp, fre interv, mag, exp interv, mag, exp
Adjusted R2 (upper) 0.8145 0.7806 0.8286 0.8002
Adjusted R2 (base) 0.7704 0.7266 0.7705 0.7399
Adjusted R2 lower 0.7943 0.7640 0.7874 0.7680
No. observations (upper) 487 458 477 487
No. observations (base) 487 487 487 487
No. observations (lower) 289 299 296 296
Total number of regressions 1140 1140 1140 1140
Regressions dropped (R2) 24 133 85 25
Regressions dropped (multi) 1 3 1 1
Remaining regressions 1115 1004 1054 1114
No. insigniﬁcant regressions 0/1115 145/1004 0/1054 0/1114
White-corrected standard errors. Base denotes the base speciﬁcation including the M -variable and the always-included I-variables (loggdp, d50 and pri)
and the base beta is the estimated coeﬃcient from the base regression. Only coeﬃcients for the M -variables are shown. The coeﬃcients for the I-variables
can be obtained from the author. The upper bound β is the estimated coeﬃcient corresponding to the regression that generates the extreme upper bound.
The lower bound β is the estimated coeﬃcient corresponding to the regressions that generates the extreme lower bound. Z-variables are those included in
the speciﬁcations that generate the bounds. "No. insigniﬁcant" denotes the number of speciﬁcations that produce a coeﬃcient statistically insigniﬁcant
at the 5% level and/or of a diﬀerent sign.
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Table 3.6: EBA results for press freedom using GMM with IV: Aggregate index and subcategories (CPI index)
Results of press freedom index and subcomponents on corruption (CPI) - Data: 1995-2004 - Method: GMM with IV
Instruments: Ethno-linguistic fractionalization index (elf) and Number of daily newspapers (news)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Aggregate Press Freedom Laws and Regulations Political Inﬂuences Economic Inﬂuences
Variable of interest (M) β z β z β z β z
Upper boundOLS -0.0474 -6.77 -0.0176 -1.31 -0.0730 -7.49 -0.0811 -4.82
Upper bound -0.0449 -6.32 -0.0125 -0.95 -0.0730 -7.49 -0.0748 -4.26
Base -0.0705 -9.54 -0.0608 -3.80 -0.1132 -10.29 -0.1165 -6.11
Lower bound -0.1008 -8.72 -0.1321 -5.15 -0.1566 -8.43 -0.2048 -6.79
Lower boundOLS -0.1008 -8.72 -0.1136 -5.40 -0.1532 -8.88 -0.1946 -6.31
Z-variables (upper) maj, fre, prod fre, prod, plist ffc, fbc, prod parl, eng, fre
Z-variables (base) − − − −
Z-variables (lower) interv, exp, plist imp, exp, def interv, exp, plist exp, eng, plist
Adjusted R2 (upper) 0.8148 0.7832 0.8335 0.7911
Adjusted R2 (base) 0.7702 0.7136 0.7676 0.7319
Adjusted R2 lower 0.7915 0.7149 0.7744 0.7328
No. observations (upper) 416 429 439 429
No. observations (base) 439 439 439 439
No. observations (lower) 263 283 263 273
Total number of regressions 1140 1140 1140 1140
Regressions dropped (R2) 30 91 39 18
Regressions dropped (multi) 0 0 0 0
Remaining regressions 1110 1049 1101 1122
No. insigniﬁcant regressions 0/1110 85/1049 0/1101 0/1122
J-test (base) 0.80 (0.37) 0.65 (0.42) 0.18 (0.67) 0.41 (0.52)
Pagan-Hall (base) 14.40 (0.01) 30.35 (0.00) 12.13 (0.03) 22.60 (0.00)
Base denotes the base speciﬁcation including the M -variable and the always-included I-variables (loggdp, d50 and pri) and the base β is the estimated coeﬃcient from
the base regression. Only coeﬃcients for the M -variables are shown. The upper bound β is the estimated coeﬃcient corresponding to the regression that generates the
extreme upper bound. The lower bound β is the estimated coeﬃcient corresponding to the regressions that generates the extreme lower bound. Z-variables are those
included in the speciﬁcations that generate the bounds. No. insigniﬁcant denotes the number of speciﬁcations that produce a coeﬃcient statistically insigniﬁcant at the
5% level and/or of a diﬀerent sign. J-Test gives the Hansen statistic for the over-identifying restrictions. Pagan-Hall test produces the statistic to test for heterogeneity.
In both cases, P -values are in parentheses.
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and socialist legal system (soc appeared in 30).
Fiscal decentralisation plays a similarly important role for the exclusion of regres-
sions when using the other measures of press freedom. We do not have a good
explanation for this ﬁnding. Instead we considered the robustness of our conclu-
sions to the inclusion of these regressions i.e. we consider the EBA without the
removal of the regressions due to the adjusted R2 criteria, the results are robust,
and to a separate test for the robustness of ﬁscal decentralisation using EBA. We
ﬁnd from this that of the 969 regressions estimated the coeﬃcient on exp is in-
signiﬁcant in 856 of them21. Overall we are satisﬁed that whatever the problem
with the ﬁscal decentralisation variables it does not aﬀect the conclusions we reach
about press freedom.
According to the results presented in Table 3.5 there are no insigniﬁcant regressions
for the aggregate press freedom index as well as two of its components, political and
economic inﬂuences on the press. Comparisons of the upper and lower bound show
that the coeﬃcients do not pass through zero for these three measures also. In EBA
terminology, aggregate press freedom and the political and economic inﬂuences on
this, are therefore robust to changes in the conditioning information set. The ﬁnal
component of the index, that on laws and regulations, whilst the coeﬃcient never
passes through zero, is insigniﬁcant in 14 per cent of the regressions that pass the
pre-selection criterion. We return to this result below.
Our results in Table 3.5 conﬁrm that press freedom has the expected relationship
with corruption. Higher levels of press freedom are associated with lower levels of
corruption. Using the upper and lower bound on the coeﬃcients as a guide then a
one standard deviation increase in the overall level of press freedom is associated
with a reduction in corruption of between 0.9 and 1.8 points. For countries like
Brazil, Turkey and South Korea with high levels of corruption this would result in
a reduction towards the mean corruption score in our data. To put this number in
21These results are similar if we use alternative measures of sub-national government, such as
sub-national revenues in relation to GDP or sub-national revenues in relation to total government
revenue)
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perspective the eﬀect of a one standard deviation increase in GDP per capita (using
the coeﬃcient from the base regression) would be roughly similar at 1.5 points.
For the economic and political components of the main index the eﬀect of a one
standard deviation increase in press freedom would be associated with a decline of
corruption between 0.6 to 1.7 for economic inﬂuences and 0.7 to 1.4 for political
inﬂuences. Unfortunately, since the data do not include speciﬁc information on
how often the media expose corruption, we are not able to explore the channels
through which media freedom impacts on corruption22
Overall the results presented in Table 3.5 evidence a close relationship between
press freedom and bureaucratic corruption, thus conﬁrming the ﬁndings of earlier
research. Moreover, we go a step further and ﬁnd evidence suggesting that cer-
tain forms of restrictions to press freedom are more strongly associated to higher
corruption than others. Speciﬁcally, while laws and regulations that inﬂuence the
media fail to qualify as robust, both political and economic pressures on the press
are robust to changes in the speciﬁcation throughout the whole EBA. This might
help to explain why Italy, which scores poorly on these components of the index,
has high corruption levels compared to other developed countries. Similarly, this
would help to understand the case of widespread corruption in Fujimori's Peru
during the 1990's. As we have already mentioned, Peru was plagued by sweeping
corruption involving a large number of sectors. In particular, the news media were
subjected to a number of severe restrictions that involved political and economic
pressures rather than legal or regulatory impediments. The fact that it was ulti-
mately a single independent media outlet left unbribed that triggered the public
scandal leading to the collapse of the administration reinforces our results23
This raises the question as to why is the laws and regulations index non-robust
whereas the other components of press freedom manage to pass the EBA test. Un-
22One of the most powerful channels through which the media may help to reduce corruption
is the exposure of corruption instances. This information is only indirectly captured in the press
freedom indexes and this may be one of the reasons why countries whose media sector expose
corruption frequently have nonetheless low press freedom levels.
23See McMillan and Zoido (2004) for an excellent account of the events that took place in
Peru during those years.
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fortunately, examination of which Z-variables leads to insigniﬁcance of the laws
and regulations index yields little that is obvious in terms of providing an ex-
planation of this ﬁnding. The Z-variables that appear most commonly in the
regressions in which laws and regulations is insigniﬁcant are a dummy for Scan-
dinavian legal system (sca appears on 73 occasions); a dummy for Protestantism
(prod appears on 73 occasions); and a dummy for party lists (plist appears on 35
occasions). The correlation between the two dummies sca and prod is equal to
one24, which is why they appear exactly the same number of times in the insignif-
icant regressions. Of the regressions in which laws and regulations is insigniﬁcant
the Z-matrix includes neither of these variables on only 5 occasions. They would
appear therefore, to be the primary reason why the laws and regulations index is
insigniﬁcant. What is particular to Scandinavian countries and their control of
press freedom through laws and regulations is not immediately obvious, although
perhaps worthy of further investigation.
Interestingly, the inclusion of these same variables in the Z-matrix produces coef-
ﬁcients that are smaller than the average for the other parts of the press freedom
index also, and for the economic inﬂuences sub-index they are the smallest in size.
Unlike the laws and regulations index, for these other parts the press freedom
remains signiﬁcant however, despite the reduction in the size of the coeﬃcient.
Finally, the fragility of the laws and regulations index would also not appear to
be due to the use of dummy variables to measure the extent of the Protestant
following in a country rather than more detailed measures. If the proportion of
Protestants, pro is used instead the laws and regulations subindex is even less
robust: it is insigniﬁcant in some 213 out of 1004 regressions (and changes sign in
some of these). Again the primary reason for the loss of signiﬁcance of the laws
and regulations index is the proportion of Protestants (141 occasions); the dummy
for Scandinavian legal system (82 occasions); and the dummy for party list system
(36 occasions).
24This is due to the fact that the countries with Scandinavian legal tradition (Denmark, Fin-
land, Norway and Sweden) coincide with those having Protestantism as a majoritarian religion
as deﬁned in our study
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3.5 Endogeneity
So far, our results indicate the existence of a close negative relation between press
freedom and bureaucratic corruption. Can we argue that the evidence suggests
that eliminating restrictions on the media and promoting a freer press is a means
of reducing corruption? A priori, the answer is no: there are theoretical as well
as empirical reasons to suspect that press freedom may be determined endoge-
nously with corruption. Potential endogeneity could bias the estimates and lead
to erroneous conclusions. In order to tackle the issue of endogeneity, we run
the EBA with instrumental variable estimation performed using the generalised
method of moments (GMM)25. The justiﬁcation to use this method is that in the
presence of arbitrary heteroskedasticity in the sample, the use of this methodology
is preferable to traditional IV estimation procedure26. The choice of instrumental
variables through GMM was also justiﬁed and supported by diagnostic tests of
heteroskedasticity, particularly the Pagan-Hall test of heteroskedasticity for IV.
Our choice of instrumental variables is somewhat limited since several potential
candidates are already being used as Z-variables. We therefore follow some pre-
vious studies in the selection of our instrumental variables, the ethno-linguistic
fractionalisation index (ELF) and the number of daily newspapers per 1000 peo-
ple (NEWS). Although some authors have proposed and used the ELF index as
an instrument for corruption, the empirical literature on the determinants of cor-
ruption has rarely found evidence of a statistically important relation between
ethno-linguistic fractionalisation and corruption. In the studies of robust deter-
minants of corruption, neither Serra (2006) nor Seldadyo and de Haan (2006) ﬁnd
25Another plausible way to check for the presence of potential endogeneity is to run a regression
model where corruption and the Z-variables are the explanatory variable for press freedom. The
potential danger in doing this is that the model may be mispeciﬁed if the determinants of press
freedom are diﬀerent than those of corruption. In order to avoid this potential problem, we only
test for endogeneity using instrumental variables.
26An important feature of the GMM methodology is the use of lagged values and ﬁrst diﬀer-
ences of the endogenous variables as instruments. We considered the inclusion of lagged values
and ﬁrst diﬀerences for the press freedom variables and performed the corresponding estimation.
However, due to the little year-to-year variability in the data we decided that this approach
was not worth pursuing and excluded these regressions from our main analysis. For an in-depth
treatment of GMM estimation and diagnostic tests see Baum et al. (2003).
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that this variable is robust although the latter point to a robust relation between
ethnic conﬂict and corruption. In relation to the number of daily newspapers per
1000 people (news), we justify its consideration as an instrument since it it highly
correlated with press freedom and there is no empirical evidence of a signiﬁcant
association with corruption. The intuition is fairly straightforward since the larger
the number of newspapers the more likely that all the views are represented and
this should be associated to high press freedom levels. Table 3.6 presents the re-
sults of EBA estimated with IV using GMM. The table has the same structure
as Table 3.5 although in addition we provide the coeﬃcients resulting from run-
ning the EBA by GMM on the speciﬁcations generating the extreme bounds in the
OLS case. These are denoted as Upper BoundOLS and Lower BoundOLS. We also
provide additional diagnostic tests for both the base regression and the bounds27.
The explanatory power of the base regression remains high at around 0.80. The
Pagan-Hall statistic rejects the null of homoskedasticity for both the upper and
lower bound's regressions and for the base regression as well. Regarding the
Hansen test for the over-identifying restrictions (also known as the J-Test), the
null hypothesis (joint hypotheses of correct model speciﬁcation and orthogonality
conditions) cannot be rejected for the base and upper bound speciﬁcations and
this supports the validity of the instruments chosen. It should be noted, however,
that it is diﬃcult to evaluate the validity of the instruments since we have a large
number of speciﬁcations, each yielding a diﬀerent value of the J-test. According
to the J-test, the instruments are valid in more than half of the total number of
models.
The most striking feature of the results in this table is however their similarity to
those estimated using OLS. Whatever may be the explanation for the robustness
or lack of the correlation between press freedom and corruption it is not driven by
its reverse causation. The coeﬃcient for press freedom is statistically signiﬁcant
across all the speciﬁcations for the aggregate index and the political and economic
27The test has been calculated for each regression of the EBA, although the statistic is only
supplied for the base and extreme bounds regressions.
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inﬂuences but not for laws and regulations.
3.6 Further robustness checks
In this section we carry out additional tests to see whether our results in the
previous section are validated when we use other variables and techniques. In
particular, we devote our attention to the use of alternative measures of corruption
and to the choice of a diﬀerent econometric technique.
3.6.1 Alternative measure of corruption28
Having checked our results for robustness to changes in speciﬁcation and method-
ologies, we perform the same analysis but this time using an alternative measure of
corruption. For this purpose, we use the corruption index elaborated by Political
Risk Services (PRS) Group and included as a chapter of the International Coun-
try Risk Guide (ICRG). The index ranks more than 140 countries from 0 (high
corruption) to 6 (low corruption) and is also based on perceptions of diﬀerent
individuals29.
The ICRG indicator is similar to CPI in many respects although it is not a com-
posite index. Table 3.7 replicates the IV estimation with GMM using the ICRG
index and the qualitative results are very similar to those obtained before. There
are some diﬀerences however. Firstly, the coeﬃcient for the laws and regulation
sub-index is not only insigniﬁcant in most of the models but also changes its sign
in several speciﬁcations. Secondly, although the coeﬃcients for both the political
28Originally, we also included an alternative indicator of press freedom, the index elaborated
by Reporters Sans Frontieres (RFS). This data had limited time coverage and is not available as
a disaggregated series and was therefore not pursued. Nevertheless, we estimated a regression
using this series and the results for the overall press freedom index were very similar to those
found here.
29Lower scores of the index indicate that "high government oﬃcials are likely to demand
special payments" and that "illegal payments are generally expected throughout lower levels
of government" in the form of "bribes connected with import and export licenses, exchange
controls, tax assessment, police protection or loans".
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Table 3.7: EBA results for press freedom using GMM with IV: Aggregate index and subcategories (ICRG index)
Results of press freedom index and subcomponents on corruption (CPI) - Data: 1995-2004 - Method: GMM with IV
Instrument: Ethno-linguistic fractionalization index (elf) and Number of daily newspapers (news)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Aggregate Press Freedom Laws and Regulations Political Inﬂuences Economic Inﬂuences
Variable of interest (M) β z β z β z β z
Upper boundOLS -0.0142 -3.59 0.0041 0.46 -0.00159 -2.70 -0.0464 -3.11
Upper bound -0.0127 -3.23 0.0049 0.59 -0.0159 -2.70 -0.0312 -2.89
Base -0.0235 -5.81 -0.0119 -1.29 -0.0375 -5.97 -0.0457 -4.65
Lower bound -0.0440 -6.14 -0.0593 -4.03 -0.0768 -6.33 -0.0704 -3.90
Lower boundOLS -0.0429 -6.25 -0.0517 -3.62 -0.0725 -6.30 -0.0577 -5.01
Z-variables (upper) fbc, fre, prod fbc, fre, prod ffc, fsc, prod maj, fre, mag
Z-variables (base) − − − −
Z-variables (lower) pres, maj, exp pres, maj, exp maj, exp, plist exp, eng, ger
Adjusted R2 (upper) 0.5466 0.5364 0.5561 0.4695
Adjusted R2 (base) 0.4708 0.4424 0.4696 0.4590
Adjusted R2 lower 0.4957 0.4507 0.4948 0.4678
No. observations (upper) 635 635 635 607
No. observations (base) 635 635 635 635
No. observations (lower) 337 337 327 338
Total number of regressions 1140 1140 1140 1140
Regressions dropped (R2) 107 178 111 239
Regressions dropped (multi) 0 0 0 0
Remaining regressions 1033 962 1029 901
No. insigniﬁcant regressions 0/1003 718/962 0/1029 0/901
J-test (base) 0.08 (0.78) 0.10 (0.75) 0.02 (0.88) 0.00 (0.95)
Pagan-Hall (base) 30.75 (0.00) 29.81 (0.00) 18.26 (0.00) 48.66 (0.00)
Base denotes the base speciﬁcation including the M -variable and the always-included I-variables (loggdp, d50 and pri) and the base β is the estimated coeﬃcient from
the base regression. Only coeﬃcients for the M -variables are shown. The upper bound β is the estimated coeﬃcient corresponding to the regression that generates the
extreme upper bound. The lower bound β is the estimated coeﬃcient corresponding to the regressions that generates the extreme lower bound. Z-variables are those
included in the speciﬁcations that generate the bounds. "No. insigniﬁcant" denotes the number of speciﬁcations that produce a coeﬃcient statistically insigniﬁcant at the
5% level and/or of a diﬀerent sign. J-Test gives the Hansen statistic for the over-identifying restrictions. Pagan-Hall test produces the statistic to test for heterogeneity.
In both cases, P -values are in parentheses.
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and economic inﬂuences sub-indexes have the (expected) negative sign as before,
they are signiﬁcantly smaller than those obtained when using the CPI index pre-
sented in Table 3.6. The z-statistics are generally lower than in the CPI case
but still they are quite high for all the models estimated. The range of variation
of the coeﬃcients is sensibly smaller than with the CPI. Thirdly, the adjusted
R2 are, notably, much lower than in the CPI regressions. This might be due to
the increased variability across the countries given by the increase in the sample
size. Finally, the Pagan-Hall test for heteroskedasticity always rejects the null of
homoskedasticity and suggests the presence of heteroskedasticity in our model.
Finally, our instruments of choice fare better in this case in terms of exogeneity
and relevance, since the null of validity of the instruments cannot be rejected in a
larger proportion of speciﬁcations across all the indexes and sub-indexes.
3.6.2 Fixed-eﬀects
Given the large number of time invariant control variables used as additional
covariates the decision was made to perform the EBA analysis without country
speciﬁc time invariant ﬁxed eﬀects. This has the advantage of allowing us to
identify which of any economic, political and social variables included in the Z-
matrix is not robustly associated with corruption. It remains possible however,
that we have excluded an important country-speciﬁc variable from our analysis. To
consider this we estimate the base regression as a ﬁxed eﬀects regression for each
of the diﬀerent measures of press freedom. We exclude the dummy for persistent
democracy, as this is time invariant and therefore collinear with the country ﬁxed
eﬀects.
Comparing the results in table 3.8 with those presented in tables 3.5 and 3.6, it
is evident that the eﬀects of diﬀerent forms of press freedom (both aggregate and
disaggregate) identiﬁed earlier remain the same even after controlling for country
ﬁxed eﬀects, where only laws and regulations is the only insigniﬁcant variable.
There are two main diﬀerences however. Firstly, although the overall press freedom
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Table 3.8: Results of press freedom index on corruption - 1995-2004
Dependent variables: Corruption Index (CPI)
Method: Fixed-eﬀects regressions
Variable of interest (M) Beta t-stat se
Press Freedom (aggregate)
pss -0.012 -2.98*** 0.004
gdp -0.719 -1.50 0.479
pri 0.108 2.47** 0.044
c 8.229 4.28 1.921
r-squared (within) 0.0232
No. observations 510
F-test (all ui = 0), F[50,456] 63.16 (0.00)
Laws and Regulations
pssa -0.008 -0.96 0.009
gdp -0.234 -0.52 0.451
pri 0.631 1.52 0.042
c 6.104 3.43 1.781
r-squared (within) 0.0062
No. observations 510
F-test (all ui = 0), F[50,456] 74.40 (0.00)
Political Inﬂuences
pssb -0.011 -1.89* 0.006
gdp -0.555 -1.14 0.487
pri 0.075 1.81* 0.042
c 7.416 3.82 1.939
r-squared (within) 0.012
No. observations 510
F-test (all ui = 0), F[50,456] 63.26 (0.00)
Economic Inﬂuences
pssc -0.019 -2.43** 0.008
gdp -0.320 -0.71 0.450
pri 0.078 1.90* 0.041
c 6.501 3.66 1.774
r-squared (within) 0.017
No. observations 510
F-test(all ui = 0), F[50,456] 70.40 (0.00)
Only time-varying variables were considered for the econometric speciﬁcation. Of the
three I variables only gdp and pri fulﬁll this criterion, while d50 is a time-invariant
dummy and therefore not included into the model. * Signiﬁcant at the 10% level **
Signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
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index and the economic inﬂuences sub-index is signiﬁcant ever after controlling for
country ﬁxed eﬀects, the coeﬃcient for political inﬂuences sub-index falls slightly
short of signiﬁcance at conventional level (the t-ratio is equal to 1.89). Secondly,
the coeﬃcients are lower than those given in tables 3.5 and 3.6 with the CPI index
(the t-ratios and the adjusted R2 are lower as well)30 .
3.7 Concluding remarks
The motivation in this chapter was to investigate the empirical relationship be-
tween press freedom and corruption and in particular, to evaluate the impact of
diﬀerent types of restrictions to press freedom. We have provided empirical evi-
dence that conﬁrms previous ﬁndings. We also reinforce this evidence by applying
a technique that allows us to incorporate not only a few but instead hundreds
of alternative speciﬁcations so as to take into account the recent ﬁndings on the
empirical determinants of corruption. We also noticed that restrictions to press
freedom come in many guises and this may have diﬀerent impacts on corruption.
We cited anecdotal evidence referring to countries with similar corruption levels
but diﬀerent incidence of, say, political inﬂuences on the media. The econometric
results suggest that not all the forms of restrictions to press freedom are strongly
correlated with corruption. This is the case for example of the laws and regulations
inﬂuencing the media. In contrast, economic and political restrictions are strongly
associated with corruption. More speciﬁcally, it appears that it is economic pres-
sures, which have a slightly stronger association with corruption. Our results are
robust to the use of diﬀerent control variables, to the inclusion of several tests
and to the use of diﬀerent indicators for both press freedom and corruption with
a caution that our measure of press freedom may capture aspects of the political
environment.
Our analysis may be seen as an addition to policy debate. In our study we found
30It should also be noted that the coeﬃcient on GDP has a negative sign in all the regressions.
However, this coeﬃcient is not statistically signiﬁcant in any of the models.
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that certain categories of press freedom have a strong and robust association with
bureaucratic corruption. The analysis allows us to know a little bit more about
how diﬀerent attacks on press freedom are correlated with high corruption lev-
els. Therefore, a situation where political inﬂuences on the media are limited is
likely to be associated with low levels of bureaucratic corruption. According to
our study this would also be the case in countries where economic pressures are
relatively unimportant. The question of whether changes in press freedom would
lead to changes in corruption remains still subject to debate. Using instrumental
variables to tackle the endogeneity problem, we have shed some more light on this
problem. In principle, it would appear that improving the economic environment
for the press sector and contributing to make it more competitive would probably
help to curb corruption. This could probably be relevant for a country like Italy
whose press freedom standards are worse than those of other European countries
such as France, Spain and Portugal. In other words, Italy would resemble more
other developed countries in terms of its corruption levels should its press freedom
standards be similar to those of the countries mentioned above. Furthermore, our
study has potential implications for countries where political inﬂuences on the
media are much more important than other types of restrictions (Pakistan and
Colombia among others). If these countries were to alleviate some of these polit-
ical pressures, most notably the severe violence against journalists, they may be
able to improve their corruption ratings by an amount no lower than 1 (one) point
in the corruption scale. As we noted above, these arguments should be taken with
caution since the evidence concerning the endogeneity problem is still limited.
In relation to the legal environment it seems that either the direct eﬀects on cor-
ruption are much lower than those of the other categories or it may be that many
eﬀects of improving the laws and regulations are passed onto corruption through
economic development. For example, there are several countries where the legal
and regulatory framework is very restrictive and the other types of pressures on
the media are not so strong. This is the case of Malaysia, Jordan and Cameroon.
According to our results, it would be more diﬃcult for these countries to achieve
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improvements in their corruption levels by reducing the restrictions of the legal
and regulatory framework. Naturally, the ﬁndings obtained in this chapter should
be taken with some caution for these relationships may be based on subjective
measures and the causality issue is not fully resolved. But, we remain conﬁdent
that our work is a serious eﬀort in exploring the robustness of the relationship be-
tween press freedom and corruption while also shedding some more light regarding
particular aspects of this relation previously unexplored.
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Chapter 4
Decentralisation, corruption and
development
4.1 Background and motivation
Our motivation in this chapter stems from the need to address the relationship
between decentralisation and corruption from a macroeconomic perspective, con-
sidering the various interdependencies between these aspects. In order to do so,
we bring together three diﬀerent strands of literature to present an integrated
analysis that has been relatively absent in the literature. Firstly, we invoke the
traditional ﬁscal federalism literature and its eﬀects on eﬃciency. The second
strand is related to the role of information asymmetries and control mechanisms
in hierarchical organisations. The ﬁnal topic concerns the eﬀects of bureaucratic
corruption on economic development. The novelty of this study lies in the use
of a dynamic growth model to analyse the relationship between decentralisation,
corruption and growth. To the best of our knowledge this is the ﬁrst study us-
ing such an approach to analyse the relationship between these three variables1.
Our main result highlights the role of corruption and information asymmetries
in determining whether decentralisation is preferred to centralisation in terms of
1Ellis and Dincer (2004) model the relationship between decentralization and corruption but
their study is based and formalized using the idea of yardstick competition.
79
economic development.
The traditional theory of ﬁscal federalism provides strong implications in terms
of the eﬃciency of the decentralised provision of public goods and services. The
theoretical literature has recognised the positive eﬀects that decentralised public
spending has on growth. Since the early contributions of Samuelson and Mus-
grave2, the theory of ﬁscal federalism has supported the view that decentralisation
increases economic welfare by tailoring outputs of such goods and services to the
particular preferences and circumstances of their constituencies [Oates (1999), p.
1122-23]. The Decentralization Theorem [Oates (1972)] establishes a presumption
in support of decentralised provision of public goods and services on the grounds of
eﬃciency. As Oates (1999) argues, this presumption is likely to be more justiﬁed
in the presence of information asymmetries and political constraints. Additionally,
the potential gains from decentralization increase if the demand for local public
goods is highly inelastic, an idea that ﬁnds support in the econometric evidence.
Furthermore, the welfare gains from decentralization are enhanced by the voting
with the feet and the mobile households arguments, although they are not depen-
dent on that assumption. More recently, Brueckner (1999, 2006) has shown that
federalism increases the incentive to save and ultimately leads to higher economic
growth. The presumption of the existence of signiﬁcant eﬃciency and welfare gains
associated with the decentralised provision of public goods has also found support
in recent empirical evidence [Yilmaz (1999), Lin and Liu (200), Akai and Sakata
(2002), Thiessen (2003) and Stansel (2005)]3. In sum, there appears to be both
theoretical and empirical arguments to expect a positive eﬀect of decentralised
provision of public goods and services on eﬃciency and welfare4.
2See Oates (2005) for a detailed review of these early contributions and their importance for
the ﬁscal federalism literature.
3Earlier studies including Davoodi and Zou (1998) and Zhang and Zou (1998), Woller and
Phillips (1998) found no signiﬁcant association between decentralisation and growth.
4There are three main drawbacks of federalism and decentralised provision of public goods:
the sacriﬁce of economies of scale in the provision of certain public goods and services, losses
associated with inter-jurisdictional tax competition and the issue of public-good spillovers and
inter-jurisdictional externalities. While these have been noted in the literature, their extent
and signiﬁcance appear to be limited to speciﬁc sets of public goods and services, taxes and
infrastructure expenditures.
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Another strand of the literature addresses the role of incentives, information asym-
metries and monitoring in organizations. More generally, this literature is con-
cerned with the role of asymmetric information in a principal-subordinate rela-
tionship. One of the main implications of these models is that decentralisation in
the context of hierarchical organisations may lead to higher corruption. In a very
inﬂuential paper, Aghion and Tirole (1997) show that if the information asymme-
try between principal and subordinate is signiﬁcant, real authority rests with the
subordinate. This also tends to raise the monitoring cost for the principal. As
Carbonara (1998) notes in relation to Aghion and Tirole (1997), as the delegation
of formal authority lowers the principal's incentive to perform their screening and
detection activities, decentralisation encourages corrupt activities. The last pa-
per shows that decentralisation of authority may increase corruption under some
conditions. Similar ideas are also presented by Bac (1996) who argues that ﬂatter
hierarchies are preferred when government monitoring is not specialized. In other
words, due to the larger and wider span of control that the government has on
steeper hierarchies, a more centralised organisation is more convenient. Both the
bureaucracy and the government are hierarchical organizations and some of the
aspects regarding its internal information and coordination relationships may be
analysed and interpreted using these theories. If we agree that decentralisation
involves the creation of intermediate decision layers consisting of public agents in
charge of certain decisions, then these ideas of formal and real authority, informa-
tion asymmetries and deﬁcient monitoring are certainly important in the debate
on the relationship between decentralisation and corruption.
Finally, the third strand of the literature we bring into our theoretical model is
related to the eﬀect of corruption on economic development. Although some time
ago there were suggestions that bureaucratic corruption could foster eﬃciency
and development, the view in recent decades is that corruption has a negative
eﬀect on economic development. This eﬀect operates through diﬀerent channels
among which the diversion of resources away from productive activities is one of
the most important. This has been suggested both in theoretical studies [Murphy
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et al. (1991, 1993), Romer (1994)] and empirical studies [Mauro (1995), Brunetti
(1997), Hines (1995) and Kaufmann et al. (1999)]. At the same time, there is a
growing literature that acknowledges the existence of a bi-directional relationship
between corruption and development. The main proposition of these studies is
that bureaucratic corruption and development are jointly determined where equi-
librium behaviour is dependent on the decisions of other agents. Multiple equilibria
are typical in these models which predict a two-way negative relationship between
corruption and development. This literature also explains the existence and persis-
tence of corruption as a permanent feature of the economy [Ehrlich and Lui (1999),
Mauro (2004), Aidt et al. (2005) and Blackburn et al. (2006)]. These theoretical
presumptions have received some support in a few empirical studies [Haque and
Kneller (2004), Aidt et al. (2005) and Mendez and Sepulveda (2006)] who have
found a non-monotonic relationship between corruption and development.
Having already established the motivation of our research, it is important to note
the relevance of the topic analysed in this chapter. The relationship between de-
centralisation and development has received an increasing share of research eﬀort
over recent decades. This is in part a consequence of a global trend towards devo-
lution and decentralisation5, most notably in developing and transition economies.
A large number of countries have implemented programmes and strategies to
redesign the relationship between diﬀerent levels of government [Manor (1999),
UNFPA (2000), Rodriguez-Pose and Gill (2003)]. Industrialized countries have
voluntarily taken steps to decentralize the provision of certain public services and
adopted more decentralised schemes of power sharing. In these countries, the main
objective has been to improve the delivery of public services and to adapt govern-
ment structures to better suit the needs of the citizens. This is for example, the
5 Although often used as equivalent, concepts such as decentralisation, deconcentration and
devolution refer to slightly diﬀerent and particular aspects of the relations between central and
periphery governments. We will refer to decentralisation to describe any type of power shift away
from the centre while we will use diﬀerent concepts of decentralisation (administrative, ﬁscal,
political, etc.) in diﬀerent sections of this chapter. Manor (1999) describes the diﬀerent concepts
of decentralisation in the following three types: a) deconcentration or administrative decentral-
isation; b) ﬁscal decentralisation; and c) devolution or democratic (political) decentralisation.
Other useful references on this are UNDP (1999) and Treisman (2002b).
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case of the decentralisation of service delivery in the UK since the early 1980's.
The introduction of neighbourhood oﬃces to improve access to certain services
had limited success but created the foundations for other reforms as in the case of
the decentralisation of the UK health system [Leach et al. (1994)]. Similarly there
have been signiﬁcant transfers of powers to the National Parliaments of Scotland,
Wales and Northern Ireland.
In the case of developing countries, the decision to redeﬁne the relations between
government levels was mainly driven by the recommendations from international
organizations such as the World Bank and the United Nations. The main objec-
tives behind such recommendations were those of promoting development through
the rearrangement of ﬁscal, political and administrative relations between govern-
ments and strengthening civil and democratic institutions. Whether voluntarily
adopted or externally dictated, there is little doubt that decentralisation strategies
have been encouraged primarily on the grounds of the perceived beneﬁts found in
the traditional theory of ﬁscal federalism, i.e. eﬃciency in public provision and
intergovernmental competition and greater matching of local needs with provi-
sion. In addition to this, decentralisation has also been supported by the view
that centralised socialist regimes failed to generate conditions leading to sustained
growth. The experiences of China, India and Russia are good examples of this. In
any case, as Manor (1999) argues, almost every country has adopted some form
of decentralisation over the last decades based on the general presumption that
it would provide a solution to many diﬀerent kind of problems which centralised
regimes had failed to address.
It does not follow however, even if centralised regimes have little credit on em-
pirical (or anecdotal) grounds, that the more decentralised structures are bereft
of such problems. While the transition to decentralisation may address several
of the eﬃciency issues mentioned before, it creates new problems. For example,
local capture of governments and inappropriate accountability systems may stand
in the way of the decentralisation process and overturn the beneﬁts of allocative
eﬃciency. Other sources of complications include the existence of agency prob-
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lems, information asymmetries, deﬁcient monitoring of sub-national governments
and problems arising due to vertical ﬁscal imbalances. These and other related
topics form an important part of the recent and current research on ﬁscal federal-
ism and decentralisation which aims to integrate political economy considerations
in the traditional approach. As noted by Bardhan (2002), these considerations
are specially relevant in developing countries where the political and institutional
framework at the sub-national level is often very weak. Learning why and how
these problems arise and develop under diﬀerent governmental arrangements and
the consequences they have for development is essential in order to inform the
discussion on these matters. Our aim in this chapter is to contribute to the under-
standing of the complex interactions between decentralisation and development
by focusing on a speciﬁc aspect of this relation, namely corruption.
Public sector corruption aﬀects development in several ways, the more obvious
being the allocation of resources away from productive activities and the squan-
dering of public funds. There are however more subtle ways in which corruption
may distort incentives and modify behaviour of economic agents bearing impli-
cations for development. Once recognised, it becomes clear that the analysis of
the relationship between corruption and development should be approached using
many diﬀerent conﬁgurations of assumptions. These eﬀorts have produced a large
body of literature studying this relation at several levels6.
Among the most debated topics in the decentralisation and development litera-
ture, an interesting idea concerns the possibility that the nature, extent and eﬀects
of bureaucratic corruption may be sensitive to the design of the relations between
(and within) diﬀerent levels of government. This suggestion, made by Shleifer and
Vishny (1993), Prud'homme (1994), Oates (1999), and Bardhan (2002), has intro-
duced yet another level to the debate on the beneﬁts of decentralisation for both
industrialized and developing countries. If we consider this possibility seriously,
then it is important to incorporate these considerations into any analysis of the
6For an excellent survey on corruption and development see Bardhan (1997). Aidt (2003)
surveys a number of theoretical approaches to corruption and Jain (2001) reviews some important
theoretical and empirical aspects of corruption.
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problems of corruption and test the robustness of results.
The potential importance of institutional features in a world of increased decen-
tralisation noted above forms one of the main motives for this study. There are
several reasons to believe that the nature and scope of bureaucratic corruption are
likely to be diﬀerent under centralised and decentralised government structures.
Some of these reasons have been analysed in the literature of the new political
economy of decentralisation in the form of information asymmetries [Bird (1994)],
political accountability [Seabright (1996)], capture by elite groups [Bardhan and
Mookherjee (2000)], yardstick competition [Besley and Case (1995)], conﬂict of
interests [Blanchard and Shleifer (2001)], and structural organisation of bribery
[Shleifer and Vishny (1993)]. Some of these elements may inﬂuence the decision of
a bureaucrat to be corrupt and they may also aﬀect the extent of corruption in an
economy. Hence, we will study the suggestion that the eﬀect of centralisation and
decentralisation on development may depend on the nature and extent of corrup-
tion using a dynamic general equilibrium approach. We develop this framework
in the next section and specify the potential implications that this may have for
policy design and implementation.
Reviewing the anecdotal and case-study evidence over the last two or three decades,
we ﬁnd a common pattern of meagre success (if any) of decentralisation pro-
grammes among developing countries. This is the case for example of Indonesia,
a highly centralised country which has implemented a decentralisation process
with very unimpressive results to date7. Some Latin American countries, like
Argentina, Chile and Colombia, experienced mixed results following the decen-
tralisation of certain public services and in particular of education during the
80's and early 90's. On one hand, some improvements were achieved in terms
of educational indicators but on the other hand, the sub-national levels found it
extremely burdensome to cope with the new services and this led to overspending,
mismanagement, and rising provincial and municipal debts. In all cases, the way in
7Some of the obstacles the decentralisation program has encountered in Indonesia are de-
scribed in Decentralize Indonesia without dismantling it, International Herald Tribune, 23 Jan-
uary 2001.
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which the accountability relationships were set to work determined the success or
failure of the decentralisation programme. With the exception of Nicaragua and
El Salvador, all the countries failed to ensure these accountability relationships
and decentralisation brought along new problems8. These examples also extend
to some African countries where problems of accountability and corruption have
sprung up following decentralisation attempts.
This chapter studies the relationship between corruption and decentralisation from
a macroeconomic perspective. Given that the eﬀects of any decentralisation pro-
gramme are ultimately spread to the aggregate variables, this has some value.
Providing a macroeconomic analysis may also help to understand better the links
and channels between corruption and economic development. We put the em-
phasis on the relation between the existence of corruption, the power-sharing ar-
rangements between the governments and economic development. The analysis
presented in this model is unique in that it provides an explicit formulation of
the relationship between corruption, decentralisation and economic development.
We bring together the theoretical and empirical predictions of both the traditional
and modern ﬁscal federalism theories and ﬁnd that the eﬀect of decentralisation on
development depends crucially on the existence and extent of corruption. Without
corruption, decentralisation is unambiguously the best outcome for development.
However, if corruption is pervasive, decentralisation may be associated with lower
capital accumulation than centralisation. This result is more likely to be observed
in developing countries with weak local political institutions and signiﬁcant infor-
mation asymmetries between the government and local administrations.
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. The next section presents
the model introducing the agents and their motivations. Section 4.3 analyzes the
incentive condition for agents to be corrupt and examines the presence of corrup-
tion in the model. In section 4.4 we derive the expressions for the budget equation
8Di Gropello (2004) provides a detailed account of several experiences of educational decen-
tralisation in Latin American countries and their rather unimpressive results. The substantial
overspending and lack of accountability of sub-national administrations following these and other
decentralisation programmes has been a cause of concern ever since.
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and taxes under corruption and no-corruption. Section 4.5.1 deals with the case
of a centralised economy under corruption and no-corruption. Section 4.5.2 an-
alyzes what happens when the economy is decentralised and the corresponding
implications for corruption and development. Section 4.6 concludes.
4.2 The Model
We develop a dynamic macroeconomic growth model with public services [Barro
(1990)], corruption, poverty traps and development [Ehrlich and Lui (1999), Mauro
(2004), Blackburn et al. (2006)]. These models have certain common features,
most important of which include the existence of multiple equilibria and devel-
opment traps originating from the interaction between opposing forces. While
Ehrlich and Lui (1999) put the emphasis on the trade-oﬀ between socially unpro-
ductive political capital and growth-enhancing human capital, Mauro (2004) and
Blackburn et al. (2006) base their analysis around the incentives faced by oﬃcials
to engage in corruption. Our model follows more closely the latter.
4.2.1 Environment
Time is discrete and indexed by t = 0, 1, ...,∞. All agents live for two-periods only
and belong to overlapping generations of dynastic families. There are two groups of
agents -households and bureaucrats9. Total population is constant and normalised
to 1, a proportion m of which are households and n are bureaucrats (n < m).
All agents work and save during the ﬁrst period and consume only in the second
period. Households work for private ﬁrms in exchange for a wage while bureaucrats
work for the government implementing policy. Policies are designed by politicians,
who are part of the government, and it is they that are in charge of monitoring
9We assume away the occupational choice problem by making agents diﬀerentiated at birth.
The skills required to become a bureaucrat are only possessed by a fraction of the population.
Later on, when we refer to the behaviour of bureaucrats, we specify a condition by which they
are induced to take public oﬃce rather than working in the private sector.
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the activities of the bureaucrats10. Public policy consists of a package of taxes and
expenditures, G, destined to provide public goods and services. Corruption arises
when, under certain conditions, bureaucrats are willing and able to appropriate
public funds in an unlawful manner thereby reducing the eﬀective level of provision
of public goods and services destined to productive activities. In order to avoid
certain rigidities imposed by the settings of our model, we assume that, no matter
how strong the incentives to engage in corruption, there will always be a core of
non-corruptible (and hence non-corrupt) agents. In this way, we assume that a
proportion ν ∈ (0, 1) of all the bureaucrats are corruptible while the remaining
1− ν are non-corruptible, and by deﬁnition, never corrupt11. On the other hand,
all the other agents undertake activities in the private sector and their behaviour
may be indirectly inﬂuenced by bureaucratic behaviour. Households work for
private ﬁrms who, in turn, combine labour and capital to produce ﬁnal output.
All markets are perfectly competitive and payments to the productive factors are
equal to their marginal products.
4.2.2 Households
Young households -households in the ﬁrst period- are endowed with λ > 1 units of
labour which they supply inelastically to ﬁrms in return for a wage wt. Total labour
supply in the economy amounts to lt = λm. In addition to their labour income,
each young household receives a bequest bt from the previous generation
12. They
are also liable to pay taxes out of their gross income. For simplicity we assume
they pay a lump-sum tax τt and their net lifetime income is therefore equal to
λwt − τt + bt. Households save their entire net income at the market interest rate
10For simplicity, we see the government as a benevolent policy maker. As we are only dealing
with bureaucratic corruption, we do not consider the possibility of elections incentives or a
corrupt government in our chapter.
11We should also note at this point that the identity of a bureaucrat, that is whether he is of
the corruptible or non-corruptible type, is unobservable to the government.
12The introduction of bequests into the model is made for purely technical reasons. As we
are not interested in modelling bequests motives, we therefore choose a very simple formulation
and with warm-glow altruism where parents leave a part of their earnings to their oﬀspring and
derive utility from this donation as originally suggested by Yaari (1965).
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to pay for private consumption and bequests left at the end of their lives in the
second period13. Each household derives linear utility from their consumption of
private goods and also from their donations to their oﬀspring. Consequently, his
lifetime income and utility are given by:
yhi = (1 + rt+1) [λwt − τt + bt] (4.2.1)
Uhi = (1 + rt+1) [λwt − τt + bt]− bt+1 + u(bt+1) (4.2.2)
where rt+1 is the market interest rate on household savings and u(bt+1) is a non-
decreasing and strictly concave function that reﬂects the joy-of-giving motive
associated with leaving bequests. Utility is maximized by the household by setting
ub(·) = 1 which implies a ﬁxed-amount intergenerational bequest equal to b for
all t. We should note that households earnings (and savings) are only aﬀected by
changes in wages and taxes. As we shall see in the next sections, bureaucratic
behaviour will aﬀect these and may have important implications for the level of
development.
4.2.3 The Government
The government enters the model through the eﬀect public spending has on pri-
vate output. In particular, we assume as in Barro (1990) that spending in public
goods and services, G, is an input to the production function. Each unit of public
spending G yields an amount σG, (σ ≤ 1) units of productive service. Once the
government decides on the total amount of public spending, it then delegates the
implementation and arrangements to bureaucrats. It is important to note that
in our model the design of policies is the sole responsibility of the government
13In our model, unlike similar papers in the literature, households savings are not directly
aﬀected by the activities of bureaucrats but rather indirectly via the eﬀect embezzlement of
government funds has on the level of taxation.
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(politicians)14. Bureaucrats only have authority over the implementation of
public policies15. Designing a policy package entails deciding the amount of public
spending to be allocated to each bureaucrat git such that
n∑
i=1
gi = ng = G. Politi-
cians will then allocate the funds to the respective bureaucrats who will carry out
the implementation of the policies. We also note that bureaucrats are respon-
sible for the collection of taxes from households but we rule out the possibility
of collusion between bureaucrats and households to avoid the payment16. As in
previous analysis [Blackburn et al. (2006), Blackburn and Forgues-Puccio (2006)]
we assume that the government pays each bureaucrat a wage equal to the one
paid by ﬁrms in the private sector. In doing so, the government ensures complete
bureaucratic participation. If a bureaucrat is discovered to be corrupt, the gov-
ernment ﬁres him and strips him of his wage while recouping a fraction δ of the
amount stolen.
The government ﬁnances its public expenditures by running a continuously bal-
anced budget. Government revenues consist of taxes imposed on households plus
any ﬁnes collected from bureaucrats who are found corrupt. The government
knows the amount of tax revenue it should collect in the absence of corruption
since it sets the tax rate and knows the number of tax-paying households17. If rev-
enues fall short of this amount then the government will suspect that corruption
is taking place. In this case, the government decides to investigate the activities
of bureaucrats by using an imprecise costless monitoring technology18. In any
14Alesina and Tabellini (2004) consider a model where politicians and bureaucrats have dif-
ferent objectives and where elections have a role in the model. The objective of that paper is
diﬀerent to our objective here although it would be possible, in principle, to incorporate elections
and politician incentives in our model.
15Although this may be seem as too extreme, it is in fact true that in most policy areas
bureaucrats act under the supervision of politicians and have only marginal or limited authority
over many decisions. See Peters (2001) for reference.
16This activity may generate opportunities for public abuse in the form of bribery and tax
evasion. However, as all households have the same labour endowment and income, and are also
subject to the same tax liability, corruption of this form does not arise in our model.
17We abstract from considering other problems that may aﬀect the certainty of tax revenues
such as tax evasion.
18For the sake of simplicity and to save on notation, we assume that government monitoring
is costless. This may be reasonable if we think that ex-post monitoring is a rather negligible
fraction of total government expenditures. In any case, costly monitoring could be added into the
model in a straightforward way without modifying the main results. In fact, it would strengthen
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case, the government is only able to detect and punish corrupt bureaucrats with a
probability p ∈ (0, 1) and with probability 1− p the governments fails to capture
the wrongdoers.
4.2.4 Bureaucrats
Following Ehrlich and Lui (1999) we assume that government intervention in the
economy necessitates the existence and active participation of a bureaucratic sec-
tor19. As we have already mentioned, bureaucrats are appointed by the govern-
ment (politicians) to implement a set of public policies. We assume that the
bureaucratic sector has an informational advantage over the government and this
asymmetry is also behind the inability to precisely monitor corrupt oﬃcials20. Al-
though not directly accountable to the citizens they are certain to be ﬁred by the
government if found corrupt while holding oﬃce.
All bureaucrats earn a wage wBt for supplying inelastically their unit of labour
endowment. Like households, bureaucrats save their total income during the ﬁrst
period for consumption in the second period. For simplicity, we assume that wages
are the only source of legal income for bureaucrats and that these are equal to
the wages paid in the private sector by ﬁrms. We have already noted that there
are two types of bureaucrats -corruptible and non-corruptible-. By deﬁnition, a
non-corruptible bureaucrat is never corrupt and resorts to his legal income only.
Accordingly, his income is always certain and equal to wbt = wt. The lifetime
income and utility of a non-corruptible bureaucrat are therefore given by:
our results since costly monitoring of corrupt bureaucrats adds an extra loss of resources to the
economy.
19The complexity of modern government structures makes it impossible for the government
to make policy interventions without recourse to bureaucrats. As noted by Banerjee (1997) and
Acemoglu and Verdier (1998), the agency problems created as a consequence of this are one of
the crucial issues behind the existence of bureaucratic corruption.
20There are a number of treatments that examine in detail the role of public bureaus. In
particular, Peters (2001) provides such an account and a detailed presentation of the nature,
behaviour and motivations of modern bureaucracies. We assume that bureaucrats have no
power over the design of policies, they are only able to alter its implementation.
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ync,b = wbt (4.2.3)
Unc,b = wbt (1 + rt+1) (4.2.4)
A corruptible bureaucrat may or may not decide to engage in corruption. In
particular, any such bureaucrat will evaluate the (expected) beneﬁts of engaging in
corruption against the beneﬁts of remaining honest. If he decides against engaging
in corruption, then his income and utility are given by equation 4.2.3 and 4.2.4. If
a bureaucrat decides to engage in corruption he embezzles a fraction θit ∈ (0, 1) of
his public funds allocation g. For simplicity we assume that each bureaucrat steals
the same fraction out of government funds, hence θt = θ
21. Therefore, the income
of a corrupt bureaucrat is equal to wbt (1 + rt+1) + θtg with probability (1− p) and
with probability p he is caught and ﬁred earning (1 − δ)θtg
22. We can write the
expected income and utility of a corrupt bureaucrat as:
U b,c = wbt (1 + rt+1)(1− p) + θg(1− pδ) (4.2.5)
4.2.5 Firms
Output is produced by ﬁrms which hire labour from households and rent capital
(loans) from all agents. There is a unit mass of identical output producers. The
21Naturally, the fraction a given bureaucrat may be able to steal depends on several factors.
One of them is the probability of detection which in our model is constant for bureaucrats at
the same level of administration as we later explain. Another factor is the oﬃce power of a
bureaucrat relative to other bureaucrats. Although it is likely that there are diﬀerences in this,
we assume the simplest case where all bureaucrats are alike in terms of oﬃce power. We discuss
this issue in more detail later in the chapter.
22To leave things simple, we rule out the possibility of investing embezzled funds in either the
formal or informal sector. In this way, bureaucrats have to spend or hide their illegal income.
Other possibilities have been analysed in the literature, such as spending additional resources
to avoid being caught [Blackburn et al. (2006)] or by shipping the embezzled funds abroad
[Blackburn and Forgues-Puccio (2006)].
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representative ﬁrm maximizes proﬁts. The production technology of the represen-
tative ﬁrm is given by:
yt = Al
α
t K
α
t k
1−α
t G
β A > 0 ; α, β ∈ (0, 1) (4.2.6)
where lt are labour units, Kt denotes the aggregate stock of capital and Gt de-
notes total amount of productive services yielded by public spending23. Labour
is hired at the competitive wage rate wt and capital is rented at the compet-
itive rate rt. Proﬁt maximization implies wt = αAl
α−1
t K
α
t k
1−α
t G
β
t and rt =
(1− α)Alαt K
α
t k
−α
t G
β
t . Since in equilibrium lt = l = λm and kt = Kt, we can
write these as:
wt = αA(λm)
α−1Gβkt ≡ w(kt) (4.2.7)
rt = (1− α)A(λm)
αGβ ≡ r (4.2.8)
We can observe that the wage rate is proportional to the capital stock whereas
the equilibrium interest rate is constant.
4.3 The incentive to be corrupt
Having presented the utilities and optimization conditions for all the agents, it
should be clear by now that corruptible bureaucrats face a decision on whether
to engage in corruption or not. In particular, they will do so if their expected
beneﬁts are no less than the beneﬁts of remaining honest. From equation 4.2.5
and noting that rt = rt+1 = r we can write this condition as:
23We incorporate both an economy-wide capital as in Romer (1986) and the services provided
by the public goods and services into the production function as in Barro (1990) as inputs
enhancing the eﬃciency of private production.
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wt(1 + r)(1− p) + θg(1− pδ) ≥ wt(1 + r) (4.3.1)
where the left-hand side term is his expected utility of embezzling funds and the
right-hand side term is his utility if he is honest. This expression can be rearranged
conveniently to yield:
θg(1− pδ) ≥ pwt(1 + r) (4.3.2)
One crucial aspect of condition 4.3.2 is that it includes the economy-wide variables
wt and r. As we will see, both variables are functions of the aggregate level of
corruption in the economy. This means that the motivation for a bureaucrat to
engage in corruption will be aﬀected by the decisions adopted by other bureaucrats.
We can start exploring these motivations by analyzing two alternative and extreme
scenarios, one in which all bureaucrats are honest and one in which all bureaucrats
are corrupt. We should remember at this point that corrupt behaviour aﬀects
the economy through a reduction in the available amount of public productive
services which are themselves an input into the production function of output by
ﬁrms. In this sense, only the ﬁnal amount of public goods and services enters
the production function and is denoted by Gt in equations 4.2.7 and 4.2.8. This
means that, if corruption exists, there will be a diﬀerence between the amount of
public funds the government decided to provide and the amount of public funds
destined for productive activities.
We start by considering the case where all corruptible bureaucrats are honest.
In this case, total government expenditure equals total public services delivered
yielding G = Gˆ = nσg in productive services. Accordingly, the incentive condition
4.3.2 becomes:
θg(1− pδ) ≥ (1 + rˆ)pwˆt ≡ ζˆ(kt) (4.3.3)
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where
rˆ = (1− α)A(λm)ασβ(ng)β (4.3.4)
wˆt = αA(λm)
α−1σβ(ng)βkt ≡ wˆ(kt) (4.3.5)
The incentive condition given in 4.3.3 is the incentive condition for an individual
bureaucrat to be corrupt given that no other bureaucrat is corrupt.
On the other hand, if all corruptible bureaucrats decide to engage in corruption
and they embezzle a fraction θ out of public funds, then the total amount of public
productive services delivered will be equal to G = G˜ = nσg(1− θ). The incentive
condition in this case becomes:
θg(1− pδ) ≥ (1 + r˜)pw˜t ≡ ζ˜(kt) (4.3.6)
where
r˜ = (1− α)A(λm)ασβ(ng)β(1− θ)β (4.3.7)
w˜t = αA(λm)
α−1σβ(ng)β(1− θ)βkt ≡ w˜(kt) (4.3.8)
Expression 4.3.6 is the condition for an individual corruptible bureaucrat to engage
in corruption given that all other corruptible bureaucrats are also corrupt.
We can see that the only diﬀerence between the two set of equations for the wage
rate and interest rate is the presence of the term (1− θ) as an argument of these
expressions for the all-corruption case. Given that (1−θ) is between 0 and 1 (since
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0 < θ < 1), it is clear that for any given stock of capital the wage rate is lower
under corruption than under no-corruption. Similarly, if we compare equations
4.3.4 and 4.3.7, we see that for any given stock of capital the interest rate is also
lower when corruption exists. The economic explanation of this is that the total
amount of public productive services under the presence of corruption is smaller
(G˜ < Gˆ), which reduces the productivity of the other inputs in the production of
private goods.
4.4 Corruption and public ﬁnances
In the previous section, we established the condition for a bureaucrat to be corrupt
under two diﬀerent hypothetical scenarios. We also showed how the existence of
corruption aﬀected certain economy-wide variables such as wages and interest
rates. We also noted earlier that changes in households (and bureaucrats) savings
were caused by changes in taxes and wages. It should be clear that wages are
aﬀected in the presence of corruption and that this aﬀects the net earnings (and
savings) of both households and bureaucrats. Now we study how are taxes aﬀected
by the existence of corruption and the eﬀect this has on savings.
Since the government maintains a balanced budget each period it is essential to
examine the budget equation under the two proposed scenarios for the level of
taxes will be diﬀerent in each case. First, if corruption is absent in the economy,
government expenditures comprise wages paid to bureaucrats and spending on
public goods and services. Revenues consist of tax receipts from all households.
In this case, the budget equation looks like:
mτ = ng + nwˆt (4.4.1)
We can determine the amount of taxes levied on households when all corruptible
bureaucrats are honest as the following:
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τ =
ng + nwˆt
m
≡ τˆ (4.4.2)
In comparison we consider the situation where all corruptible bureaucrats are
indeed corrupt. In this case, each bureaucrat embezzles θg with probability (1−p)
and if caught and ﬁred (with probability p), he retains θg(1 − δ). Accordingly,
government expenditures comprise wages paid to bureaucrats and spending on
public goods and services. However, unlike the previous case, both total wages
and spending are aﬀected. This occurs in part because there is a proportion
of corrupt bureaucrats who are caught and dismissed without pay, government
expenditure on wages are reduced by npνw˜t -the salaries of corrupt bureaucrats
who are ﬁred. It also occurs because as bureaucrats steal government funds that
otherwise would have constituted tax receipts, the government loses nνθg(1− pδ)
in public funds to corrupt bureaucrats that get away with their malfeasance24.
Under these conditions, the budget equation becomes:
mτ = ng + nw˜t(1− pν) + nνθg(1− pδ) (4.4.3)
and the level of taxes levied on households when all corruptible bureaucrats are
corrupt is given by:
τ =
ng + nw˜t(1− pν) + nνθg(1− pδ)
m
≡ τ˜ (4.4.4)
Comparing equations 4.4.2 and 4.4.4, we see that the level of taxes under cor-
ruption may be higher or lower than under no-corruption. This is because while
corruption results in the loss of public funds (embezzled funds), it also leads to
lower payments of wages to bureaucrats (given that a fraction p of bureaucrats are
caught and ﬁred without pay). In fact, taxes under corruption will be higher only
if nw˜t(1−pν)+nνθg(1−pδ) > nwˆt. Note that we can see the total amount of em-
24Note that this amount is the result of the total amount of embezzled funds nvθg minus the
funds that are recovered from corrupt bureaucrats that are caught nvpθgδ.
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bezzled funds nνθg(1−pδ) as an indication of the aggregate impact of corruption.
Accordingly, the incidence of corruption in the economy will be larger the higher
the fraction of corruptible bureaucrats, ν, the higher the funds allocated to each
bureaucrat g, the lower the probability of detection p, and the lower the fraction
the government is able to recover out of funds embezzled by bureaucrats who are
caught δ. We are now ready to analyse how corruption aﬀects capital accumu-
lation in the economy. We explore this possibility by analysing two alternative
scenarios.
4.5 Regimes and development
In this section we address the issue of determining diﬀerent regimes of corruption
and development by focusing on the structural organisation of public service de-
livery. In particular, we focus on two alternative extreme cases, full centralisation
and full decentralisation. In order to incorporate the ﬁscal federalism proposi-
tions into this model we assume that regardless of whether corruption exists or
not, decentralised provision of public goods and services is more (economically)
eﬃcient than centralised provision. This assumption is meant to capture the dif-
ferences -widely acknowledged and recognised in the literature- in the eﬃciency of
public service delivery between centralisation and decentralisation25. To keep the
analysis simple, we assume that the parameter σ, which represents the economic
eﬃciency associated to the provision of public goods and services, is larger under
decentralisation than under centralisation. In particular, we assume that σc < 1
and σd = 1. We analyse the case of centralisation ﬁrst.
25It should be noted that this is a sensible assumption to make in the context of the ﬁscal
federalism literature. As we have argued earlier, there is signiﬁcant theoretical and empirical
support for this assumption although it is particularly relevant in the presence of certain condi-
tions such as the absence of interjurisdictional spillovers and the existence of competition among
jurisdictions. One should also consider the possibility that poor countries may not reap the
economic beneﬁts of decentralisation due to the presence of weak institutions. Still, if the basic
conditions proposed by the theory of ﬁscal federalism are present, the presumption may still be
valid.
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4.5.1 Centralisation and development
In this section, we consider the case of an economy where the provision of public
services is carried out by central level bureaucrats only. Probably the best way to
think about this situation is one where local or regional bureaucrats have limited
powers or no powers at all. In such a case, top-level or central bureaucrats are re-
sponsible for the nationwide administration and delivery of public services. In such
a conﬁguration, we assume that the informational asymmetry problem between
central bureaucrats and the government is limited. This idea ﬁnds support in a
signiﬁcant number of studies in the literature on industrial organisation. Bardhan
(2002) argues that national information and monitoring systems are more eﬃcient
than those at the local and regional level. But even if the bureaucrats at this
level are better informed than the government about embezzlement opportunities,
the fact that these bureaucrats are closer to the central government (not only
in geographical terms but more importantly in hierarchical terms) simpliﬁes the
monitoring tasks by the government. It is agreed that monitoring and auditing are
better developed and more eﬃcient at the national than at the local or regional
level [Prud'homme (1995)]. Additionally, one may think that in this type of set-
ting bureaucrats constitute a more or less homogeneous and cohesive group which
further facilitates the monitoring tasks. The introduction of this assumption will
aﬀect θ which is labeled θc in this scenario.
We can now study how accumulation takes place in a corruption-free environment.
In this case, both households and bureaucrats save their legal income. The sum
of net savings by households and bureaucrats yields the total amount of savings
in the economy as follows:
sˆt = m(λwˆt − τˆt + b) + nwˆt (4.5.1)
where m(λwˆt − τt + b) are total household savings and nwˆt are total bureaucrat
savings. Using equations 4.3.5 and 4.4.1 to rewrite equation 4.5.1 it follows that
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capital accumulation occurs in the following way:
kˆct+1 = αA(λm)
α(σc)β(ng)βkt − ng + mb ≡ fˆ
c(kt) (4.5.2)
Now we consider the case where the economy is aﬀected by corruption. As we know
from the previous discussion, this is the case where all corruptible bureaucrats
are corrupt. In this situation, total savings comprise the net total savings by
households plus the savings of all bureaucrats which are diﬀerent from the non-
corruption case. Note also that a number (1−ν)n of bureaucrats (non-corruptible)
are able to save their legal income, but the group of corruptible bureaucrats will
have an expected level of savings equal to νn(1− p)w˜t. Thus, the wage that both
corruptible and non-corruptible bureaucrats receive is lower than the wage in the
non-corruption case. In this way, total savings are given by:
sˆt = m(λw˜t − τ˜t + b) + (1− ν)nw˜t + νn(1− p)w˜t (4.5.3)
Replacing w˜t and τ˜t by their equals in equations 4.3.8 and 4.4.4 and plugging them
into 4.5.3, we can derive the capital accumulation equation for the case where all
corruptible bureaucrats are corrupt as:
k˜ct+1 = αA(λm)
α(σc)β(ng)β(1−θc)βkt−ng[1+νθ
c(1−pδ)]+mb ≡ f˜ c(kt) (4.5.4)
Working with 4.5.2 and 4.5.4, we can ﬁnd the steady state levels of capital for
each case as the following:
100
kˆc,∗ =
mb− ng
1− αA(λm)α(σc)β(ng)β
(4.5.5)
k˜c,∗ =
mb− ng[1 + νθc(1− pδ)]
1− αA(λm)α(σc)β(ng)β(1− θc)β
(4.5.6)
These steady state levels of capital are stationary if both mb > ng[1 + νθ(1− pδ)]
and if αA(λm)α(σc)β(ng)β ∈ (0, 1) are satisﬁed26.
From equations 4.5.5 and 4.5.6, it is evident that capital accumulation is lower
under corruption than under no-corruption, that is k˜c,∗ < kˆc,∗27. The intuition
behind this can be seen by remembering how corruption aﬀects the main variables.
First, as we have already noted, at every level of capital, the marginal productivity
of labour is lower under corruption than no-corruption. The rationale behind this
is that when bureaucrats embezzle public funds, the amount of public spending
injected in the economy is lower and this reduces the productivity of labour and
hence wages. Second, corruption raises the total costs of public goods causing
taxes to be higher and resulting in lower private savings.
It is important to stress the result that corruption is harmful to development and
that this is due to the loss of public resources and the decrease in public spending
in goods and services. Furthermore, we are able to establish that corruption not
only aﬀects development but low development aﬀects corruption. This follows
from section 4.3 noting that ζˆ(kt) > ζ˜(kt). One can clearly observe that both
conditions are increasing monotonically in kt. It is easy to show that there exist
two critical levels of capital k∗1 and k
∗
2 such that:
Deﬁnition k1,b is the unique value of kt for which ζˆ(k1,b) = θg(1− pδ) such that
26Note that if mb > ng[1 + νθ(1 − pδ)] then it is true that mb > ng. The same observation
is valid for the other condition since if αA(λm)α(σc)β(ng)β ∈ (0, 1) then it is also true that
αA(λm)α(σc)β(ng)β(1− θc)β ∈ (0, 1).
27This follows from the evidence that for any given kt, f˜
c(·) < fˆc(·).
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ζˆ(·) < θg(1− pδ) for all kt < k1,b and ζˆ(·) > θg(1− pδ) for all kt > k1,b.
Deﬁnition k2,b is the unique value of kt for which ζ˜(k2,b) = θg(1− pδ) such that
ζ˜(·) < θg(1− pδ) for all kt < k2,b and ζ˜(·) > θg(1− pδ) for all kt > k2,b.
It is clear that k1,b < k2,b and that these capital levels deﬁne boundaries beyond
which the incentive conditions given in section 4.3 are satisﬁed or not. Using
these critical capital levels, we can now determine whether corruption forms part
of an equilibrium or not. In particular, if kt < k1,b, there exists an equilibrium
in which all corruptible bureaucrats are corrupt. And if kt > k2,b, there exists
an equilibrium in which all corruptible bureaucrats are non-corrupt. Finally, if
k1,b < kt < k2,b, it results in multiple equilibria where bureaucrats are either
corrupt or non-corrupt. These results validate the other side of our argument, i.e.
that low levels of development are associated to high corruption and viceversa28.
As we can infer, these results give rise to three diﬀerent development regimes. The
ﬁrst, a low-development regime where there is a unique stable equilibrium and for
which corruption is part of the economy (in fact, corruption is at a maximum
in this regime). The second, a high-development regime where there is a unique
stable equilibrium and for which corruption is not part of the economy (there
is zero corruption). Finally, an intermediate-development regime where there are
multiple equilibria which are frequency dependent, i.e. the decision of a corruptible
bureaucrat to be corrupt will rely heavily on the number of other bureaucrats who
are corrupt or not. These results are represented in ﬁgure 4.1.
4.5.2 Decentralisation and development
In this section we focus on the determination of capital accumulation under a
regime of bureaucratic decentralisation. Unlike the previous regime where local
bureaucrats had no involvement in the implementation of policies, in this case the
28Although these cases imply total and zero corruption, in practice there always remains still
a core of non-corruptible and non-corrupt bureaucrats.
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Figure 4.1: Corruption and development. Parameter values: α = 0.4, A = 3,
λ > 1, m = 0.6, n = 0.2, g = 1.4, b = 0.6, ν = 0.3, p = 0.5, δ = 0.5, β = 0.2,
σc = 0.7, θc = 0.25 and θd = 0.75.
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economy consists only of local level bureaucrats whose functions are to implement
the provision of public goods and services decided by the national government29.
In this conﬁguration, the informational asymmetries between the government and
the local or decentralised bureaucrats are signiﬁcantly larger than in the centralised
case. We have already noted the reasons why this is likely to be the case. In addi-
tion, several other reasons support this assumption. Some of these are summarized
in convincingly pointed by Bardhan (2002) and include local capture, lax account-
ability relationships and deﬁcient monitoring and information systems at the local
levels. For the reasons mentioned, we make the assumption that the fraction each
decentralised bureaucrat is able to steal is larger than in centralisation, θd > θc.
This assumption is meant to capture the idea that informational asymmetries are
not only more relevant in a decentralised setting but also that local bureaucrats
are more loosely controlled and have greater ability to embezzle a higher propor-
tion of public funds. This assumption can be justiﬁed for two reasons. First, the
hierarchical distance between the government and local level bureaucrats aﬀords
decentralised bureaucrats greater latitude to embezzle funds. This is perhaps bet-
ter described as representing a weak accountability relationship between the local
bureaucrat and the central government. Second, local bureaucrats have usually
fewer obstacles and greater incentives to be corrupt. Prud'homme (1995) notes
for example that local bureaucrats are usually able to establish unethical relation-
ships with local interest groups since they usually spend long spells in the oﬃce in
the same location. Others point to the presumption that bureaucratic careers are
longer and more stable at the national than at the local level. If the time-horizon
for local bureaucrats is shorter, then it might be reasonable to assume that they
steal higher proportions of public funds. The theories presented by Aghion and
Tirole (1997), Bac (1996) and Carbonara (1998) also suggest that this is a sensible
assumption to make.
29In order to keep the modelling simple, we consider only one level of sub-national governments,
the local level, which we think as of being the lowest level. We could alternatively include a
provincial or regional level but this would probably add more complexity without inﬂuencing
the main results. In fact, the implicit assumption here is that the more layers in the structure
the larger the information asymmetry associated to the lowest level.
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First we explore the case where corruption is absent. Recall that in this case
both households and bureaucrats save the same as in the centralisation regime.
Remember that in this case σc < σd = 1. The expression of total supply of loans
which equals aggregate savings is therefore equal to:
sˆt = m(λwˆt − τˆt + b) + nwˆt (4.5.7)
where m(λwˆt − τt + b) are total household savings and nwˆt are total bureaucrat
savings as before. Using equations 4.3.5 and 4.4.1 to rewrite equation 4.5.7 it fol-
lows that the expression for capital accumulation in a corruption-free decentralised
setting is equal to:
kˆdt+1 = αA(λm)
α(ng)βkt − ng + mb ≡ fˆ
d(kt) (4.5.8)
since σd = 1. Note that for any given kt, the corresponding level of kt+1 is higher
in this case than in the centralisation case. This is due to the eﬀect the greater
eﬃciency associated to decentralisation of public service relative to the centralised
case, σd > σc.
When all corruptible bureaucrats are corrupt households savings become m(λw˜t−
τ˜t+b) (note that both wages and taxes aﬀect households savings) and bureaucrats
savings equal (1 − ν)nw˜t + νn(1 − p)w˜t. This level of total savings is similar to
the one we obtained for the case of corruption and centralisation but in this case
the eﬃciency of public goods and services, σd is equal to 1. Using the expressions
for 4.3.8, and 4.4.3 we are able to obtain the expression for capital accumulation
under extreme corruption and decentralisation:
k˜dt+1 = αA(λm)
α(ng)β(1− θd)βkt − ng[1 + νθ
d(1− pδ)] + mb ≡ f˜d(kt) (4.5.9)
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We are now ready to obtain the steady state capital levels for these two cases.
Starting from equations 4.5.8 and 4.5.9 we can derive two expressions for the
steady state capital level in a decentralised regime with and without corruption
yielding:
kˆd,∗ =
mb− ng
1− αA(λm)α(ng)β
(4.5.10)
k˜d,∗ =
mb− ng[1 + νθd(1− pδ)]
1− αA(λm)α(ng)β(1− θd)β
(4.5.11)
In order to guarantee the stationarity of these equilibrium points it must be true
that both mb > ng[1 + νθd(1 − pδ)] and αA(λm)α(ng)β ∈ (0, 1) are satisﬁed30.
Similarly to the centralised case, we have that capital accumulation is lower un-
der corruption, k˜d,∗ < kˆd,∗ since f˜d(kt) < fˆ
d(kt) for any given kt
31. From this
analysis, we can derive another important result. Note that direct comparison of
equations 4.5.6 and 4.5.11 is not able to reveal whether decentralisation of public
service delivery under the presence of corruption is preferred to centralisation in
similar circumstances. If we look more closely at these equations we see that the
numerator in 4.5.6 is larger than the numerator in 4.5.11 (this is mainly due to
the extra loss in public resources generated in a decentralised setting). And from
the denominator we see that there are two opposing forces, the eﬃciency of public
spending and the proportion bureaucrats are able to steal out of public funds.
Comparing these we arrive at the following condition:
[1− θd]β < (σc)β[1− θc]β (4.5.12)
30Note that if mb > ng[1 + νθd(1 − pδ)] then it will also be true that mb > ng. A similar
observation is valid for the other condition since if αA(λm)α(ng)β ∈ (0, 1) then it is also veriﬁed
that αA(λm)α(ng)β(1− θd)β ∈ (0, 1) .
31This can also be derived comparing equations 4.5.10 and 4.5.11. The numerator in 4.5.10 is
larger than the numerator in 4.5.11 since ngνθd(1−pδ) is positive. Furthermore, the denominator
in 4.5.11 is smaller due to the presence of the term (1− θd)β .
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If this inequality is satisﬁed, then the extra losses in public resources due to the
institutional conditions in the decentralised economy will outweigh the extra gains
due to the better eﬃciency in public goods provision. Note that this condition
depends crucially on the relationship between the eﬃciency parameter of the cen-
tralised regime, and on the diﬀerent fraction bureaucrats are able to embezzle
in the centralised and decentralised structures. The greater and more eﬃcient
monitoring and hierarchical control of centralised bureaucrats the more likely a
decentralised economy causes further losses and harm to economic development
in the presence of corruption.
Figure 4.2: Decentralisation, corruption and development. Parameter val-
ues: α = 0.4, A = 3, λ > 1, m = 0.6, n = 0.2, g = 1.4, b = 0.6, ν = 0.3, p = 0.5,
δ = 0.5, β = 0.2, σc = 0.7, θc = 0.25 and θd = 0.75.
We present some simulation results in ﬁgures 4.2 and 4.3 as a way of illustrating
the main results of the model. We considered standard values for the parameters
and both simulations include the same parameters except for the economic eﬃ-
107
Figure 4.3: Decentralisation, corruption and development. Parameter val-
ues: α = 0.4, A = 3, λ > 1, m = 0.6, n = 0.2, g = 1.4, b = 0.6, ν = 0.3, p = 0.5,
δ = 0.5, β = 0.2, σc = 0.7, θc = 0.25 and θd = 0.3.
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ciency and informational parameters. Note that regardless of the values of these,
decentralisation is the best outcome in terms of development in the absence of
corruption. However, if corruption is present in the economy, then the outcome is
ambiguous. In ﬁgure 4.2, where the informational diﬀerences between centralised
and decentralised structures are signiﬁcant (θd is signiﬁcantly larger than θc), con-
dition 4.5.12 is satisﬁed and a decentralised structure is associated with very low
capital levels and indeed lower than those that would be achieved in a centralised
structure. If however, the informational diﬀerences between centralised and decen-
tralised structures are not very important (θd is slightly larger than θc), then it can
be seen in ﬁgure 4.3 that decentralisation is associated with higher capital levels
than centralisation. In fact, while our model predicts that in the absence of cor-
ruption, decentralisation is the better outcome for development, we can no longer
be certain that decentralisation is the better outcome if corruption is pervasive.
4.6 Conclusions
Decentralisation of public ﬁnance and governance has been advocated in recent
decades by international organizations and national governments. Based on eﬃ-
ciency grounds, the idea that bringing the government closer to the people would
result in a better and more eﬃcient outcome yielding greater social welfare has
been a strong motivation to decentralise. The traditional theory of ﬁscal feder-
alism has been centred around this idea. The public choice literature considered
the role of public agents as utility maximizers and derived slightly diﬀerent im-
plications regarding the eﬀects of decentralisation. More recently, the modern
theory of ﬁscal federalism is characterised by the consideration of political pro-
cesses and the behaviour of public agents and the role of asymmetric information
between diﬀerent agents. All these theoretical considerations have introduced
additional complexities to the question of whether to centralise or decentralise dif-
ferent government activities. In particular, it seems that the trade-oﬀ is between
eﬃciency-enhancing considerations stemming from the traditional theory of ﬁscal
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federalism and accountability, information and incentives stemming from the re-
cent political economy of ﬁscal federalism. The issue is certainly more complex
than it was originally considered and there are several interrelationships between
the economic and political aspects involved.
This research has been motivated by the above considerations and the aim has
been to provide a framework that enables us to capture some of these ideas. Our
study is an attempt to contribute to the analysis of ﬁscal federalism and develop-
ment in the presence of bureaucratic corruption. We elaborate a dynamic growth
model where corruption is endogenously determined according to the decisions
of individuals (in particular, public servants). In this context, the existence of
a centralised or decentralised structure yields diﬀerent implications in terms of
the eﬀects on economic development. Among the results of our analysis, in line
with previous research on corruption and development, is that corruption is al-
ways adverse to economic development. This is because corruption diverts public
resources away from productive activities. Furthermore, our model suggests that
if corruption is absent in the economy, decentralisation is associated with greater
capital accumulation than centralisation. However, if corruption occurs, then we
show that decentralisation may be the worst alternative if there are weak institu-
tions at the local level. This is the case if monitoring is signiﬁcantly more eﬃcient
at the central level than at the local level and if the net eﬃciency gains associ-
ated with decentralisation are not signiﬁcantly large. Finally, our model permits
the coexistence of corruption and poverty as permanent rather than temporary
features of an economy.
Our results are in line with some results in the empirical literature. There is agree-
ment that corruption aﬀects economic development negatively via the diversion of
investible resources. Likewise, there is agreement that corruption is also aﬀected
negatively by economic development. In fact, the new directions in empirical re-
search conform to the hypothesis of a bivariate relationship between corruption
and development. Furthermore, there is mixed evidence regarding the relationship
between decentralisation and corruption in the empirical literature. While there
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are some studies that ﬁnd that federalism is associated with more corruption in
the economy, other authors have found that ﬁscal decentralisation is associated
to lower corruption. Again, the latest empirical developments suggest that it is
perhaps more convenient to adopt a more integrated approach to the study of de-
centralisation and corruption considering the interrelationships between diﬀerent
aspects or types of decentralisation. The ideas presented in this chapter accord
with this if we consider that improved economic eﬃciency is associated with cer-
tain types of decentralisation and reduced hierarchical control and informational
and monitoring problems are associated to other types of decentralisation.
We think it would be desirable to pursue certain extensions to this analysis. The
decision to centralise or decentralise is rarely exogenous. It may be dependent on
certain features of the socio-economic system or may be part of a larger restruc-
turing of the public sector. In terms of our model, this would imply to postulate
that the degree of decentralisation is a function of the aggregate level of corrup-
tion or development or both. Another reﬁnement we may consider is making
the probability of detection endogenous. It is likely that more eﬃcient (costly)
monitoring leads to an increase in the probability of detection. Finally, it may
be important to consider the role of oﬃce-motivated politicians by incorporating
national and local elections into the model. This is likely to pit the objectives
of the bureaucrats against those of the politicians, with one possible eﬀect being
that local politicians may be more interested in monitoring local bureaucrats more
eﬃciently. This would possibly reduce the ability of local bureaucrats to embezzle
bureaucrats funds and alleviate local accountability problems.
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Chapter 5
Federalism, decentralisation and
corruption
5.1 Introduction
In the past 30 years the number of federal states has increased1. Decentralisa-
tion of some form has been adopted in developed and developing countries alike.
In part this trend is explained by a belief that centralised governments encour-
age rent-seeking behaviour causing an increase in corruption levels [Bardhan and
Mookherjee (2000)]. The theoretical literature on this topic would suggest how-
ever that such a simple view of the policy choice available is misplaced. The
relationship between decentralisation and corruption is complex: decentralisation
is multifaceted and can give rise to mixed predictions. Under some conditions
centralised governments are more corrupt whereas under some other deﬁnition of
decentralisation they are more corrupt2.
Because of the reasons mentioned in the previous paragraph, it is not surpris-
1Among industrialized countries, Spain and Belgium have joined Australia, Canada, Ger-
many, Switzerland and the United States (Italy agreed to a federalist turn after a Constitutional
reform in 2001). Federalization processes also took place in Ethiopia and are currently being
debated in a number of developing countries (Uganda, Afghanistan and Indonesia).
2For an excellent survey on the theoretical and empirical contributions to the literature see
Fjelstad (2004).
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ing to observe a number of apparent inconsistencies in the empirical literature on
decentralisation and corruption. For instance, while some papers ﬁnd evidence
that federal countries have higher corruption ratings [Goldsmith (1999), Treisman
(2000), and Wu (2005)], several other scholars have found that ﬁscal decentral-
isation is associated to lower corruption [Fisman and Gatti (2002a), Barenstein
and de Mello (2001)]. In theory, federal states are not necessarily ﬁscally decen-
tralised states, although it seems that there exists a positive association between
them. According to Ebel and Yilmaz (2002), the average sub-national share of
expenditures is 38% for federal countries and 22% for unitary countries. However,
there are cases of unitary countries with a high degree of ﬁscal decentralisation,
as the Nordic countries. At the same time, there are some federal countries with
very low levels of ﬁscal decentralisation, as is the case of Croatia, Malaysia and
Indonesia. Other studies stress the role of other aspects of decentralisation, such
as political or administrative decentralisation. It has been argued that political
decentralisation is important to improve accountability at the lower levels and
some studies have found evidence of this. Additionally, some research has found
evidence that administrative decentralisation within the public sector is associated
to lower corruption [Wade (1997), Kuncoro (2004)].
In this chapter we try to bring the empirics closer to the theory by acknowledging
that there are many diﬀerent dimensions to decentralisation and that there may be
inter-relationships between them. In so doing we build on a small recent literature
that recognises this point. Treisman (2002b,a) provides a systematic treatment
of the issue, carefully deﬁning diﬀerent types of decentralisation and providing
measures for each of them. Recognising the importance of their joint eﬀect on
corruption he ﬁnds some direct eﬀects but no interaction eﬀects. This study has a
closer relationship with Enikolopov and Zhuravskaya (2006) who test whether the
eﬀects of one of the aspects of decentralisation we also consider, ﬁscal decentralisa-
tion, on corruption depend on the existence and extent of political institutions. In
particular, they analyse how the level of political centralisation modiﬁes the eﬀect
of ﬁscal decentralisation on corruption. They ﬁnd evidence from this approach
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that strong party systems make it more likely that ﬁscal decentralisation reduces
corruption and that political centralisation along with ﬁscal decentralisation im-
proves government quality for a sample of developing countries. This evidence
oﬀers support for some long-standing political theories of decentralisation.
Our work addresses the following issues:
• Which decentralisation measures are important? - This aims to capture the
rich diversity of the measures of decentralisation used in the literature.
• Are there multi-dimensional aspects?
• Are there any signiﬁcant interaction eﬀects?
We contribute to this recent literature both by recognising and measuring the
existence of diﬀerent dimensions of decentralisation but also examine some hy-
potheses in order to provide a sensible econometric model. We gather a large
set of decentralisation indicators -most of which have been used alternatively by
earlier research- and group them into categories in order to re-examine the rel-
evant empirical literature in a diﬀerent light. Interestingly, we ﬁnd evidence of
heterogeneity in the relationship between decentralisation and corruption regard-
less of the decentralisation measure used. Furthermore, unlike earlier research we
argue and ﬁnd that some types of decentralisation are simultaneously associated
with corruption through both direct and indirect eﬀects. We do not explore the
co-evolution of these dimensions of decentralisation3.
Our ﬁnding that long-standing unitary countries (constitutional centralisation)
which are also ﬁscally decentralised have low corruption is to some extent present
in earlier research. The main diﬀerence is that most articles do not model or ﬁnd
3Unfortunately, we were not able to analyse time-varying features of the relationship between
corruption and decentralisation. Although we have data on corruption and other control variables
since 1975, there are almost no time-series data for decentralisation indicators. Apart from
annual dummies of little use in panel-data methods, the only decentralisation measures with
time-series data are exp and rev. The problem with these is that the sample of countries suﬀers
signiﬁcant variations throughout the 25-year period.
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these two dimensions of decentralisation signiﬁcantly associated with corruption
in the same model. This result is quite robust both in terms of a variety of speci-
ﬁcations and controls used and in terms of alternative decentralisation measures.
Furthermore, we also ﬁnd evidence suggesting that political decentralisation -the
existence of municipal elections- is also associated with corruption but only in an
indirect way through its eﬀect on constitutional decentralisation. In particular,
political decentralisation worsens the impact of constitutional centralisation on
corruption. This result is similar to Enikolopov and Zhuravskaya (2006) who ﬁnd
a negative indirect eﬀect of political institutions on corruption.
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows. In the next section, we
review the theoretical background on decentralisation and federalism, stressing the
diﬀerent dimensions and exploring the interrelations and overlaps between these
dimensions. Section 5.3 details the data and the empirical strategy chosen in this
research. In section 5.4, we present and discuss the main results of this chapter. We
also analyse diﬀerent hypothesis regarding the joint impact of diﬀerent dimensions
of decentralisation on corruption. Section 5.5 concludes.
5.2 Decentralisation and theory
5.2.1 Federalism deﬁned
In order to model the relationship between federalism, decentralisation and cor-
ruption, we need ﬁrst to be clear on what we mean by federalism and its opposite
unitarism. As Treisman (2002b) notes there are several ways of deﬁning federal-
ism. We group them in two broad categories. First, there is what might be called
de jure federalism where the status of federal or federation is enshrined in the Con-
stitution or some other special laws. Second, there is what might label de facto
federalism, where although not explicitly deﬁned as federal or federations, they
meet some criteria widely considered to be requirements of a federal structure.
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The list of federal countries resulting from both deﬁnitions will in general be dif-
ferent. According to Treisman (2002b) some anomalies arise: de facto federations
such as the US and India (and the more recently federalised Spain) would not be
listed as de jure federations since their Constitutions do not explicitly mention
this special status. Constitutionally-federal Canada would drop out from the de
facto classiﬁcation since sub-national legislatures are not given residual powers4.
Similarly, while there are many diﬀerent deﬁnitions of unitarism the most common
refers to formal arrangements of power between national governments and regional
governments, the most important of which is the existence of regional assemblies
with important policymaking power [Gerring et al. (2005a), pp. 13]. Again, there
may be countries that have unitary features without them being explicitly cited
in the constitution. An important observation also made by these authors is that
theoretically unitary governments are perfectly compatible with diﬀerent aspects
of decentralisation as are federal governments. If we accept this then we shall look
at the controversies and inconsistencies in the empirical literature in a diﬀerent
light.
5.2.2 Theoretical literature
To motivate the empirical analysis we provide a review of the literature on decen-
tralisation and corruption. We organise this into four sections.
Fiscal Federalism. The traditional theory of ﬁscal federalism has its roots in
the public ﬁnance literature, with key contributions from Musgrave, Samuelson5,
and Tiebout (1956). This was then formalised by Oates (1972). He shows ﬁrst
that in a multi-level government situation where at least some public goods have
regionally-bounded beneﬁts, decentralised ﬁnance provides opportunities for gains
in social welfare. Even with inter-jurisdictional externalities, decentralised pro-
4We may also add that unless we could objectively deﬁne what a `federal' country is, a country
like China where economic federalism has played an important role in promoting growth, could
be even thought of as federal.
5See Oates (2005) for references and summary of these contributions.
116
vision creates a better outcome as opposed to a uniform centralised provision of
public goods. Second, there is an informational asymmetry: local governments
are better informed about the local preferences than the central government and
this is also known as the preference-matching argument for ﬁscal decentralisa-
tion. Third, there is Tiebout's `voting-with-the-feet' argument that citizens will
sort themselves into homogeneous communities demanding the same local public
goods. Finally, the existence of hard-budget constraints should force local and
regional governments to put in eﬀort to generate and rely on their own sources of
revenues. If the local and regional governments are given transfers from the centre
or face soft budget constraints then eﬃciency levels will likely drop. Taking these
arguments together, we would expect that the scope for bureaucratic corruption
is lower with ﬁscal federalism or ﬁscal decentralisation. In principle, intergovern-
mental competition to attract residents lowers the incentive and ability to extract
rents and bribes. Moreover, the existence of hard-budget constraints reduces the
scope for corruption since local governments are responsible for ﬁnancing their
own expenditures.
Nevertheless, there remain theoretical arguments that suggest that ﬁscal decen-
tralisation (of both expenditure and revenues) may create perverse incentives and
corruption. For example, because of over-budgeting and lack of accountability in
the case of soft-budget constraints arising from tax evasion and unconditional in-
tergovernmental grants. This situation may be particularly relevant in cases where
there is no political decentralisation. Another possible factor that may distort in-
centives is the way sub-national budgets are ﬁnanced. Barenstein and de Mello
(2001) have suggested that the relationship of ﬁscal decentralisation to corruption
hinged on the way sub-national expenditures are ﬁnanced.
Political decentralisation. There is perhaps no better description of the diﬃ-
culties in deﬁning centralisation than Alexis de Tocqueville's comment that Cen-
tralisation is now a word constantly repeated but is one that, generally speaking,
no one tries to deﬁne accurately6. Alongside Montesquieu and philosophers from
6Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, Vol. 1, Part 1, ch. 5.
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the Enlightenment, de Tocqueville's ideas on federalism and decentralisation gen-
erated vigorous research eﬀort to study the advantages and disadvantages of polit-
ical decentralisation. The central idea of political decentralisation (or government
decentralisation as is also called) is that citizens should be given more power in
political and public decision-making. This involves the creation of a number of
diﬀerent institutions that support this objective. Local and regional elections, re-
gional autonomy, local committees and civil associations, sub-national authority
over taxation, spending and legislation, are all diﬀerent mechanisms involved in
the context of political decentralisation. This type of decentralisation often re-
quires constitutional or statutory reforms. There are several arguments favouring
political decentralisation. The most commonly cited are the greater accountability
to the local and regional electorate, the development of a civic local culture by
fostering democratisation and the involvement of other local actors in the decision-
making process (NGO's, civil and professional associations, private sector, etc.).
Despite these theoretical arguments endorsing political decentralisation, others
have highlighted the potential dangers associated with political decentralisation.
Riker (1964) provided strong theoretical arguments in favour of political central-
isation. The basic idea is that political centralisation may serve as a mechanism
to complement and boost the outcome of ﬁscal decentralisation by making local
politicians internalise inter-jurisdictional externalities to a greater extent. Al-
ternatively Bardhan and Mookherjee (2000) argue that political decentralisation
may not be as eﬀective if local capture of public oﬃcials by interest groups is
widespread.
Constitutional decentralisation7. The concept of constitutional decentralisa-
tion (or equivalently constitutional federalism) is closely associated to what we
earlier deﬁned as de jure federalism, representing the establishment of a federal
regime by the Constitution. There is however, in addition the concept of contin-
gent decentralisation, which refers to our current understanding of federalism as
7We refer to constitutional decentralisation as the existence of a federal regime enshrined in
the Constitution. This expression was introduced by Diamond (1969) in his article about the
relationship between federalism and decentralisation.
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including the erosion and degradation of the constitutional decentralisation princi-
ple by jurisprudence and/or Courts rulings [Aranson (1990)]. Federalism as con-
stitutional decentralisation diﬀers from federalism as contingent decentralisation
in that the authority of the states under constitutional decentralisation is guaran-
teed as a matter of organic, constitutional law. Neither prudential nor political
judgments or decisions taken at the national level can overturn such guarantees in
the face of the appropriate legal ﬁdelity to the original constitutional arrangement
[Aranson (1990), p. 20]. One connotation derived from this distinction is that
constitutional decentralisation is a rather static status while contingent decentral-
isation is inherently a dynamic concept. In general, constitutional and contingent
decentralisation will diﬀer: contingent decentralisation is driven by pure utilitarist
motives and this will shape the distribution of powers and federal arrangements
in practice. Aranson (1990) shows the widening gap between these two concepts
but in general it has happened in several other federal countries. It may be even
argued that contingent decentralisation will eventually cause a country to recen-
tralize if many judicial or consuetudinary instances8 erode the true nature and
spirit of constitutional decentralisation. At the empirical level, distinguishing be-
tween these two types of `federalism' is not practicable and only constitutional
decentralisation measures can be used.
What are the predictions of the theory for the relationship between constitutional
decentralisation and corruption? Similarly to the case of political decentralisa-
tion the answer is not clear. Constitutional federalism has often been advocated
as a system to accommodate ethnic and religious diﬀerences and other regional
peculiarities. Federalism provides room for diversity and reduces the possibility
of tensions and conﬂicts which may also originate opportunities for the extrac-
tion of rents. Yet on the other hand, the well-known arguments of multiplication
and overlapping of layers of government causing accountability problems and the
'overgrazing' of the bribe base in federal systems suggests that the latter may also
be associated to higher corruption.
8The term consuetudinary law is applied to cases where the rule of law is determined by
long-extant customs as opposed to case law or legislative processes
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Structural decentralisation. According to Treisman (2002b) structural decen-
tralisation refers to the number of tiers of government. The greater the number of
tiers the more decentralised the country. This deﬁnition gives a sense of structural
decentralisation as comprising the vertical structure of country and this form of
decentralisation is often refereed to as vertical decentralisation. This concept of
structural decentralisation is likely to be related to other forms of decentralisation
(possibly the so-called decision-making decentralisation or even ﬁscal decentrali-
sation). In fact it is possible that where there are several tiers of government, each
tier will have the authority over certain decisions (i.e. spending, taxing, legisla-
tion, etc.) or that each tier will be accountable for their own sources of revenues
and expenditures. The deﬁnition given by Treisman refers to a tier as having a
political executive in charge of certain decisions and having a territorial jurisdic-
tion. It is clear from this that the relationship between structural and political
decentralisation should be a close one. This can be conﬁrmed in Table 5.3. Other
measures such as the number of intermediate and local jurisdictions in a country
will be included within this form of decentralisation, although technically they do
not represent forms of structural or vertical decentralisation.
5.3 Data and sample characteristics
The empirical approach adopted in the chapter builds the relationship between
decentralisation in stages. In the ﬁrst stage we try to identify which measures of
the diﬀerent aspects of decentralisation are correlated with corruption. As a second
stage we then consider the multi-faceted nature of decentralisation, and attempt
to establish the robustness of the results in the ﬁrst stage to other aspects of
decentralisation. Finally, we allow for the possibility that there may be interaction
between the various measures of decentralisation.
In this section we describe and motivate the choice of regression model that we
use in stage 1 of the empirical analysis and outline the data. The baseline model
we adopt in the chapter is typical of that found in the literature. It regresses a
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measure of corruption against a series of control variables found to be robustly
correlated with corruption [Treisman (2000); Serra (2006)] and a series of measures
of decentralisation:
CORRi = β0+β1DECi+β2 logGDPi+β3 logPOPULi+β4PRESSi+εi (5.3.1)
where CORRi is the corruption measure, DECi is our decentralisation indicator,
logGDPi is the logarithm of GDP per capita (PPP), logPOPULi is the logarithm
of total population and PRESSi is the degree of press freedom
9.
We test model 1 using a dataset containing information for up to 177 countries.
This data include standard decentralisation indicators used by others and some
newly assembled measures. To measure corruption we use the World Bank's Con-
trol of Corruption Index10.The decentralisation measures, deﬁnitions and coverage
are given in Table 5.1 below. Some of the indicators are alternative measures for
a certain type of decentralisation. More details about the source and coverage are
given in the Data Appendix. Table 5.2 presents summary statistics for some of
our variables.
Consistent with the theoretical literature we separate these measures into four
groups: ﬁscal, constitutional, political and structural decentralisation. In many
cases we can capture diﬀerent aspects of these four main types of decentralisation.
We detail the data sources for these variables in the Appendix, along with some
summary statistics and the correlation between the variables.
Fiscal decentralisation. The most commonly used indicators of ﬁscal decen-
9We choose to include a measure of press freedom rather than for example a measure of
democracy more typically used. This reﬂects the robustness of this variable using error-bounds
analysis in Freille et al. (forthcoming); the high correlation between press freedom and measures
of democracy; and the sensitivity of the measures of democracy to changes in speciﬁcation.
10This choice is made to maximise the set of available observations. We have tested the ro-
bustness of this choice to the alternative measures of corruption by Transparency International's
CPI and the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) and for a common set of countries ﬁnd
no substantive diﬀerences. These results are available from the author on request.
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Table 5.1: Decentralisation indicators
Variable Description Type Obs Years
exp Sub-national expenditure (% total exp.) Fiscal 69 1990-00**
rev Sub-national revenue (% total revenue) Fiscal 68 1990-00**
fis Score for ﬁscal decentralisation Fiscal 67 1996
muni Local governments elected? Political 127 2000
state State/province governments elected? Political 134 2000
stconst Are senators' constituencies the provinces? Political 58 2000
author Sub-national authority in ﬁscal and legal Political 61 2000
auton Existence of autonomous regions Political 156 2000
pol Score for political decentralisation Political 67 1996
dec2 Political decentralisation index (1) Political 75 2000
dec4 Political decentralisation index (2) Political 80 2000
federal Federalism dummy Constitutional 177 2000
federal(2) Federalism dummy (broad concept) Constitutional 177 2000
fedindex Index of federalism Constitutional 125 2000
unitary Index of unitarism Constitutional 106 2000
unitaryhis Index of unitary history Constitutional 106 2000
tiers Number of elected sub-national tiers Structural 127 1999
regj Number of intermediate jurisdictions Structural 61 1999
locj Number of local jurisdictions Structural 108 1999
* This is the number of countries with data available for each indicator (using the WBC corruption index).
** Average for the period. For sources see Appendix B
tralisation in the literature are the percentage ratio of sub-national government
expenditure to total government expenditure and the percentage ratio of sub-
national government revenue to total government revenue11. In both cases the
data are an average for the period of the 1990's. Following previous studies, we
decide to use the ratio of sub-national government revenue to total government
revenue, rev, as our main indicator for ﬁscal decentralisation. If the vertical ﬁscal
imbalance is not signiﬁcant, it is sensible to choose this indicator as the measure
that best captures the extent of ﬁscal decentralisation.
Constitutional decentralisation. Constitutional decentralisation refers to whether
the structure of the relations between diﬀerent government units are based on fed-
eral or unitary grounds according to legal bodies. In general researchers capture
11One problem of using these two indicators as alternative is the existence of vertical ﬁscal im-
balances. In short, this implies that sub-national revenues fall short of sub-national expenditure
and the diﬀerence should be compensated by coordination mechanisms between the diﬀerent
levels of government.
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Table 5.2: Summary statistics for selected variables
Variable Description Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
exp Share of sub-national gov. exp. 22.9 15.6 2.02 80.53 69
rev Share of sub-national gov. revenue 18.03 14.8 0.81 78.12 68
author Sub-national authority in spend/tax 0.44 0.5 0 1 61
federal_alt Dummy for federalism [Treisman] 0.1 0.3 0 1 177
tiers Number of elected sub-national tiers 1.16 0.89 0 3 127
regj Number of intermediate jurisdictions 26.74 24.9 2 135 61
locj Number of local jurisdictions 4438.56 23949.3 17 237687∗ 108
muni Local governments elected? 1.36 0.82 0 2 127
state State/prov. governments elected? 0.87 0.81 0 2 134
ﬁs Score for ﬁscal decentralisation 0.41 0.22 0 1 67
pol Score for political decentralisation 0.55 0.23 0 1 67
adm Score for adm. decentralisation 0.54 0.28 0.01 1 67
auton Existence of autonomous regions? 0.1 0.3 0 1 156
stconst Are senators' constituencies the
provinces?
0.5 0.5 0 1 58
dec2 Political decentralisation index 1 2.21 1.6 0 5 75
dec4 Political decentralisation index 2 2.2 1.53 0 4 80
federal Dummy for federal countries 0.13 0.34 0 1 177
fedindex Index of federalism 4.14 1.32 1 5 125
unitary Index of unitarism 1.6 0.74 0 2 106
unitaryhis Index of unitary history 36.82 31 0 101 106
federal(2) Federal dummy (broad) 0.28 0.45 0 1 174
cpi Corruption Perception Index (TI) 4.73 2.4 1.2 10 91
icrg Corruption Index (ICRG) 2.96 1.22 1 6 140
wbc Corruption Index (World Bank) -0.02 1.03 -1.8 2.5 173
loggdp Log of GDP per capita 3.68 0.51 2.67 4.77 160
logpopul Log of total population 6.86 0.76 5.01 9.1 174
pss Press freedom index 48.17 25.04 5 100 174
democindex Index of democracy 5.13 3.98 0 10 151
demochis Dummy for democratic history 0.26 0.44 0 1 107
polrights Index of political rights 3.59 2.23 1 7 174
democ1 Alternative democracy index 3.65 1.98 1 7 174
bri Dummy for former British colony 0.28 0.45 0 1 177
fre Dummy for former French colony 0.16 0.37 0 1 177
spa Dummy for former Spanish colony 0.11 0.32 0 1 177
por Dummy for former Port. colony 0.03 0.17 0 1 177
ethno Ethno-linguistic frac. index 0.35 0.3 0 1 143
eng English legal system (dummy) 0.31 0.46 0 1 175
soc Socialist legal system (dummy) 0.19 0.4 0 1 175
fre French legal system (dummy) 0.43 0.5 0 1 175
ger German legal system (dummy) 0.03 0.18 0 1 175
sca Scandinavian legal system (dummy) 0.03 0.17 0 1 175
pro_d Dummy for Protestant country 0.22 0.41 0 1 174
Note: Only selected variables are given in the Table. Data for year 2000, otherwise the closest available year. ∗
Although India has a very large number of elected local jurisdictions (237687), we have included this observation in
our data since it does not aﬀect the results of our econometric analysis. As we note later, the exclusion of India in
the regressions using locj does not change the results. For sources and data description see table B.4 in Appendix B
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this as a zero-one dummy with all countries not explicitly federal being labeled as
Unitarian. In our study we explore several alternative and complementary mea-
sures. Our main control for the federal structure of a country -unitaryhis- however
is a newly assembled indicator that measures not only the current status of federal
or unitary but also considers recent history. In particular, this variable gives the
score of unitary history for a country during a period of 100 years. In other words,
if a country has always been a federation or federal (Argentina, Canada, Malaysia
and Switzerland among others), then the score assigned is 0. Countries that have
been mostly unitary throughout this time period (like Denmark, Japan, and Swe-
den), receive high scores, whereas countries that have either changed regime or
have a relatively short unitary history are ranked in between (Austria, Spain and
Thailand)12. Although we also use dummies and indexes of federalism, we con-
sider that the federalist or unitarist characteristics of a country are best captured
using not only the present features but also the federalist or unitarist history. This
reason motivates the choice of unitaryhis as our main measure of constitutional
decentralisation.
Political Decentralisation. According to the World Bank political decentrali-
sation is about providing the citizens of a country more power in public decision-
making and is associated with institutions ranging from pluralistic politics and
representative government, to local and regional democratization and greater par-
ticipation in decisions. We have a number of political decentralisation indicators
taken from diﬀerent sources. We consider three of these to most fully capture
the essence of political decentralisation: muni, a categorical variable indicating
the existence of municipal executive and legislative elections, state, a similar vari-
able for provincial or state elections and stconst, a dummy registering whether
the provinces/states represent the constituencies of the senators. Although we
consider all three indicators in our regressions, we believe the variable measuring
the existence of municipal elections, muni, best captures the idea of political de-
centralisation, since it assesses the extent and depth of electoral decentralisation,
12See Appendix B for source and deﬁnitions
124
which is the most relevant aspect of political decentralisation.
Structural Decentralisation. Finally structural decentralisation concerns the
vertical (number of tiers) and horizontal (number of jurisdictions within each tier)
make-up of the political structure13. We use three indicators here: the number of
elected tiers (tiers), the number of elected regions or jurisdictions within the upper
tier (regj ) and the number of elected localities or jurisdictions within the lower tier
(locj ). It should be noted that our variable tiers is the most appropriate to capture
this form of decentralisation since it gives evidence on the vertical organisation of
the country.
Table B.1 in the Appendix shows the correlations between diﬀerent forms of de-
centralisation, while we reproduce the correlation for the main decentralisation
variables in Table 5.3. It appears from both that the interrelations between con-
stitutional, political and structural decentralisation are straightforward. It is the
case for example that none of our main indicators for each aspect of decentralisa-
tion -rev for ﬁscal, unitaryhis for constitutional, muni for political and tiers for
structural- in Table 5.3 are signiﬁcantly correlated. Most of the correlations are
intuitive; the positive correlation between federal and unitaryhis; that countries
with a federal system are also likely to have local (muni) and regional (state)
elections and have higher number of elected government tiers (tiers) for example.
Other signiﬁcant correlations are between unitaryhis and stconst for example.
Figure 5.1 provides a diﬀerent way to look at the data. Here we arrange countries
according to their ﬁscal and constitutional decentralisation regimes and indicate
the level of corruption in those countries. According to the previous literature, we
would expect countries with high ﬁscal decentralisation and with constitutional
centralisation (unitarism) to show low corruption levels. This is evidenced in
the ﬁgure by looking at the upper right-hand side quadrant where all countries
(in bold) have low corruption levels. Similarly, countries with low ﬁscal decen-
13Treisman (2002b) introduces his deﬁnition of vertical decentralisation by measuring the
number of tiers in a system. This categorization includes single-tiered systems such as Singapore
and multi-tiered systems such as Argentina, the United States and China.
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Table 5.3: Pairwise correlations between selected decentralisation indi-
cators
Variables unitaryhis muni locj federal state stconst tiers regj
unitaryhis 1.000
(106)
muni 0.137 1.000
(85) (127)
locj -0.141 0.108 1.000
(78) (90) (216)
federal -0.330* 0.209* 0.275* 1.000
(106) (127) (216) (177)
state 0.045 0.547* 0.066 0.361* 1.000
(84) (110) (96) (134) (134)
stconst -0.318* 0.314* 0.201 0.447* 0.288* 1.000
(48) (45) (41) (58) (49) (58)
tiers 0.140 0.479* 0.190* 0.437* 0.359* 0.463* 1.000
(81) (104) (108) (127) (107) (42) (127)
regj 0.085 0.112 -0.003 -0.138 0.004 -0.150 0.005 1.000
(47) (55) (60) (61) (53) (31) (61) (61)
Notes: The number of observations is given under the corresponding correlation. * Denotes signiﬁcance
at the 10% level
tralisation and with constitutional decentralisation (federalism) should have high
corruption levels. Although the evidence is not as strong as in the previous case,
the lower left-hand side quadrant shows most countries as having intermediate to
high corruption levels.
5.4 Empirical evidence: Fiscal decentralisation, fed-
eralism and political institutions
5.4.1 Which aspects of decentralisation matter?
Tables 5.4 and 5.5 contain the results for the baseline regression we speciﬁed
above. We have considered the robustness of the results to alternative measures
of corruption (the CPI and ICRG indices of corruption) and to changes in the
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Figure 5.1: Fiscal and constitutional decentralisation
observations. We reproduce the latter in table B.2 in the Appendix B where we
use a common subset of countries including all the countries with data available
for the three corruption indexes.
In discussing the results we begin with the ﬁscal decentralisation indicators, the
sub-national government expenditure as a percentage of total government expen-
diture and sub-national government revenue as a percentage of total government
revenue. The results for these variables are consistent with earlier research: ﬁs-
cal decentralisation is associated with lower corruption ratings [Huther and Shah
(1998); Fisman and Gatti (2002a); Barenstein and de Mello (2001)]. The coeﬃ-
cients are also similar in size to those obtained previously.
In contrast to the results for ﬁscal decentralisation less agreement has been found
in the literature for constitutional decentralisation. Treisman (2000) found that
federal states are perceived to be more corrupt and that this conclusion was robust
to several tests, whereas for a diﬀerent indicator Gerring et al. (2005a) ﬁnd that
unitary systems are strongly associated with good governance. Others have found
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no relationship between federalism and corruption [Fisman and Gatti (2002a); Wu
(2005)].
Table 5.5 conﬁrms these mixed results. The zero-one federal dummy suggests that
federalism has no relationship to corruption, a result similar to that obtained if we
use the federal dummy included in Treisman (2000)14. Investigating the results
further we ﬁnd we are unable to replicate Treisman's result that federal states
are more corrupt for two reasons. Firstly, the eﬀect of the federalism dummy is
sensitive to the inclusion of the logarithm of total population and to cultural and
historical indicators. Second, the results for the federalism dummy are sensitive
to the year chosen. Specifying the model and the data as closely as possible to
Treisman, our results are similar to his paper for 1996 and 1998 (federal states are
more corrupt) although the coeﬃcients are never signiﬁcant, but the coeﬃcients
become negative when we use either 2000 or 2002 (federal states are less corrupt).
Also in Table 5.4 we explore whether using more detailed measures of constitu-
tional decentralisation help to improve the robustness of this variable. The ﬁrst
measures is an index of federalism (fedindex ) ranging from 1 (most federal) to 5
(most unitary). Although the positive sign of the coeﬃcient implies that unitary
countries are associated with lower corruption levels, it is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from zero. The second measure is taken from Gerring et al. (2005a). The authors
study the relative merits of federal and unitary systems and come to the con-
clusion that long standing unitary systems are associated with lower corruption.
The unitarism index (unitary) takes values of 0=federal (elective regional legis-
latures plus constitutional recognition of sub-national authority), 1=semi-federal
(where there are elective legislatures at the regional level enjoying important poli-
cymaking power but in which constitutional sovereignty is reserved to the national
government), and 2=unitary [Gerring et al. (2005a)]. As can be observed in Table
5.5 the coeﬃcient on this variable is again not signiﬁcant.
14Our federal dummy includes a slightly larger number of countries and therefore the number
of federal states diﬀer between our study and Treisman's. He uses the classiﬁcation of federal
countries as given in Elazar (1995), while we use this and other sources to update the data. As
a result of this, we add Bosnia and Herzegovina, Comoros, Ethiopia, Serbia and Montenegro,
South Africa, and the United Arab Emirates to the list of federal countries.
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The ﬁnal indicator, also from Gerring et al. (2005a), is a historical unitarism
index (unitaryhis) created on the basis of the annual unitary scores used above15.
The estimation results (regression corresponding to unitaryhis in Table 5.4) show
that countries with long standing unitary regimes have lower corruption. Using
our simple baseline regression, we have obtained the same qualitative results as
Gerring et al. (2005a), although it should be noted that they use the ICRG index
of corruption. For the same index of corruption we ﬁnd an insigniﬁcant eﬀect
from the unitary history variable (it is signiﬁcant if we use the CPI index of
corruption)16.
In other models in Tables 5.4 and 5.5, we explore the relationship between po-
litical dimensions of decentralisation and corruption. Several forms of political
decentralisation have been recognized in the literature including electoral decen-
tralisation, structure of the party system, decision-making authority and residual
powers [Treisman (2002b,a); Enikolopov and Zhuravskaya (2006)]. We focus how-
ever on a subset of these aspects for which we can ﬁnd reliable data, namely indi-
cators of electoral decentralisation and of authority decentralisation (also known
as decision-making decentralisation).
From Table 5.4 we can see that none of the indicators of political decentralisation
are signiﬁcantly and consistently related with corruption. However, this is not
the case if other measures of corruption are used as can be seen from Table 5.5
in Appendix B. According to this table we note that there is a positive associa-
tion between corruption and author when we use the ICRG index. In addition,
the existence of local elections at the executive and legislative levels -muni - is
negatively associated with the CPI index; a similar negative relationship also ex-
ists when we use an aggregate indicator of political decentralisation, dec4, which
aggregates over muni and state. The sensitivity of the political decentralisation
15Although the authors have used time series data we estimate the model using the index for
the year 2000. We do this since there is little year-to-year variation in the index and we were
unable to obtain the original data. The variable measures the unitary history of a country from
1901 to 2000. For the construction, measurement and coverage of this index see Gerring et al.
(2005a).
16Some investigation suggests that this diﬀerence is due to the use of panel data in their study.
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Table 5.4: Baseline regressions - Cross Section (Year:2000) - Variable subset of countries
Dependent variable: Corruption - Method: OLS
cpi icrg wbc cpi icrg wbc cpi icrg wbc cpi icrg wbc cpi icrg wbc cpi icrg wbc
EXP REV MUNI STATE AUTHOR AUTON
DEC 0.03∗∗ 0.02∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗ 0.02∗ 0.01∗∗ -0.76∗∗∗ -0.04 -0.16∗∗ -0.14 -0.08 0.00 -0.40 -0.69∗∗∗ -0.11 -0.47 -0.36 -0.22
[2.40] [2.46] [2.90] [2.13] [1.81] [2.37] [-3.15] [0.27] [-2.10] [-0.64] [-0.70] [0.07] [-0.71] [-3.20] [-0.70] [-0.96] [-1.31] [-1.24]
GDP 3.79∗∗∗ 0.96∗∗∗ 1.82∗∗∗ 3.99∗∗∗ 0.93∗∗∗ 1.87∗∗∗ 3.89∗∗∗ 0.87∗∗∗ 1.31∗∗∗ 3.39∗∗∗ 0.88∗∗∗ 1.45∗∗∗ 3.50∗∗∗ 0.88∗∗ 1.21∗∗∗ 2.93∗∗∗ 0.90∗∗∗ 1.26∗∗∗
[6.71] [2.98] [11.24] [6.81] [2.81] [10.92] [8.31] [3.48] [6.64] [6.69] [3.95] [11.23] [4.7] [2.44] [4.46] [6.27] [4.67] [8.38]
POPUL -0.57∗∗ -0.46∗∗∗ -0.23∗∗∗ -0.44∗∗ -0.44∗∗∗ -0.18∗∗ -0.35∗ -0.09 0.09 -0.53∗∗ -0.15 -0.07 -0.30 0.06 0.13 0.57∗∗∗ -0.14 0.00
[-2.6] [-3.34] [-2.76] [-2.06] [-3.27] [-2.15] [-1.67] [-0.67] [1.06] [-2.51] [-1.16] [-1.15] [-0.97] [0.32] [1.25] [-2.89] [-1.17] [-0.02]
PRESS -0.02∗∗ -0.03∗∗∗ -0.01∗∗∗ -0.02∗∗ -0.03∗∗∗ -0.01∗∗∗ -0.02∗∗ -0.02∗∗∗ -0.02∗∗∗ -0.02∗ -0.02∗∗∗ -0.01∗∗∗ -0.02 -0.28∗∗∗ -0.02∗∗ -0.02∗∗ -0.02∗∗∗ -0.01∗∗∗
[-2.37] [-4.34] [-3.61] [-2.33] [-4.46] [-3.62] [-2.46] [-4.51] [-3.87] [-1.84] [-5.12] [-3.54] [-1.17] [-4.9] [-2.36] [-2.08] [-4.76] [-3.78]
Obs 56 64 68 55 63 67 73 99 121 77 107 127 37 47 57 81 115 142
R2 0.76 0.61 0.83 0.76 0.59 0.83 0.74 0.48 0.69 0.72 0.47 0.73 0.69 0.50 0.65 0.71 0.49 0.69
cpi icrg wbc cpi icrg wbc cpi icrg wbc cpi icrg wbc cpi icrg wbc cpi icrg wbc
DECENT4 FEDINDEX UNITARYHIS TIERS REGJ LOCJ
DEC -0.30∗ -0.05 -0.05 0.05 0.11 0.07 0.01∗∗ 0.00 0.01∗∗ -0.12 -0.21∗ -0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00∗∗ 0.00
[-1.94] [-0.64] [-1.13] [0.42] [1.56] [1.42] [2.17] [0.86] [2.44] [-0.6] [-1.72] [-0.48] [0.3] [-0.45] [-0.22] [0.87] [2.14] [1.58]
GDP 3.82∗∗∗ 0.93∗∗∗ 1.48∗∗∗ 2.90∗∗∗ 0.94∗∗∗ 1.44∗∗∗ 2.00∗∗∗ 0.92∗∗∗ 1.10∗∗∗ 2.62∗∗∗ 0.96∗∗∗ 1.22∗∗∗ 2.67∗∗∗ 1.13∗∗∗ 1.16∗∗∗ 2.77∗∗∗ 1.08∗∗∗ 1.31∗∗∗
[7.58] [3.6] [9.18] [6.13] [4.36] [9.32] [3.28] [3.33] [6.47] [6.61] [4.57] [9.94] [5.99] [4.37] [5.98] [7.19] [4.54] [10.15]
POPUL -0.36 -0.11 -0.01 -0.52∗ -0.01 0.01 -0.29 -0.11 0.03 -0.39∗ -0.27∗ -0.08 -0.44 -0.25 -0.12 -0.54∗ -0.46∗∗ -0.13
[-1.62] [-0.71] [-0.07] [-1.83] [-0.05] [0.16] [-1.37] [-0.77] [0.52] [-1.73] [-1.76] [-0.95] [-1.32] [-1.12] [-0.85] [-1.88] [-2.59] [-1.22]
PRESS -0.02** -0.02*** -0.01*** -0.02** -0.02*** -0.01*** -0.05*** -0.02** -0.02*** -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.02*** -0.04*** -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.03*** -0.02*** -0.01***
[-2.01] [-4.37] [-3.18] [-2.23] [-3.64] [-2.94] [-3.28] [-2.59] [-4.61] [-3.48] [-4.97] [-5.49] [-3.53] [-3.25] [-4.59] [-3.26] [-3.41] [-4.94]
Obs 67 90 106 83 113 121 65 87 103 83 107 122 51 54 60 77 97 106
R2 0.72 0.46 0.71 0.69 0.47 0.71 0.70 0.48 0.73 0.69 0.56 0.74 0.74 0.57 0.76 0.69 0.54 0.75
White-corrected standard errors. *** Signiﬁcant at the 1% level. ** Signiﬁcant at the 5% level. * Signiﬁcant at the 10% level. The constant term is not reported in this table.
DEC is the decentralisation indicator which varies across the diﬀerent columns of the table according to the measure selected. We estimate each alternative model for three diﬀerent
corruption indexes. Data are for 2000 except for TIERS, REGJ and LOCJ with data for 1999. GDP and POPUL are in logs.
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Table 5.5: Baseline regressions - Cross Section (Year= 2000) - Variable subset of countries - Additional Decentrali-
sation Indicators
Dependent variable: Corruption - Method: OLS
cpi icrg wbc cpi icrg wbc cpi icrg wbc cpi icrg wbc cpi icrg wbc cpi icrg wbc
FEDERAL UNITARY STCONST FIS POL ADM
DEC 0.16 -0.16 -0.03 -0.11 0.12 0.02 0.14 0.34 0.07 -0.43 0.47 0.08 0.37 0.84 0.49 -0.43 0.34 -0.11
[0.39] [-0.66] [-0.16] [-0.42] [0.80] [0.24] [0.29] [1.16] [0.40] [-0.36] [0.96] [0.20] [0.28] [1.65] [1.26] [-0.52] [0.87] [-0.35]
GDP 2.92∗∗∗ 0.89∗∗∗ 1.24∗∗∗ 2.30∗∗∗ 1.03∗∗ 1.25∗∗∗ 2.89∗∗∗ 0.50 1.37∗∗∗ 2.70∗∗∗ 0.82∗∗ 1.41∗∗∗ 2.67∗∗∗ 0.87∗∗ 1.42∗∗∗ 2.81∗∗∗ 0.79∗∗ 1.44∗∗∗
[6.33] [4.64] [8.58] [4.05] [3.66] [8.25] [3.25] [1.13] [6.21] [3.18] [2.53] [4.73] [3.11] [2.66] [5.01] [3.27] [2.55] [5.32]
POPUL -0.58∗∗ -0.10 0.01 -0.49∗ -0.07 0.02 -0.64∗∗ -0.26 -0.08 -0.72∗ -0.09 -0.06 -0.69∗ -0.14 -0.07 -0.70∗ -0.13 -0.05
[-2.51] [-0.72] [0.12] [-1.84] [-0.37] [0.25] [-2.40] [-1.30] [-0.91] [-1.81] [-0.49] [-0.50] [-1.94] [-0.65] [-0.68] [-2.01] [-0.66] [-0.45]
PRESS -0.02∗∗ -0.02∗∗∗ -0.01∗∗∗ -0.05∗∗∗ -0.02∗∗∗ -0.02∗∗∗ -0.03∗∗ -0.02∗∗ -0.01∗∗∗ -0.02 -0.02∗∗∗ -0.01∗ -0.02 -0.02∗∗∗ -0.01∗ -0.02 -0.02∗∗∗ -0.01∗
[-2.13] [-5.14] [-4.14] [-3.92] [-2.73] [-4.94] [-2.29] [-2.10] [-2.84] [-1.17] [-3.07] [-1.85] [-1.16] [-3.05] [-1.97] [-0.94] [-3.36] [-1.84]
Obs 88 126 157 65 87 103 39 48 55 37 43 55 37 43 55 37 43 55
R2 0.70 0.48 0.69 0.68 0.48 0.71 0.72 0.36 0.69 0.64 0.53 0.69 0.64 0.55 0.70 0.64 0.53 0.64
White-corrected standard errors. *** Signiﬁcant at the 1% level. ** Signiﬁcant at the 5% level. * Signiﬁcant at the 10% level. The constant term is not reported in this table.
DEC is the decentralisation indicator which varies across the diﬀerent columns of the table according to the measure selected. We estimate each alternative model for three diﬀerent
corruption indexes. Data are for 2000 except for POL, FIS, and ADM with data for 1996. GDP and POPUL are in logs.
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measures as determinants of corruption matches results found elsewhere in the
literature [Treisman (2002b,a)]. Enikolopov and Zhuravskaya (2006) ﬁnd no di-
rect relation of these indicators to corruption (only through their interaction with
ﬁscal decentralisation measures)17.
Finally in Table 5.4 we direct our attention to the structural decentralisation indi-
cators. The existence of autonomous contiguous regions, the number of regional
jurisdictions and the number of local jurisdictions are included here along with
the number of elected sub-national tiers (vertical decentralisation according to
Treisman). In no case is there any evidence of a relationship of any kind with
corruption. This supports Treisman (2002a) who found that the number of sub-
national elected tiers is sensitive to the inclusion of a measure of GDP, one of the
most robust determinants of corruption, and country size. The existence of au-
tonomous contiguous regions may be in principle associated with lower corruption
given that these regions may be seen as checks on the central authority. But the
fact that most of these regions are associated with ethnic groups would probably
act as a balancing act increasing corruption derived from ethnic or linguistic frag-
mentation. The data suggest that auton and corruption are not directly related.
We summarise the results of our regression models in table 5.6. For each indicator
we report whether the coeﬃcient is signiﬁcant, the signiﬁcance level and the sign
of the coeﬃcient across all three corruption indexes. The variable subset column
refers to the regressions where we use a diﬀerent subsample for each corruption
index whereas the common subset column reports the results using the same sub-
sample. It can be observed that, in general, our main measures of decentralisation
-rev, unitaryhis, muni and tiers- are signiﬁcant and have the expected sign. In
particular, rev is signiﬁcant in all regression models, and unitaryhis and muni
are always signiﬁcant except for the ICRG index. Tiers is reported signiﬁcant
only when using the ICRG index. As we have argued earlier, these indicators
are those which best capture and represent the decentralisation features that we
17The severe limitations of the data, in its majority dummies or categorical variables suggest
a careful interpretation of these ﬁndings. In any case, the available indicators do not seem to be
aﬀecting or aﬀected by corruption in a direct way.
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study. In addition, the fact that the results using a common subset of countries do
not change much compared to those obtained for the variable subset of countries,
suggests that our estimation results are not heavily dependent on the choice of
corruption index. Since this appears to be the case, the remainder of this chapter
uses the WBC index on the basis that it maximizes the subsample size and that
it appropriately captures the presence of bureaucratic corruption.
Table 5.6: Signiﬁcance of decentralisation indicators
Variable Variable Subset Common Subset
cpi icrg wbc sign cpi icrg wbc sign
exp ** ** *** positive ** ** positive
rev ** * ** positive ** * * positive
muni *** ** negative *** ** negative
state variable ** negative
author *** negative *** negative
auton negative negative
decent4 * negative * ** ** negative
fedindex positive positive
unitaryhis ** ** positive ** ** positive
tiers * negative ** negative
regj positive positive
locj ** positive ** positive
federal variable variable
unitary variable variable
stconst positive * * positive
*** Signiﬁcant at the 1% level. ** Signiﬁcant at the 5% level. * Signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
Sign: negative, if always negative; positive, if always positive; variable, if signs changes across
corruption indexes. For sources see Appendix B
From our discussion above, it is clear that there are relatively few measures of de-
centralisation that directly impact on corruption and fewer that are robust across
the diﬀerent indices of corruption typically used in the literature. Some combi-
nations of the signiﬁcant variables uncovered are also somewhat puzzling. For
example, why are federal countries more corrupt than unitary countries if ﬁscal
decentralisation is associated with lower corruption? Is the relationship between
ﬁscal decentralisation and corruption the same at diﬀerent levels of ﬁscal and po-
litical decentralisation? Why is political decentralisation not related to corruption
in light of all the electoral accountability and local capture theories? To what
extent is territorial/structural decentralisation associated to more eﬃcient organ-
133
isation and delivery of public services? Does granting decision-making authority
to sub-national governments have a diﬀerent impact on corruption if electoral
decentralisation is in place?
5.4.2 Multi-dimensional corruption
One of our objectives in this work is to try to analyse a number of dimensions of
decentralisation and their relationship to corruption. As we noticed earlier, the
literature in this area is somewhat vague in describing the way in which diﬀerent
aspects of decentralisation may be simultaneously important. In Table 5.7 we
concentrate on the main variables found to be signiﬁcant in Table 5.4. Model 1
replicates the very basic model included in Table 5.4 with only the ﬁscal decen-
tralisation indicator (rev) controlled for. In model 5 we include both ﬁscal and
unitary history measures, in model 7 we add the political measure muni and in
model 8 we add the structural measure locj 18. Only the results for ﬁscal and con-
stitutional decentralisation are robust, indeed their estimated eﬀects increases in
size and signiﬁcance compared to the earlier regressions. These results do not alter
when we include the structural and political measures, excluding the ﬁscal and
federal measure. This regression also highlights a limitation of trying to control
for many dimensions of decentralisation, since the number of observations drops
markedly. The main drop in the number of observations from model 5 to 12 is
caused by the inclusion of muni for which we have many missing observations. We
have also tested (although they are not shown in the table) the other indicators
for constitutional (federal), political (state, stconst) and structural (tiers, regj ) in
the regressions as an alternative measure of unitaryhis, muni and locj. In no case
are the coeﬃcients signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero.
As a ﬁnal check on these models, we have included additional controls in the speci-
18One potential concern when using locj is the possibility that countries with a very large
number of elected jurisdictions are driving our results. The most notable case is India. We have
performed the analysis excluding this country and the results for this variable and other relevant
variables remain largely unchanged. In any case, we are conﬁdent that our results in Table 5.7
are not driven by the inclusion of India in the sample.
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Table 5.7: Corruption on decentralisation and standard controls. Direct Eﬀects
Dependent variable: Corruption (WBC index). Method: OLS
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12
rev 0.018*** 0.029*** 0.017*** 0.030*** 0.025*** 0.030*** 0.029*** 0.029*** 0.029***
(4.195) (7.795) (3.603) (7.337) (4.908) (7.025) (5.998) (7.006) (6.135)
loggdp 1.954*** 1.169*** 1.329*** 1.354*** 1.883*** 2.154*** 1.983*** 2.079*** 1.983*** 2.022*** 1.967*** 1.966***
(12.652) (7.157) (6.736) (10.828) (11.073) (12.064) (11.468) (10.860) (10.947) (9.274) (11.990) (10.917)
logpopul -0.159** 0.049 0.095 -0.074 -0.121 -0.127 -0.103 -0.136 -0.103 -0.121 -0.101 -0.095
(-2.022) (0.741) (1.178) (-0.707) (-1.541) (-1.305) (-1.157) (-1.098) (-1.145) (-1.161) (-1.206) (-1.084)
pss -0.010*** -0.017*** -0.015*** -0.013*** -0.004 -0.010*** -0.002 -0.005 -0.002 -0.005 -0.004 -0.003
(-3.409) (-4.475) (-3.806) (-4.737) (-0.955) (-2.733) (-0.545) (-1.079) (-0.255) (-0.956) (-1.047) (-0.608)
unitaryhis 0.005** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.008*** 0.009*** 0.008*** 0.009*** 0.009***
(2.110) (5.310) (4.727) (4.033) (4.663) (3.616) (4.657) (4.183)
muni -0.158** -0.191 -0.109 -0.079 -0.109 -0.182 -0.133 -0.106
(-2.022) (-1.416) (-0.681) (-0.455) (-0.666) (-1.003) (-0.852) (-0.645)
locj 0.000 0.000
(1.120) (1.532)
polrights -0.002
(-0.022)
ethno 0.038
(0.147)
bri 0.218
(1.579)
prod 0.072
(0.436)
Adj R2 0.854 0.725 0.684 0.754 0.901 0.848 0.890 0.889 0.887 0.890 0.894 0.887
N 65 101 120 104 53 55 47 41 47 39 47 47
Note: All regressions exclude Argentina and Russian Federation. Robust standard errors (only t-ratios are reported). * Signiﬁcant at the 10% level **
Signiﬁcant at the 5% level *** Signiﬁcant at the 1% level. All models are estimated by OLS. For details on data sources and description see appendix B.
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ﬁcation. The idea behind this procedure is to account for the possibility that there
are direct and independent signiﬁcant eﬀects of diﬀerent aspects of decentralisa-
tion on the level of corruption. In general, when papers examine the relationship
between federalism and corruption, they either exclude any other aspect of ﬁscal
decentralisation from the speciﬁcation [Treisman (2000)] or they have failed to
ﬁnd any signiﬁcant direct eﬀect of federalism on corruption [Fisman and Gatti
(2002a)]. Models 9 through 12 experiment using the speciﬁcation given by model
7 (ﬁscal, political and constitutional decentralisation altogether) and adding other
standard controls that have been suggested as robust determinants of corruption
elsewhere [Treisman (2000), La Porta et al. (1999) and Serra (2006)]. The level
of political rights, the ethno-linguistic fractionalization index, and dummies for
British colonial history and protestantism as dominant religion come out insignif-
icant without introducing any signiﬁcant changes to the coeﬃcients of our main
variables of interest19.
5.4.3 Interaction eﬀects
Before we move on to consider the models with indirect and interaction eﬀects we
think it may be useful to examine the relationship between corruption and a few
of the decentralisation indicators at diﬀerent degrees of decentralisation. We split
the sample according to a certain criterion and perform a rolling regression. This
procedure takes several steps involving ranking the observations on the variable of
interest (ﬁscal, political constitutional or structural decentralisation in our case)
and then running an initial regression for the observations satisfying a certain cri-
terion. For example, we may choose as our initial sub-sample the observations for
which ﬁscal decentralisation is less than the mean value. Another alternative is
to choose an arbitrary sub-sample size and deﬁne that as the initial sub-sample.
We then run a regression using this sub-sample, obtain the estimates and statis-
tics and record the values. Next we add the nearest highest-ranked observation
19We have also used alternative indicators for each of these controls and have also controlled
for other potential determinants of corruption with the results being largely unchanged.
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not included in the initial regression and we drop the lowest-ranked observation
included in the initial sub-sample. We always keep the sub-sample size constant
throughout this analysis, thus making sure any changes are not due to the in-
crease/decrease in the size of the sample. We continue this procedure until the
last (highest-ranked) observation is added and we record the estimates.
The only limitation to this procedure is that we can only perform it for the con-
tinuous measures of decentralisation, since using a discrete or categorical measure
will result in all countries having the same rank within each category. Therefore
we perform this analysis for three continuous measures of decentralisation: exp,
rev, and unitaryhis. In the exp and rev cases we are left with 68 and 67 observa-
tions respectively and we choose a sub-sample size of 30 for each20. Regarding the
corruption indicator we use the World Bank Control of Corruption index which
has been chosen as our main corruption index21. The coeﬃcients, signiﬁcance and
conﬁdence intervals for each of the regressions using the three indicators can be
found in Appendix B. We summarize the results of the analysis in the following
graphs. Graph 5.2 shows the sensitivity of the coeﬃcient on ﬁscal decentralisa-
tion as measured through sub-national expenditure (exp) to gradual shifts from
lower to higher ﬁscal decentralisation. It is clear from the graph that when our
sub-sample includes the lower end of the scale (ﬁscally centralised countries) the
coeﬃcient of ﬁscal decentralisation on corruption is negative (the dots in the ﬁg-
ure) although almost never signiﬁcant at the 10% level. But as we gradually
include more ﬁscally decentralised countries in our sub-sample, the coeﬃcients
become positive and signiﬁcant for a high percentage of regressions. The fact that
the graph depicts a smooth transition from negative to positive coeﬃcients when
ﬁscal decentralisation increases is indicative of the presence of heterogeneity in the
relationship between these two variables22.
20Using the criterion of deﬁning the sub-sample by the observations that fall below or above
the average the size of the sub-samples is 24 in the exp case and 18 in the rev case.
21The same analysis has been performed for the selected decentralisation measures using al-
ternative corruption indexes. This can be consulted in Appendix B.
22However we should note that number of sub-samples which yield a signiﬁcant coeﬃcient is
rather limited. It is likely that the drop in the number of observations in each sub-sample is
responsible (at least partly) for the drop in signiﬁcance levels.
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Figure 5.2: Rolling regression for exp and wbc
A similar pattern is observed in graph 5.3. The decentralisation measure is now the
sub-national revenue share as a proportion of total government revenue (rev). The
heterogeneity in the relationship between corruption and ﬁscal decentralisation is
present regardless of the ﬁscal decentralisation indicator that we use. Graph 5.4
show the sensitivity of the coeﬃcients of our measure of constitutional decentral-
isation (unitaryhis), the degree of unitary history of a country. As we mentioned
earlier, this measure has been elaborated by Gerring et al. (2005a,b). It is worth
noting the similarities between this graph and the previous ones. This variable
does not measure the same aspects though since as we noted earlier unitary coun-
tries need not be more ﬁscally centralised than federal countries (although in prac-
tice this seems to be the case). In any case, this graph shows preliminary evidence
suggesting that the relationship between long unitary history and corruption may
not be as straightforward as it has been argued [Gerring et al. (2005a)]. More
importantly it appears that the relationship between long unitary history and less
corruption is being driven by the sub-sample of historically unitarist countries
which have a higher GDP per capita than the rest of the countries. In fact, the
average GDP per capita for the sub-sample of historically unitarist countries is
almost three times that of the historically federal countries23.
23We split the sample in two grouping the countries above and below the average of unitary
history.
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Figure 5.3: Rolling regression for rev and wbc
From the previous analysis it is evident that aspects of ﬁscal and constitutional
decentralisation are associated to corruption. It also appears that there may be
some heterogeneity in the relationship between these variables and corruption.
The results yielded by the rolling regression analysis suggest this may the case.
We would like to examine the form of heterogeneity existent in this relationship
and in order to do this we proceed with additional econometric analysis adding
interaction terms to the baseline speciﬁcations24.
Now we want to examine the possibility that other aspects of decentralisation
may aﬀect corruption indirectly or that ﬁscal and constitutional decentralisation
may have an indirect rather than a direct eﬀect on corruption. We use a base
speciﬁcation including both controls for ﬁscal and constitutional decentralisation
and we introduce some interaction terms. In principle we would expect that other
aspects of decentralisation or of the institutional environment may aﬀect the im-
pact of ﬁscal or constitutional decentralisation on corruption. The interactions
that we propose in this section are based in theoretical presumptions provided by
24Ideally we would like to test the presence of potential contingent eﬀects in the relationship
between decentralisation and corruption. For example, the relationship between decentralisa-
tion and corruption may be positive beyond certain thresholds of development and negative or
inexistent for other thresholds. Unfortunately, this was not possible in our investigation for two
reasons. First, we do not have continuous variables for all the decentralisation dimensions that
we consider. Second, even for those aspects that we have suitable variables (rev, unitaryhis), the
size of the sub-sample is not convenient for using threshold regression models.
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Figure 5.4: Rolling regression for unitaryhis and wbc
the relevant literature. For instance, we interact the ﬁscal decentralisation control
(rev) with both GDP per capita and with the political decentralisation indica-
tors. It is expected that as nations become more developed the marginal eﬀect
of ﬁscal decentralisation on corruption will be smaller since the increase in GDP
per capita would improve corruption levels by a large extent. The interaction
of ﬁscal decentralisation with political decentralisation indicators comes naturally
from Riker's theory and it was previously tested by Enikolopov and Zhuravskaya
(2006). Other interactions that may be of interest are the constitutional decen-
tralisation with ethnic and linguistic fragmentation: there is a long-standing line
of research arguing that federal countries are better suited than unitary system to
accommodate the eﬀects of regional and ethnic diﬀerences [see Bermeo (2002) for
a recent evaluation of these ideas.].
Looking at the results presented in Table 9, one thing that we notice is that the
coeﬃcients for both ﬁscal (rev) and constitutional decentralisation (unitaryhis)
keep the expected sign and their signiﬁcance in most cases. As a ﬁrst result, we
can observe that the inclusion of interaction terms do not aﬀect signiﬁcantly the
direct eﬀects of the two decentralisation aspects.
Regarding the results for the interaction terms, there are three models, 1, 5 and 7
that yield signiﬁcant coeﬃcients. Model 1 produces a negative sign for interaction
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Table 5.8: Corruption on decentralisation and standard controls. Interaction Eﬀects
Dependent variable: Corruption (WBC index). Method: OLS
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
rev 0.037*** 0.064 0.031 0.028*** 0.031*** 0.030*** 0.040*** 0.038***
(6.866) (1.542) (0.856) (5.724) (7.776) (7.508) (5.341) (6.216)
unitaryhis 0.013*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.031*** 0.018 0.008*** 0.032***
(4.251) (5.095) (4.692) (4.367) (3.184) (0.666) (3.586) (3.262)
loggdp 1.876*** 2.064*** 1.984*** 1.847*** 1.872*** 1.949*** 2.011*** 1.884***
(11.292) (7.580) (10.607) (8.698) (9.459) (7.339) (8.005) (9.848)
logpopul -0.152* -0.131* -0.103 -0.136 -0.135 -0.117 -0.035 -0.170*
(-1.945) (-1.768) (-1.146) (-1.424) (-1.605) (-1.452) (-0.267) (-1.981)
pss -0.003 -0.004 -0.002 -0.006 -0.005 -0.004 -0.007 -0.003
(-0.613) (-0.864) (-0.530) (-1.051) (-1.005) (-0.779) (-1.208) (-0.613)
INT : rev · unitary -0.000** -0.000*
(-2.113) (-1.789)
INT : rev · gdp -0.008
(-0.837)
muni -0.107 0.456* 0.407
(-0.430) (1.732) (1.499)
INT : rev ·muni -0.000
(-0.015)
INT : unitary · ethno -0.004
(-0.831)
INT : unitary ·muni -0.011** -0.010*
(-2.236) (-1.857)
INT : unitaryhis · gdp -0.002
(-0.331)
regj 0.007 **
(2.372)
INT : rev · regj -0.001**
(-2.582)
Adj R2 0.905 0.900 0.887 0.903 0.898 0.899 0.900 0.901
N 53 53 47 45 47 53 30 47
Note: All regressions exclude Argentina and Russian Federation. Robust standard errors (only t-ratios are reported). * Signiﬁcant at the 10%
level ** Signiﬁcant at the 5% level *** Signiﬁcant at the 1% level. All models are estimated by OLS. For details on data sources and description
see appendix B.
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between constitutional decentralisation and ﬁscal decentralisation. The negative
sign implies that the positive eﬀect of a unitary system on corruption is worsened
when the country becomes more ﬁscally decentralised. As discussed earlier unitary
systems need not be incompatible with other aspects of decentralisation. The sign
of this interaction is somewhat surprising. One possible reason for this to happen
is that when countries become more ﬁscally decentralized the eﬀectiveness of a
unitary structure to control and monitor the growing amount of resources allocated
to the deconcentrated units decreases. In any event, even when the coeﬃcient is
negative and signiﬁcant, its size is very small.
Model 5 yields a negative sign for the interaction term between political and
constitutional decentralisation. Again, this means that the positive eﬀect of con-
stitutional decentralisation on corruption worsens when the country becomes more
politically decentralised. Finally, the results for model 7 imply that the positive
eﬀect of ﬁscal decentralisation on corruption is worsened when the number of
intermediate jurisdictions grows. We have also tried other indicators of political
decentralisation interacted with ﬁscal and constitutional decentralisation measures
but none of these other interaction terms was found signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from
zero.
In model 8 we include both direct eﬀects of ﬁscal and constitutional decentralisa-
tion and the interaction terms from models 1 and 5. The rationale for this is to
test whether these interactions still hold when included within the same econo-
metric model. Model 8 is clear in that it renders both direct eﬀects and both
interaction terms signiﬁcant. The signs are the same as those obtained in the
previous models. In this way, Model 8 stands both as a robustness check on the
model with direct eﬀects and also as a more comprehensive model for describing
the empirical relationship between corruption and decentralisation. As it is clear
from this model, our suggestions earlier in this research have been upheld by the
analysis of the data.
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Figure 5.5: Partial regression plots - Model 5
Figure 5.6: Partial regression plots - Model 7
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5.5 Conclusions
The last 30 years have seen a large number of countries embark on some form
of decentralisation. While the causes of this trend are in general precise and
well-known, its consequences are much less certain and by no means deﬁnitive.
Evaluating the results of decentralisation is not an easy task. Case studies provide
an important source of evidence but generalisation is not straightforward. Cross-
country and panel-data studies are becoming more common but suﬀer from two
main problems. On one hand, there are data issues. On the other hand, there
are modelling problems. These two elements act as limiting forces on both the
quantity and quality of empirical research. Nevertheless, there seems to be a
renewed scholarly commitment to take the empirics to new levels.
We need better and more thorough empirical studies. We argue that a ﬁrst step
towards this is to understand decentralisation as a multidimensional phenomenon
that has a large variety of eﬀects. In this sense, we should ideally aim at identify-
ing these dimensions and postulating the likely eﬀects and the interrelationships
between them. In this sense, the theoretical literature has provided interesting
insights that have been often left unexplored by the empirical literature until very
recently. Our work in this chapter has shown why this approach is important,
what are some of questions still unresolved in the empirical literature and how to
attempt a sensible approach to tackling these issues.
Recent literature has acknowledged the presence of a number of aspects that make
the study of the relationship between decentralisation and corruption less obvious.
First, it has been recognized that diﬀerent dimensions of decentralisation exist
and that they have complex interrelations. Second, it has been argued that the
extent and eﬀects of decentralisation may depend on the existence and extent
of other dimensions of decentralisation. Although these ideas are not new, they
are becoming increasingly common in the empirical literature. Finally, it has
also been suggested that diﬀerent dimensions of decentralisation may co-evolve
and their interactions over time might have a strong eﬀect on corruption and the
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institutional quality.
Our results in this chapter may provide a few insights regarding the policy debate
on the eﬀects of decentralisation. In particular, as we have seen, the positive eﬀect
of ﬁscal decentralisation on corruption seems to be larger when countries have a
deeply rooted unitarist history. While this result seems to be not so intuitive, it
is plausible that high ﬁscal decentralisation without changing the constitutional
basis or government organisation may indeed be associated with high corruption
levels. This may be particularly the case if increasing the spending or taxing au-
thority of sub-national governments is not associated with increased accountability
arising from the existence of solid local institutions. Furthermore, a growing num-
ber of unitary countries are resorting to local democratization processes via local
elections or referenda voting. Our results suggest that certain forms of political
decentralisation are correlated with a high incidence of bureaucratic corruption
particularly if the country has a unitarist tradition and low levels of ﬁscal de-
centralisation. It should be noted, that according to our results, the existence of
a long-standing unitary system is directly and indirectly associated with corrup-
tion. As these correlations have opposite signs, the overall result is uncertain and
essentially an empirical matter.
While our results may suggest that some forms of decentralisation aﬀects corrup-
tion, another plausible interpretation is that other factors may have a more direct
eﬀect on the existence and extent of bureaucratic corruption. In the empirical
literature some authors have suggested the importance of factors such as fragmen-
tation and weak local institutions. These are implicitly and indirectly present in
our analysis to some extent but we are not able to assess their incidence. It would
be desirable to utilise more disaggregated measures of decentralisation and politi-
cal institutions in order to achieve a greater understanding of the interactions and
relationships that have an association with corruption.
Finally, although we have shown that our results are consistent with a sensible
speciﬁcation, and robust to controlling for diﬀerent variables and data, we are
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rather cautious regarding the direction of the causation and concerning potential
policy implications. The aim in this chapter has been to investigate the existence
and extent of the relationships between multiple dimensions of decentralisation
and corruption. There may be additional considerations if endogeneity of the
regressors is a possibility and the study of this issue would be an interesting
exercise to understand better the nature and implications of this problem.
In conclusion, the issue of whether decentralisation leads to more or less corruption
is still uncertain and much more empirical research is needed. But we believe that
this future empirical research should be aimed at exploring the interrelations of
diﬀerent aspects or dimensions of decentralisation. The study of these aspects
has been suggested and carried out by Barenstein and de Mello (2001), Rodden
(2002), Treisman (2002b,a) and Enikolopov and Zhuravskaya (2006). Our study
contributes to this literature by both reinforcing some of the earlier ﬁndings and
obtaining some new evidence.
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Chapter 6
Concluding remarks
6.1 Summary of ﬁndings
This thesis has studied several aspects of the relationship between corruption and
development with the aim of contributing to the empirical and theoretical lit-
eratures. The focus has been placed on the determinants of corruption and we
have used various methodologies to address three key topics -the relationship be-
tween freedom of the press and corruption, the relationship between corruption,
development and decentralisation and the relationship between federalism, decen-
tralisation and corruption.
With regard to the relationship between press freedom and corruption, we have
evaluated the relevant literature and identiﬁed the need for a thorough analysis of
this relationship. The main motivation, discussed in chapter 3, is given by the ex-
istence of mixed evidence regarding this relationship. We have also set the goal of
exploring this relationship further by considering how speciﬁc restrictions to media
freedom aﬀect bureaucratic corruption. Our empirical evidence, obtained using
a global sensitivity analysis, conﬁrms earlier results that greater media freedom
is associated with lower corruption. Our estimates of the eﬀect of press freedom
on corruption however, are not only robust to diﬀerent data and methods but
also to changes in the conditioning information set. More speciﬁcally, we have
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used the growing body of knowledge on the determinants of corruption to test the
press freedom estimates for robustness to a wide range of potential determinants
using the methodology known as extreme bounds analysis. We have also suggested
and implemented certain methods and statistics to overcome the criticisms of this
methodology.
In addition to conﬁrming earlier results, we have also explored how diﬀerent as-
pects of restrictions to press freedom matter for corruption. The econometric
results suggest that not all the forms of restrictions to press freedom are strongly
and robustly correlated with corruption. For example, the evidence suggests that
the aspects concerning legal and administrative regulations obstructive of the me-
dia are not robustly associated to higher corruption. In contrast, economic and
political restrictions are strongly associated with higher corruption and the esti-
mates suggest a sizable eﬀect. We also present preliminary evidence concerning
the direction of the causation. Based on the tests to control for endogeneity, it
would appear that improvements in press freedom lead to a lower incidence of cor-
ruption. Nevertheless, we remain cautious regarding this issue given the diﬃculties
of ﬁnding meaningful and truly exogenous instruments.
The second central topic we study is the relationship between corruption, develop-
ment and decentralisation. One of the issues that has received much attention in
recent years is the bidirectional relationship between corruption and development.
Among the appeal of these models is that they allow us to incorporate and analyse
the impact of institutional or policy changes without aﬀecting their essential prop-
erties. We use this type of dynamic growth model to analyse the conditions under
which decentralisation is associated with higher economic development. Although
much has been written on the beneﬁts and dangers of decentralisation, the overall
eﬀect on development is subject to much debate and contention. Our purpose
regarding this topic has not been to elaborate a fully comprehensive model but
rather to provide a simple model considering diﬀerent decentralisation regimes
and the implications for corruption and development. The issue is certainly more
complex than it was originally considered and there are several interrelationships
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between the economic and political aspects involved.
The main implications of our model can be summarised as follows: ﬁrst, cor-
ruption has a negative impact on development. Bureaucratic corruption, in our
model represented as embezzlement of public funds, divert away public funds that
otherwise would have been contributed to production of private services. It also
increases the cost of public activity by raising monitoring costs. Second, we ﬁnd
that decentralisation is always preferable to centralisation if corruption is absent
in the economy but may not be the preferred alternative if corruption is pervasive.
Under some conditions, the economic beneﬁts associated to decentralisation are
more than oﬀset by the political costs associated to it, and the economy may end
up with a lower development level than if the country were decentralised. Finally,
the model is able to explain why in the absence of institutional reform, corruption
and poverty remain as permanent characteristics of the economy. This result is
particularly important given the emphasis on decentralisation reforms advocated
in recent decades. Although our analysis does not accurately capture the decision
to decentralise or recentralise it might provide a framework of analysis that would
be well suited to this task and could be extended to incorporate multiple aspects
of decentralisation and eventually to endogenise the decentralisation process.
Our ﬁnal central topic addresses the relationship between federalism, decentrali-
sation and corruption. There are obvious links with the topic studied in chapter
4, although the methodology and scope are somewhat diﬀerent. The aim here is
to incorporate a multidimensional examination of the relationship between cor-
ruption and decentralisation. The methodology is empirical. Although it has
been recognized that there are multiple dimensions of decentralisation, until very
recently, the empirical literature has rarely gone beyond the analysis of a sin-
gle or alternative aspects of decentralisation. Furthermore, it has been noted that
there may be important interrelations and overlaps between these diﬀerent aspects
worth considering. In addition, there are reasons to believe in the possibility that
certain forms of decentralisation work better when certain forms of centralised
institutions are present. Finally, it is likely that diﬀerent dimensions of decentral-
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isation co-evolve over time and this co-evolution may produce a signiﬁcant eﬀect
on corruption and institutional quality.
We have suggested earlier in this thesis that empirical studies on corruption and
decentralisation are at a relatively early stage in their development. While there
are several theories of decentralisation, the empirical literature has not generally
addressed their multidimensional nature and the interrelations between diﬀerent
types of decentralisation. Several reasons lie behind this. First, there is a problem
of data availability and concept. In order to avoid having only a partial view of the
problem, one must ensure to deﬁne, group and control for the several recognized
dimensions of decentralisation. Decentralisation has been often suggested as a
channel through which countries are able to achieve eﬃciency, accountability and
democratisation. Most likely, not all forms of decentralisation contribute to these
objectives or at least not to the same extent.
Our study adds to the recent literature in that we not only recognize and measure
the existence of diﬀerent dimensions of decentralisation but also suggest hypothe-
ses based on the theoretical literature and model their interactions. Furthermore,
unlike most previous research we propose and ﬁnd that some types of decentral-
isation are simultaneously associated with corruption through both direct and
indirect eﬀects. Our ﬁnding that long-standing unitary countries (constitutional
centralisation) that are also ﬁscally decentralised have low corruption is to some
extent present in earlier research. The main diﬀerence is that most articles do
not ﬁnd that these two dimensions of decentralisation are signiﬁcant in the same
model. Furthermore, we also ﬁnd evidence suggesting that political decentralisa-
tion is also associated with corruption, but only in an indirect way through its
eﬀect on constitutional decentralisation. In particular, political decentralisation
weakens the impact of constitutional centralisation on corruption. This result is
similar to Enikolopov and Zhuravskaya (2006) who ﬁnd a negative indirect eﬀect
of political decentralisation on corruption. Our results are robust to a range of
speciﬁcations and to several alternative measures.
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6.2 Policy implications
We believe the research undertaken in this study yields a number of policy im-
plications in diﬀerent directions. The two empirical studies have been centred
around the relationship between corruption and two important dimensions of the
socio-economic system: democratic institutions and the role and structure of the
government in the economy. Our research on freedom of the media and corruption
conﬁrms the role of democracy as an important check on government corruption.
Moreover, this study stresses the role of press freedom as a crucial check on corrup-
tion as has been observed in the literature [Brunetti and Weder (2003), McMillan
and Zoido (2004)]. On the other hand, although the implications regarding the
role and structure of the government are not as clear-cut as those concerned with
press freedom, it would appear that ﬁscally decentralised countries which are also
structured on a unitarist basis have lower levels of corruption. Furthermore, our
research also supports the idea that for certain forms of decentralisation to impact
on corruption (constitutional decentralisation for instance), some form of political
centralisation would be beneﬁcial.
Notably, the positive eﬀect of ﬁscal decentralisation on corruption seems to be
greater when countries have a long-standing history of unitarism. Furthermore, a
growing number of unitary countries are resorting to local democratization pro-
cesses via local elections or referenda voting. Our results suggest that a move to
higher political decentralisation may have adverse eﬀects on corruption particu-
larly if the country has a unitary system of government and low ﬁscal decentrali-
sation. The overall result of decentralisation on development will depend on dif-
ferent factors however. One of these concerns the political economy considerations
associated with decentralisation such as the existence of local capture, deﬁcient
monitoring and the eﬀect of political decentralisation on local accountability.
Our theoretical model in Chapter 4 also provides some insights concerning the pol-
icy discussion of the eﬀects of decentralisation. In particular, it may be possible
as we have shown that the eﬀects of decentralisation on the economy are blurred
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by the existence of pervasive corruption. A large number of developing countries
immersed in poverty and corruption have undertaken institutional reforms con-
ducing to greater decentralisation of public services and governance. The ﬁndings
in our theoretical model suggest that decentralisation may not be the best policy if
the countries are experiencing high corruption levels. Finally, our results suggest
that if informational asymmetries in public administration and deﬁciencies at the
local levels are signiﬁcant, the positive eﬀects of the greater economic eﬃciency of
decentralised provision of public goods and services may be overshadowed by the
negative eﬀects associated with those problems.
6.3 Limitations and other considerations
An important topic in empirical research is related to the problem of drawing
conﬁdent inferences on causality. Ideally, the way to address this problem involves
not only testing for the potential endogeneity of the regressors but also introducing
causality tests. Our work in this thesis has not addressed these issues for several
reasons. Firstly, there are data limitations that prevent us to work with long
periods of time. Second, it is diﬃcult to use panel methods or other techniques
suited to address the causality problem given the nature and characteristics of
our main variables. Finally, our analysis has been concerned mainly with the
identiﬁcation of relationships between the variables of interest. While the focus in
Chapter 3 is on robustness, Chapter 5 addresses the problem of heterogeneity in
the relationship between the variables. Additionally, we have also tried to look for
insights in the theoretical models and presumptions as a way to assist in drawing
inferences but this has been made diﬃcult given the lack of formal models. Given
these circumstances, we believe it is important to stress that our results should
be taken with caution when drawing inferences on causality and the direction
of the eﬀects. Our results indicate the existence of robust relationships between
certain variables with some suggestions regarding the direction of the eﬀects. It
is necessary to have better data and to run appropriate tests in order to draw
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conﬁdent inferences about causality and direction of the eﬀects,
Another possible caveat of our research relates to the fact that we have not been
able to integrate the analyses of Chapters 4 and 5. To a large extent, this has been
mainly due to the intention of keeping the theoretical modeling simple. Introduc-
ing several dimensions of decentralisation into the theoretical model would have
required a sacriﬁce in terms of simplicity and clarity. There may have also been
tractability issues. One plausible way of blending the theoretical and empirical
analyses would be to group the diﬀerent decentralisation dimensions according to
whether they have mostly economic eﬀects or informational/political eﬀects. This
is certainly an interesting approach that may be worth pursuing in future research.
Finally, we would like to comment on the matter of choosing between diﬀerent
measures for the main variables of our study. In our study, the main criteria to
choose a particular indicator have been the extent to which the measure repre-
sented the deﬁnition of the concept and the possibility of maximising the number
of observations. In this sense, we have analysed the inclusion of several alternative
indicators for press freedom, corruption and decentralisation. We have focused on
the Press Freedom Index (Freedom House), CPI and WBC Corruption Indexes and
three measures of decentralisation: the ratio of sub-national government revenue
to total government revenue, the unitary history of a country and the presence
of local elections of the executive and legislative. According to our criteria, these
are the measures that best capture the essence of the phenomenons under study.
While other indicators have been used in the past by previous studies, we re-
main conﬁdent that our choice of indicators responds to the criteria speciﬁed and
therefore are the best available for the purposes of this research.
6.4 Directions for future research
There are a number of potential extensions to the topics studied here. First,
it would be desirable to endogenise the decentralisation decision. In our model,
153
while corruption and development are endogenously determined, decentralisation
is imposed exogenously. The decision to decentralise (and the decentralisation
process itself) is much more complex and is likely to be aﬀected by corruption
and economic development. Another possible extension is to make the probability
of detection endogenous to the model. One way to do this could be to introduce
costly monitoring eﬀort as a mechanism that allows the government to increase
this probability.
A second important issue for further research concerns the role of politicians in
the theoretical model. Instead of considering a benevolent government, it would
be interesting to analyse the behaviour of oﬃce-motivated politicians. The intro-
duction of elections of local and national government would provide the model
with a source of additional interactions. More speciﬁcally, this would likely pit
politicians against bureaucrats as their objectives go in opposite directions. The
introduction of these modiﬁcations may give rise to additional eﬀects (collusion
between bureaucrats and politicians; increased monitoring; etc.) that impact on
the relationship between corruption and development.
Thirdly, considering the evidence presented in this thesis regarding the associa-
tion between press freedom and corruption, it would be useful to evaluate the
eﬀects that other democratic checks and balances have on the relationship be-
tween corruption and media freedom. This is especially relevant for developing
and transition countries where some or all democratic institutions may be weak.
An additional area where much research is needed is that of examining the dynamic
eﬀects of institutional reforms on corruption. This type of research has been
somewhat hindered due to a relative lack of time-varying indicators. However,
there are some corruption and governance data which are available for relatively
long periods and could be used in conjunction with indicators of institutional
change.
Finally, it would be desirable to evaluate the eﬀects of corruption on the location
and production decisions of ﬁrms. The increasing availability of micro-level data
154
oﬀers the opportunity to undertake research in this exciting area considering the
microeconomic impact of corruption on the behaviour of individuals and ﬁrms.
Although there are few empirical studies using ﬁrm-level data, more research is
clearly needed in order to derive more general implications about these microeco-
nomic eﬀects.
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Table A.1: Summary statistics for selected variables
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
cpi 5.25 2.59 0.4 10 510
loggdp 3.91 0.45 2.89 4.54 510
pri 2.37 1.85 1 7 510
d50 0.52 0.5 0 1 487
pss 35.01 21.98 5 97 510
pssa 10.17 7.74 0 30 510
pssb 15.36 10.73 0 40 510
pssc 9.47 5.67 0 27 510
tra 63.51 35.77 10.9 229.6 510
imp 32.65 17.24 6.9 104.8 510
fue 11.11 18.45 0 99.60 486
int 2.44 0.77 1 5 495
def 2.36 1.68 -2.2 12.4 509
ﬀc 0.02 0.14 0 1 500
fsc 0.2 0.4 0 1 500
fbc 0.28 0.45 0 1 500
parl 0.58 0.49 0 1 490
pres 0.36 0.48 0 1 490
maj 0.62 0.49 0 1 475
eng 0.31 0.46 0 1 510
soc 0.1 0.3 0 1 510
fre 0.41 0.49 0 1 510
ger 0.1 0.3 0 1 510
sca 0.08 0.27 0 1 510
elf 0.27 0.28 0 0.86 490
plist 0.55 0.45 0 1 500
mag 0.55 0.37 0 0.99 500
ever 0.66 0.47 0 1 500
cat_d 0.33 0.47 0 1 510
pro_d 0.08 0.27 0 1 510
exp 27.34 13.89 3.47 58.73 321
elfalt 36.36 31.31 0 90 440
news 173.35 157.88 1.8 610.2 416
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Table A.2: Correlations between selected variables
var cpi gdp pri d50 pss pssa pssb pssc tra fue int ffc fsc fbc parl pres maj exp eng soc fre ger sca pro plist mag
cpi 1.0
gdp 0.8 1.0
pri -0.6 -0.8 1.0
d50 0.6 0.6 -0.5 1.0
pss -0.8 -0.8 0.9 -0.5 1.0
pssa -0.6 -0.7 0.9 -0.5 0.9 1.0
pssb -0.7 -0.7 0.8 -0.4 1.0 0.8 1.0
pssc -0.6 -0.6 0.7 -0.4 0.9 0.6 0.8 1.0
tra 0.2 0.2 -0.1 0.2 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 1.0
fue -0.3 -0.3 0.3 -0.0 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.3 -0.1 1.0
int 0.1 -0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 -0.0 1.0
ffc -0.2 -0.2 0.4 -0.2 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.3 -0.1 0.2 0.0 1.0
fsc -0.4 -0.3 0.1 -0.3 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.1 -0.2 0.3 -0.3 -0.1 1.0
fbc -0.1 -0.4 0.4 -0.0 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.1 0.0 0.1 -0.1 -0.3 1.0
parl 0.6 0.6 -0.5 0.5 -0.5 -0.5 -0.4 -0.4 0.2 -0.4 0.1 -0.2 -0.6 -0.0 1.0
pres -0.5 -0.5 0.4 -0.5 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.3 -0.2 0.3 -0.1 0.2 0.6 -0.1 -0.9 1.0
maj -0.2 -0.2 0.2 -0.3 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.2 -0.1 -0.2 -0.1 0.1 -0.1 0.3 -0.0 0.1 1.0
exp 0.3 0.3 -0.2 0.4 -0.3 -0.3 -0.2 -0.1 -0.3 0.1 0.2 . -0.1 0.1 0.1 -0.1 0.1 1.0
eng 0.0 -0.2 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 -0.3 0.7 0.1 -0.1 0.2 0.0 1.0
soc -0.2 -0.1 0.1 -0.3 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 -0.0 0.1 -0.0 -0.1 -0.2 -0.1 0.1 0.1 -0.0 -0.2 1.0
fre -0.3 -0.1 0.1 -0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 -0.1 0.2 -0.2 0.2 0.6 -0.4 -0.3 0.3 -0.1 -0.3 -0.6 -0.3 1.0
ger 0.2 0.3 -0.2 0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.3 -0.0 -0.2 -0.1 -0.0 -0.2 -0.2 0.3 -0.2 0.1 0.3 -0.2 -0.1 -0.3 1.0
sca 0.5 0.3 -0.2 0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.2 0.1 0.1 0.3 -0.0 -0.1 -0.2 0.3 -0.2 -0.4 0.3 -0.2 -0.1 -0.2 -0.1 1.0
pro 0.6 0.4 -0.3 0.4 -0.5 -0.4 -0.5 -0.4 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 -0.3 -0.1 0.3 -0.3 -0.3 0.4 -0.0 -0.1 -0.4 0.1 0.8 1.0
plist 0.2 0.3 -0.2 0.2 -0.2 -0.1 -0.2 -0.3 -0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.2 -0.6 0.1 -0.1 -0.6 -0.0 -0.6 0.2 0.3 0.0 0.3 0.2 1.0
mag 0.1 0.3 -0.2 0.0 -0.2 -0.1 -0.2 -0.3 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.2 -0.5 -0.1 -0.0 -0.6 -0.1 -0.6 0.1 0.3 0.0 0.3 0.2 0.8 1.0
The number of observations for the correlations is variable but for most correlations is around 500 observations. Only in the case of exp it drops to around 300. For a description of the
each variable see Table B.4
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Table A.3: Variable description and data sources
Code Variable description Detail and source
cpi Corruption Perception Index Elaborated by Transparency International. This measure provides (subjective) perceptions of bureau-
cratic corruption across countries. Scores range from 0 (most corrupt) to 10 (least corrupt). From 1995
to 2004. (Available at www.transparency.org)
loggdp Logarithm of GDP per capita The logarithm of real GDP per capita PPP was taken from the 2003 World Bank Indicators CD-Rom.
From 1993 to 2001.
d50 Persistence of democracy in last 50
years
Proxy for stability of democracy in a country. It measures the extent to which a country has been a
democracy over the last 50 years (dummy equals 1) or not (dummy equals 0).,From 1995 to 2004.
pri Index of political rights Index of political rights. Source: Freedom House.
tra Trade as percentage of GDP The sum of imports and exports in goods and services divided by GDP captures the degree of openness
to foreign competition. Taken from the 2003 World Development Indicators CD-Rom. From 1993 to
2001.
imp Imports of goods and services as a % of
GDP
Capture the extent of openness to foreign competition. Measured as the share of imports of goods and
services in GDP. Taken from the 2003 World Development Indicators CD-Rom. From 1994 to 2002.
fue Proportion of fuel and mineral exports
in merchandise exports
Proportion of fuel and mineral exports in merchandise exports, as a measure of the level of potential
rents and quasi-rents. Source: 2003 World Development Indicators CD-Rom. From 1993 to 2001.
interv Index of government intervention Index of government intervention. Countries with low government intervention have low values on the
index. Source: Heritage Foundation (www.heritage.org). From 1995 to 2003.
Continued on next page
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Table A.3: (continued)
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Code Variable description Detail and source
def Military expenditure as a % of GDP Military expenditure as a percentage of GDP taken from Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
(SIPRI). Available at http://databases.sipri.se/. From 1994 to 2002.
maj Dummy for majoritarian system Dummy for a plurality (majority) electoral system. Source: Database of Political Institutions, World
Bank, 2001 (http://econ.worldbank.org). From 1993 to 2001.
pres Dummy for presidential system Dummy variable assigning ones to countries which have presidential executive systems. Source: Database
of Political Institutions, World Bank, 2001 (http://econ.worldbank.org). From 1992 to 2000.
parl Dummy for parliamentary system Dummy assigning ones to countries which have parliamentary systems to elect the chief executive. Source:
Database of Political Institutions, World Bank, 2001 (http://econ.worldbank.org). From 1992 to 2000.
fbc Dummy for former British colony Dummy variable taking value 1 if country has a British colonial legacy, 0 otherwise. Source: Warcziag
(1996), Grier (1997), and Treisman (2000)).
ffc Dummy for former French colony Dummy variable taking value 1 if country has a French colonial legacy, 0 otherwise. Source: Warcziag
(1996), Grier (1997), and Treisman (2000).
fsc Dummy for former Spanish colony Dummy variable taking value 1 if country has a Spanish colonial legacy, 0 otherwise. Source: Warcziag
(1996), Grier (1997), and Treisman (2000).
ever Dummy for any colonial history Dummy variable taking value if a country has ever been a colony since 1776, and 0 otherwise. Source:
Persson et al. (2003), based on Wacziarg (1996). From 1995 to 2003.
Continued on next page
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Table A.3: (continued)
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Code Variable description Detail and source
pss Aggregate press freedom index Index of Press Freedom. Ranges from 0 to 100 with low scores indicating more press freedom and high
values denoting less press freedom. Released by Freedom House (www.freedomhouse.org).
pssa Press freedom subindex: Laws and reg-
ulations
Subindex of Laws and regulations that inﬂuence press freedom. Ranges from 0 to 30 with low scores
indicating more press freedom and high values denoting less press freedom. Released by Freedom House.
pssb Press freedom subindex: Political inﬂu-
ences
Subindex of Political inﬂuences on press freedom. Ranges from 0 to 40 with low scores indicating more
press freedom and high values denoting less press freedom. Released by Freedom House.
pssc Press freedom subindex: Economic in-
ﬂuences
Subindex of Economic inﬂuences on press freedom. Ranges from 0 to 30 with low scores indicating more
press freedom and high values denoting less press freedom. Released by Freedom House.
free Index of economic freedom The index measures how well countries score on a list of 10 diﬀerent areas of economic freedom. Ranges
from 1 (complete freedom) to 5 (lack of freedom). Source: The Heritage Foundation (www.heritage.org).
From 1995 to 2003.
eng Dummy for English legal system Dummy for the origin of the legal system, taking value 1 if the country has English legal roots and 0
otherwise. Source: La Porta et al. (1999). From 1995 to 2003.
soc Dummy for Socialist legal system Dummy for the origin of the legal system, taking value 1 if the country has Socialist legal roots and 0
otherwise. Source: La Porta et al. (1999). From 1995 to 2003.
fre Dummy for French legal system Dummy for the origin of the legal system, taking value 1 if the country has French legal roots and 0
otherwise. Source: La Porta et al. (1999). From 1995 to 2003.
Continued on next page
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Table A.3: (continued)
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Code Variable description Detail and source
ger Dummy for German legal system Dummy for the origin of the legal system, taking value 1 if the country has German legal roots and 0
otherwise. Source: La Porta et al. (1999). From 1995 to 2003.
sca Dummy for Scandinavian legal system Dummy for the origin of the legal system, taking value 1 if the country has German legal roots and 0
otherwise. Source: La Porta et al. (1999). From 1995 to 2003.
prod Dummy for Protestantism as dominant
religion
Dummy for Protestantism as a dominant religion in a country, taking value 1 if 2/3 or more of the
population belong to the Protestant religion. Source: own elaboration drawing from La Porta et al.
(1999). From 1995 to 2003.
catd Dummy for Catholicism as dominant
religion
Dummy for Catholicism as a dominant religion in a country, taking value 1 if 2/3 or more of the population
belong to the Catholic religion. Source: own elaboration drawing from La Porta et al. (1999). From
1995 to 2003.
elf Index of ethno-linguistic fractionaliza-
tion
Index of ethno-linguistic fractionalization measuring the probability that two randomly selected persons
from a given country will not belong to the same ethno-linguistic group. Source: La Porta et al. (1999).
From 1995 to 2003.
news Daily newspapers per 1000 people Number of daily newspapers per 1000 people. Source: World Development Indicators (WDI).
exp Sub-national expenditure as a % of to-
tal government expenditure
Proportion of total government spending accounted for by sub-national governments. Source: World
Bank Dataset based on the Government Finance Statistics, IMF. From 1987 to 1998.
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Table A.4: Selected Data
country year cpi pss pssa pssb pssc gdp pri d50
Argentina 2000 3.5 41 10 23 8 11730 2 0
Australia 2000 8.3 10 2 2 6 21680 1 1
Austria 2000 7.7 12 6 4 2 22870 1 1
Bangladesh 2000 2.29 60 18 29 13 1320 3 0
Belgium 2000 6.1 9 2 5 2 22220 1 1
Bolivia 2000 2.7 22 8 10 4 2180 1 0
Brazil 2000 3.9 33 8 14 11 6720 3 0
Cameroun 2000 2 77 25 33 19 1460 7 0
Canada 2000 9.2 14 3 6 5 23080 1 1
Chile 2000 7.4 27 9 11 7 8300 2 0
China 2000 3.1 80 30 35 15 2930 7 0
Colombia 2000 3.2 59 18 31 10 7030 4 1
Czech Republic 2000 4.3 20 6 9 5 12880 1
Denmark 2000 9.8 9 2 2 5 25450 1 1
Ecuador 2000 2.6 44 16 20 8 3170 2 0
Egypt 2000 3.1 69 19 31 19 2990 6 0
Finland 2000 10 15 2 7 6 20090 1 1
France 2000 6.7 24 2 13 9 20500 1 1
Germany 2000 7.6 13 6 4 3 22390 1 1
Greece 2000 4.9 30 10 16 4 14020 1 0
Hungary 2000 5.2 30 5 18 7 9850 1 0
India 2000 2.8 42 4 27 11 2330 2 1
Indonesia 2000 1.7 49 19 18 12 3070 4 0
Ireland 2000 7.2 21 6 7 8 21080 1 1
Israel 2000 6.6 30 11 15 4 18880 1 1
Italy 2000 4.6 27 2 13 12 21810 1 1
Japan 2000 6.4 19 2 12 5 23740 1 1
Jordan 2000 4.6 57 24 23 10 3710 4 0
Continued on next page
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country year cpi pss pssa pssb pssc gdp pri d50
Kenya 2000 2.1 70 22 36 12 990 6 0
Malaysia 2000 4.8 70 21 37 12 8140 5 1
Mexico 2000 3.3 50 10 25 15 7380 3 0
Netherlands 2000 8.9 14 6 4 4 23270 1 1
New Zealand 2000 9.4 8 4 3 1 17010 1 1
Nigeria 2000 1.2 53 16 19 18 790 4 0
Norway 2000 9.1 5 4 0 1 26780 1 1
Pakistan 2000 2.2 64 15 40 9 1710 7 0
Philippines 2000 2.8 30 10 14 6 3660 2 0
Poland 2000 4.1 19 8 7 4 7800 1 0
Portugal 2000 6.4 17 9 4 4 15060 1 0
Russia 2000 2.1 60 12 30 18 5700 4
South Africa 2000 5 25 8 13 4 10320 1 1
South Korea 2000 4 27 6 16 5 12660 2 0
Spain 2000 7 18 6 8 4 16870 1 0
Sweden 2000 9.4 11 4 3 4 20430 1 1
Switzerland 2000 8.6 8 4 2 2 25770 1 1
Thailand 2000 3.2 30 12 11 7 6270 2 0
Turkey 2000 3.8 58 22 25 11 5880 4 1
Uganda 2000 2.3 40 18 19 3 1260 5 0
United Kingdom 2000 8.7 20 7 6 7 20900 1 1
United States 2000 7.8 13 2 5 6 30110 1 1
Venezuela 2000 2.7 34 12 14 8 5900 4 1
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Table B.1: Pairwise correlations among selected decentralisation indicators
exp rev muni sta const auth auto dec4 dec2 fed1 fed2 fedi unit uhis fis pol adm tier regj locj
exp 1.00
rev 0.95 1.00
muni 0.06 0.08 1.00
sta 0.41 0.38 0.55 1.00
const 0.52 0.47 0.31 0.29 1.00
auth 0.55 0.57 0.52 0.69 0.31 1.00
auto 0.24 0.24 0.12 0.08 0.28 0.19 1.00
dec4 0.53 0.48 0.89 0.89 0.26 0.71 0.26 1.00
dec2 0.56 0.52 0.88 0.88 0.29 0.71 0.39 0.99 1.00
fed1 0.47 0.44 0.21 0.36 0.48 0.67 0.07 0.31 0.32 1.00
fed2 0.45 0.39 0.18 0.34 0.45 0.63 0.24 0.41 0.43 0.62 1.00
fedi -0.47 -0.47 -0.25 -0.32 -0.48 -0.61 0.00 -0.35 -0.35 -0.78 -0.62 1.00
unit -0.63 -0.65 -0.15 -0.41 -0.48 -0.61 -0.09 -0.30 -0.33 -0.88 -0.69 0.86 1.00
uhis -0.24 -0.32 0.14 0.04 -0.32 -0.19 -0.10 0.18 0.17 -0.33 -0.20 0.31 0.38 1.00
fis 0.51 0.54 0.13 -0.01 0.08 0.39 0.04 0.22 0.20 0.17 0.03 -0.01 0.21 0.16 1.00
pol -0.03 0.15 -0.11 0.06 0.25 -0.23 0.03 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.05 -0.13 -0.17 0.06 -0.04 1.00
adm -0.04 -0.06 0.13 -0.15 0.01 0.24 0.02 0.53 0.55 0.03 -0.04 0.17 0.42 0.36 0.04 0.04 1.00
tier 0.22 0.13 0.48 0.36 0.50 0.40 0.05 0.42 0.42 0.44 0.35 -0.43 -0.42 0.14 -0.05 -0.16 -0.13 1.00
regj -0.05 -0.04 0.12 0.00 -0.14 -0.04 -0.04 0.04 0.03 -0.14 -0.01 0.00 0.06 0.08 0.45 -0.09 0.25 0.01 1.00
locj 0.30 0.25 0.11 0.07 0.20 0.23 -0.03 0.22 0.23 0.27 0.20 -0.30 -0.28 -0.14 -0.10 -0.21 -0.12 0.19 0.00 1.00
Pairwise correlations are calculated for year 2000. * Denotes signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
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Table B.2: Baseline regressions - Cross Section (Year= 2000) - Common subset of countries
Dependent variable: Corruption - Method: OLS
cpi icrg wbc cpi icrg wbc cpi icrg wbc cpi icrg wbc cpi icrg wbc cpi icrg wbc
EXP REV MUNI STATE AUTHOR AUTON
DEC 0.03∗∗ 0.02∗∗ 0.01 0.03∗∗ 0.02∗ 0.01∗∗ -0.74∗∗∗ -0.16 -0.35∗∗∗ -0.15 -0.25∗∗ -0.04 -0.40 -0.64∗∗∗ -0.30 -0.44 -0.28 -0.07
[2.31] [2.35] [1.47] [2.05] [1.76] [1.22] [-3.01] [-1.4] [-3.17] [-0.69] [-1.95] [-0.46] [-0.71] [-2.58] [-1.21] [-0.91] [-1.21] [-0.28]
GDP 3.75∗∗∗ 0.83∗ 1.83∗∗∗ 3.93∗∗∗ 0.87∗ 1.90∗∗∗ 3.85∗∗∗ 1.23∗∗∗ 1.86∗∗∗ 3.40∗∗∗ 1.23∗∗∗ 1.64∗∗∗ 3.50∗∗∗ 1.24∗∗ 1.70∗∗∗ 2.89∗∗∗ 0.97∗∗∗ 1.45∗∗∗
[6.48] [1.92] [7.4] [6.58] [1.92] [7.55] [8.22] [4.86] [8.33] [6.64] [5.8] [6.78] [4.7] [3.97] [4.69] [6.16] [4.78] [6.5]
POPUL -0.59∗∗ -0.54∗∗∗ -0.18∗ -0.47∗∗ -0.52∗∗∗ -0.13 -0.39∗ -0.43∗∗∗ -0.13 -0.52 ∗∗ -0.35 ∗∗ -0.19 ∗ -0.30 -0.27 -0.05 -0.63 ∗∗∗ -0.50 ∗∗∗ -0.24 ∗∗
[-2.67] [-3.53] [-1.82] [-2.15] [-3.42] [-1.37] [-1.82] [-2.95] [-1.3] [-2.46] [-2.33] [-1.9] [-0.97] [-1.20] [-0.34] [-3.15] [-3.86] [-2.6]
PRESS -0.02∗ -0.03∗∗∗ -0.02∗∗∗ -0.02∗∗ -0.03∗∗∗ -0.02∗∗∗ -0.02∗∗ -0.02∗∗∗ -0.01∗∗∗ -0.02∗ -0.02∗∗∗ -0.01∗∗ -0.02 -0.02∗∗∗ -0.02∗∗∗ -0.02∗∗ -0.02∗∗∗ -0.01∗∗
[-2.39] [-3.42] [-3.25] [-2.35] [-3.41] [-3.23] [-2.51] [-4.8] [-3.03] [-1.9] [-5.18] [-2.32] [-1.17] [-3.82] [-1.61] [-2.18] [-5.00] [-2.42]
Obs 55 55 55 54 54 54 71 71 71 76 76 76 37 37 37 79 79 79
R2 0.77 0.63 0.83 0.76 0.63 0.83 0.74 0.64 0.8 0.71 0.65 0.78 0.69 0.68 0.72 0.71 0.66 0.76
cpi icrg wbc cpi icrg wbc cpi icrg wbc cpi icrg wbc cpi icrg wbc cpi icrg wbc
DECENT4 FEDINDEX UNITARYHIS TIERS REGJ LOCJ
DEC -0.30∗ -0.19∗∗ -0.14∗∗ 0.04 0.06 0.04 0.01∗∗ 0.00 0.00∗∗ -0.11 -0.29∗∗ -0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00∗∗ 0.00
[-1.9] [-2.58] [-2.05] [0.37] [0.92] [0.80] [2.17] [0.41] [2.12 [-0.56] [-2.50] [-0.29] [0.45] [-0.19] [-0.15] [0.88] [2.64] [1.75]
GDP 3.83∗∗∗ 1.35∗∗∗ 1.89∗∗∗ 2.86∗∗∗ 0.98∗∗∗ 1.45∗∗∗ 1.95∗∗∗ 0.60∗ 0.97∗∗∗ 2.61∗∗∗ 1.00∗∗∗ 1.31∗∗∗ 2.61∗∗∗ 0.99∗∗∗ 1.23∗∗∗ 2.76∗∗∗ 1.04∗∗∗ 1.37∗∗∗
[7.5] [5.84] [7.43] [6.05] [4.65] [6.44] [3.17] [1.98] [3.46] [6.54] [4.89] [6.93] [5.66] [3.6] [5.4] [7.09] [4.53] [7.41]
POPUL -0.36 -0.37∗∗ -0.10 -0.59∗∗ -0.40∗∗ -0.16 -0.35∗ -0.41∗∗ -0.13 -0.39∗ -0.33∗∗ -0.11 -0.42 -0.30 -0.06 -0.54∗ -0.55∗∗ -0.19
[-1.61] [-2.28] [-1.02] [-2.08] [-2.35] [-1.33] [-1.72] [-2.52] [-1.42] [-1.72] [-2.01] [-1.07] [-1.26] [-1.24] [-0.47] [-1.88] [-2.92] [-1.6]
PRESS -0.02∗∗ -0.02∗∗∗ -0.01∗∗∗ -0.03∗∗ -0.02∗∗∗ -0.01∗∗∗ -0.05∗∗∗ -0.04∗∗∗ -0.03∗∗∗ -0.03∗∗∗ -0.03∗∗∗ -0.02∗∗∗ -0.05∗∗∗ -0.03∗∗∗ -0.03∗∗∗ -0.03∗∗∗ -0.02∗∗∗ -0.02∗∗∗
[-2.05] [-4.97] [-2.59] [-2.33] [-4.68] [-2.74] [-3.33] [-4.36] [-4.21] [-3.52] [-5.35] [-3.99] [-3.8] [-4.03] [-4.4] [-3.29] [-4.1] [-3.88]
Obs 66 66 66 82 82 82 64 64 64 82 82 82 50 50 50 76 76 76
R2 0.71 0.65 0.78 0.69 0.64 0.76 0.71 0.60 0.78 0.69 0.66 0.77 0.74 0.59 0.78 0.69 0.62 0.77
White-corrected standard errors. *** Signiﬁcant at the 1% level. ** Signiﬁcant at the 5% level. * Signiﬁcant at the 10% level. The constant term is not reported in this table.
DEC is the decentralisation indicator which varies across the diﬀerent columns of the table according to the measure selected. We estimate each alternative model for three diﬀerent
corruption indexes. Data are for 2000 except for TIERS, REGJ and LOCJ with data for 1999. GDP and POPUL are in logs.
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Table B.3: Baseline regressions - Cross Section (Year= 2000) - Common subset of countries - Additional Decentral-
isation Indicators
Dependent variable: Corruption - Method: OLS
cpi icrg wbc cpi icrg wbc
FEDERAL UNITARY
DEC 0.17 -0.01 0.01 -0.12 0.01 -0.03
[0.40] [-0.04] [0.26] [-0.47] [0.09] [-0.29]
GDP 2.88∗∗∗ 0.98∗∗∗ 1.45∗∗∗ 2.25∗∗∗ 0.64∗∗ 1.08∗∗∗
[6.22] [4.68] [6.51] [3.92] [2.03] [4.05]
POPUL -0.63∗∗ -0.46∗∗∗ -0.22∗∗ -0.57∗∗ -0.41∗∗ -0.21∗
[-2.68] [-3.31] [-2.09] [-2.16] [-2.16] [-1.8]
PRESS -0.02∗∗ -0.02∗∗∗ -0.01∗∗∗ -0.05∗∗∗ -0.04∗∗∗ -0.03∗∗∗
[-2.23] [-4.9] [-2.66] [-3.98] [-4.54] [-4.75]
Obs 86 86 86 64 64 64
R2 0.70 0.65 0.76 0.69 0.60 0.76
White-corrected standard errors. *** Signiﬁcant at the 1% level. **
Signiﬁcant at the 5% level. * Signiﬁcant at the 10% level. The con-
stant term is not reported in this table. DEC is the decentralisation
indicator which varies across the diﬀerent columns of the table ac-
cording to the measure selected. We estimate each alternative model
for three diﬀerent corruption indexes. Data are for 2000 except for
POL, FIS, and ADM with data for 1996. GDP and POPUL are in
logs.
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Table B.4: Variable description and data sources
Code Variable description Detail and source
cpi Corruption Perception Index Elaborated by Transparency International. This measure provides (subjective) perceptions of bureaucratic
corruption across countries. Scores range from 0 (most corrupt) to 10 (least corrupt). From 1995 to 2004.
(Available from www.transparency.org)
wbc Control of Corruption Index One of the indicators of the Worldwide Governance Research Indicators Dataset 2004 available from the
World Bank at www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/data.html#dataset.
icrg ICRG Corruption Ratings Corruption ratings included in the International Country Risk Guide Database elaborated by Political Risk
Services. Accessible at www.icrgonline.com.
logGDP Logarithm of GDP per capita The logarithm of real GDP per capita PPP was taken from the 2003 World Bank Indicators CD-Rom. From
1993 to 2001.
logPOPUL Logarithm of Total Population Years available 1969-2004. Data from the Worldbank's World Development Indicators (2006).
pss Press Freedom Index Index of Press Freedom. Ranges from 0 to 100 with low scores indicating more press freedom and high values
denoting less press freedom. Released by Freedom House (www.freedomhouse.org).
exp Subnational expenditure as % of total government
expenditure
Average for the period 1990-2000 of the IMF's Government Finance Statistics. Available at http://www.
worldbank.org/publicsector/decentralisation/data.htm
rev Subnational revenue as % of total government rev-
enue
Average for the period 1990-2000 of the IMF's Government Finance Statistics. Available at http://www.
worldbank.org/publicsector/decentralisation/data.htm
muni Are municipal governments locally elected? Categorical variable taking the value of 2 if both the local executive and legislative are locally elected, 1
if the executive is appointed but the legislature elected and 0 if both are appointed. Available from the
Database of Political Institutions 2004 (DPI).
state Are state/province governments elected? Categorical variable taking the value of 2 if both the state/provincial executive and legislative are elected,
1 if the executive is appointed but the legislature elected and 0 if both are appointed. Available from the
Database of Political Institutions 2004 (DPI).
Continued on next page
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Table B.4: (continued)
B.4  Continued from previous page
Code Variable description Detail and source
stconst Are the constituencies of the senators the
state/provinces?
Dummy variable taking value 1 if the Senate is elected on a state/province basis and 0 if otherwise. Taken
from the Database of Political Institutions 2004 (DPI).
author Do the state provinces have authority over taxing,
spending or legislating?
Dummy variable taking the value of 1 if any of these is true, 0 otherwise. Available from the Database of
Political Institutions 2004 (DPI).
auton Are there autonomous regions? Dummy variable taking the value of 1 if there exists autonomous contiguous regions, 0 otherwise. Available
from the Database of Political Institutions (DPI).
pol Factor score for political decentralization It ranges from 0 (low decentralization) to 1 (high decentralization). Source: Schneider (2003). Year of
observations, 1996.
fis Factor score for ﬁscal decentralization It ranges from 0 (low decentralization) to 1 (high decentralization). Source: Schneider (2003). Year of
observations, 1996.
adm Factor score for administrative decentralization It ranges from 0 (low decentralization) to 1 (high decentralization). Source: Schneider (2003). Year of
observations, 1996.
dec2 Political decentralization index Constructed on the basis of aggregating auton, muni and state, from the Database of Political Institutions
(DPI).
dec4 Political decentralization index Constructed on the basis of aggregating muni and state, from the Database of Political Institutions (DPI).
federal Dummy for a federal country Variable taking the value of 1 if the country is federal, 0 otherwise. Based on the classiﬁcation of Elazar (1995)
and the Handbook of Federal Countries. Other sources: CIA World Factbook, and selected Constitutions
of countries.
federal(2) Dummy for a federal country (broader concept) Variable taking the value of 1 if the country is federal, 0 otherwise. Based on the classiﬁcation of Elazar (1995)
and the Handbook of Federal Countries. Other sources: CIA World Factbook, and selected Constitutions
of countries.
federal_alt Dummy for a federal country (Treisman) Dummy for federalism. Source: Treisman (2000).
fedindex Index of federalism Ranges from 1 to 5, with lower values indicating a more federal country. Source: STM103 Global Indicators
Shared Dataset V2.0 available at www.pippanorris.com.
Continued on next page
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Table B.4: (continued)
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Code Variable description Detail and source
unitary Index of unitarism Index taking the value of 0=federal (elective regional legislatures plus constitutional recognition of subna-
tional authority) 1= semi-federal (where there are elective legislatures at the regional level enjoying impor-
tant policy-making power but in which constitutional sovereignty is reserved to the national government)
2= unitary. Source: Gerring et al. (2005a,b) available at www.pippanorris.com. Year=2000.
unitaryhis Index of Unitary History Cumulative index constructed on the basis of the annual values of unitary. Source: Gerring et al. (2005a,b)
available at www.pippanorris.com. Year=2000.
tiers Number of elected sub-national tiers Data for year 1999. Source: www.worldbank.org.
regj Number of intermediate jurisdictions Data for year 1999. Source: www.worldbank.org.
locj Number of local jurisdictions Data for year 1999. Source: www.worldbank.org.
polrights Index of political rights Political Rights Index (Freedom House). From 1 (most free) to 7 (least free). Source: www.freedomhouse.org.
ethno Ethnolinguistic fractionalisation index Average value of 5 diﬀerent indexes of ethnolinguistic fractionalization. Its value ranges from 0 to 1. Source:
La Porta et al. (1999).
bri Dummy for former British colony Variable taking the value of 1 if the country has ever been a British colony, 0 otherwise. Source: Treisman
(2000), Persson et al. (2003) and CIA World Factbook.
fre Dummy for former French colony Variable taking the value of 1 if the country has ever been a French colony, 0 otherwise. Source: Treisman
(2000), Persson et al. (2003) and CIA World Factbook.
spa Dummy for former Spanish colony Variable taking the value of 1 if the country has ever been a Spanish colony, 0 otherwise. Source: Treisman
(2000), Persson et al. (2003) and CIA World Factbook.
por Dummy for former Portuguese colony Variable taking the value of 1 if the country has ever been a Portuguese colony, 0 otherwise. Source: Treisman
(2000), Persson et al. (2003) and CIA World Factbook.
pro_d Dummy for Protestantism as dominant religion Dummy taking the value of 1 if the country's dominant religion is Protestantism. Source: CIA World
Factbook.
eng English legal origin Dummy taking the value of 1 if the country has a tradition of English Common Law, 0 otherwise. Source:
La Porta et al. (1999)
Continued on next page
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Table B.4: (continued)
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Code Variable description Detail and source
soc Socialist legal origin Dummy taking the value of 1 if the country has a tradition of Socialist/Communist Laws, 0 otherwise.
Source: La Porta et al. (1999)
fre French legal origin Dummy taking the value of 1 if the country has a tradition of French Commercial Code, 0 otherwise. Source:
La Porta et al. (1999)
ger German legal origin Dummy taking the value of 1 if the country has a tradition of German Commercial Code, 0 otherwise.
Source: La Porta et al. (1999)
sca Scandinavian legal origin Dummy taking the value of 1 if the country has a tradition of Scandinavian Commercial Code, 0 otherwise.
Source: La Porta et al. (1999)
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Table B.5: Selected Data
country year wbc gdp pss popul rev unitary muni state locj stconst
Afghanistan 2000 -1.59 - 90 - - - 0 0 - -
Albania 2000 -.6 3.57 56 6.49 1.85 18.98 2 1 374 -
Algeria 2000 -.7 3.73 83 7.48 - - 1 1 1552 -
Angola 2000 -1.4 3.28 80 7.09 - - 0 1 - -
Argentina 2000 -.4 4.09 41 7.57 39.18 0 2 2 1617 1
Armenia 2000 -.8 3.38 57 6.49 - 15.24 2 0 931 -
Australia 2000 2.1 4.41 10 7.28 31.95 0 2 2 900 1
Austria 2000 1.9 4.46 12 6.90 26.39 44.17 - 2 2353 1
Azerbaijan 2000 -1.1 3.41 70 6.91 19.75 - 1 - - -
Bahamas 2000 .8 4.23 7 5.48 - 48.44 1 1 - 0
Bahrain 2000 .4 4.20 75 5.83 2.60 - - 1 - -
Bangladesh 2000 -.6 3.17 60 8.12 - 19.1 0 0 4642 0
Barbados 2000 - 4.19 16 5.43 - 58.1 - - - 0
Belarus 2000 -.1 3.68 80 7.00 29.13 - 0 0 179 0
Belgium 2000 1.4 4.44 9 7.01 5.85 63.61 2 2 589 0
Belize 2000 .2 3.77 25 5.40 - 36.2 0 0 - 0
Benin 2000 -.2 2.99 30 6.79 - 19.1 2 2 77 -
Bhutan 2000 1.3 - 76 5.91 - - - 0 - -
Bolivia 2000 -.7 3.38 22 6.92 20.76 34.96 2 0 312 1
Bosnia and H. 2000 -.5 3.76 56 6.58 - - 2 - 137 -
Botswana 2000 1 3.88 28 6.22 - 58.1 1 1 17 0
Brazil 2000 0 3.87 33 8.23 28.63 0 2 2 5581 1
Brunei 2000 -.2 - 74 5.53 - - - 0 - -
Bulgaria 2000 -.2 3.78 30 6.91 13.79 20.9 2 2 294 -
Burkina Faso 2000 -.7 3.01 40 7.05 - - - - 250 -
Burundi 2000 -1.4 2.78 83 6.83 - - 2 1 - -
Cambodia 2000 -.6 3.26 61 7.10 - 18.96 - - - -
Cameroon 2000 -1.1 3.27 77 7.18 - - 1 0 336 -
Canada 2000 2.3 4.44 14 7.49 52.97 0 2 2 4507 1
Cape Verde 2000 .2 3.69 32 5.64 - 17.28 - 1 - -
C.A.R. 2000 -1 3.06 60 6.57 - 15.44 0 0 174 -
Chad 2000 -.6 2.93 72 6.90 - - 0 0 - -
Continued on next page
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country year wbc gdp pss popul rev unitary muni state locj stconst
Chile 2000 1.5 3.96 27 7.18 7.18 68.86 1 0 340 1
China 2000 -.3 3.58 80 9.10 51.48 - 2 2 - -
Colombia 2000 -.4 3.79 59 7.63 - 73.39 2 2 1068 1
Comoro Is. 2000 -.6 3.24 40 5.75 - - - 1 - 1
Congo, DR 2000 -1.4 2.98 90 6.54 - - 0 - - -
Congo, Rep. of 2000 -.9 2.83 77 7.69 - - - 1 - 1
Costa Rica 2000 1 3.95 16 6.58 2.89 101 2 0 496 -
Cote d'Ivoire 2000 -.6 3.20 74 7.20 - - 1 1 196 -
Croatia 2000 0 3.98 63 6.64 10.69 3.98 2 1 543 1
Cuba 2000 -.3 - 94 7.05 - - 1 0 169 -
Cyprus 2000 1.1 4.30 16 5.88 - 59.1 - - - -
Czech Republic 2000 .4 4.19 20 7.01 16.39 15.44 2 1 5768 0
Denmark 2000 2.4 4.46 9 6.73 32.15 100.88 2 2 275 -
Djibouti 2000 -1 3.29 63 5.82 - - - - - -
Dom. Republic 2000 -.3 3.80 30 6.92 0.81 44.5 2 0 90 1
Ecuador 2000 -1 3.53 44 7.09 - 56.16 2 - 1079 -
Egypt 2000 -.2 3.55 69 7.81 - - 0 1 199 -
El Salvador 2000 -.2 3.67 40 6.79 - 34.58 2 0 262 -
Eq. Guinea 2000 -1.8 4.18 78 5.66 - - 0 - - -
Eritrea 2000 -.1 2.97 68 6.61 - - 0 0 - 0
Estonia 2000 .8 3.99 20 6.14 18.83 28.28 2 1 254 -
Ethiopia 2000 -.1 2.83 62 7.81 - 12.44 - - 910 1
Fiji 2000 .5 3.70 58 5.91 3.11 52.82 1 1 - -
Finland 2000 2.5 4.41 15 6.71 31.59 98.28 - 0 455 -
France 2000 1.5 4.41 24 7.77 13.21 96.8 2 1 36559 1
Gabon 2000 -.7 3.79 55 6.10 - - 2 0 - -
Gambia 2000 -.1 3.24 70 6.12 - - - 1 - -
Georgia 2000 -.7 3.30 47 6.67 - 19.1 2 0 4000 -
Germany 2000 1.7 4.41 13 7.91 33.52 10.56 2 2 16121 1
Ghana 2000 -.4 3.29 61 7.29 - 9.8 - 1 110 -
Greece 2000 .8 4.24 30 7.04 - 81.6 2 1 5922 -
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country year wbc gdp pss popul rev unitary muni state locj stconst
Grenada 2000 .2 3.88 20 5.01 - 38.88 - - - 0
Guatemala 2000 -.7 3.59 54 7.06 3.68 53.82 0 0 324 -
Guinea 2000 -.4 3.29 71 6.87 - - 1 0 33 -
Guinea-Bissau 2000 -.4 2.89 56 6.14 - 11.62 - - - -
Guyana 2000 -.4 3.60 22 5.88 - 34.44 2 2 - -
Haiti 2000 -1 3.25 58 6.90 - - - 0 133 -
Honduras 2000 -.7 3.40 48 6.81 - 48.46 2 0 293 -
Hong Kong 2000 - 4.41 - 6.82 - - - - - -
Hungary 2000 .8 4.13 30 7.00 12.65 20.9 2 0 3153 -
Iceland 2000 2.5 4.45 12 5.45 22.40 97.4 2 1 - 0
India 2000 -.2 3.38 42 9.01 33.64 0 2 1 237687 1
Indonesia 2000 -1.1 3.48 49 8.31 3.64 7.78 - 0 - -
Iran 2000 -.6 3.75 68 7.80 - 7.88 - - 720 -
Iraq 2000 -1.2 - 98 7.37 - - - - - -
Ireland 2000 1.6 4.48 21 6.58 7.46 96.8 2 2 80 0
Israel 2000 1.3 4.38 30 6.80 9.45 78.44 - 1 273 -
Italy 2000 .9 4.40 27 7.76 10.97 54.85 2 2 8104 1
Jamaica 2000 -.2 3.53 11 6.41 - 66.78 - - - 0
Japan 2000 1.4 4.42 19 8.10 - 99.18 2 2 3233 1
Jordan 2000 .1 3.58 57 6.69 - - 1 0 669 0
Kazakhstan 2000 -.9 3.66 58 7.18 28.77 - 1 1 303 -
Kenya 2000 -1.1 3.00 70 7.48 5.55 - - - 168 -
Kuwait 2000 .9 4.20 48 6.34 - - 0 0 - -
Kyrgyzstan 2000 -.9 3.19 61 6.69 17.90 - 1 1 61 -
Laos 2000 -.9 3.20 66 6.72 - - 1 1 - -
Latvia 2000 0 3.90 24 6.38 19.51 19.1 1 1 566 -
Lebanon 2000 -.5 3.62 61 6.64 - - 0 0 - -
Lesotho 2000 .2 3.33 56 6.24 - 11.5 0 0 - 0
Liberia 2000 -1.2 - 67 6.50 - - - - - 1
Libya 2000 -.9 - 90 6.72 - - 2 2 1500 -
Lithuania 2000 .3 3.94 20 6.54 20.86 22.54 2 0 56 -
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country year wbc gdp pss popul rev unitary muni state locj stconst
Luxembourg 2000 2.1 4.77 10 5.64 10.14 - - 0 - 0
Macedonia 2000 -.5 3.78 42 6.31 - 19.1 2 - - -
Madagascar 2000 -.8 2.91 32 7.19 - 19.1 2 2 1391 0
Malawi 2000 -.2 2.78 52 7.01 - 13.58 0 0 - -
Malaysia 2000 .2 3.95 70 7.37 15.82 0 2 1 143 0
Maldives 2000 -.6 - 65 5.44 - - - 0 - -
Mali 2000 -.6 2.90 26 7.04 - 17.28 2 0 279 -
Malta 2000 .2 4.26 17 5.59 - 60.68 0 0 - -
Mauritania 2000 -.7 3.22 67 6.42 - - - - - -
Mauritius 2000 .5 3.98 17 6.07 1.96 55.4 2 - - -
Mexico 2000 -.4 3.96 50 7.99 21.86 0 - 2 2418 1
Moldova 2000 -.9 3.11 58 6.63 23.57 19.1 2 2 35 -
Mongolia 2000 -.4 3.21 29 6.38 25.43 20.9 1 1 - -
Morocco 2000 .4 3.54 49 7.46 - - 0 0 1547 -
Mozambique 2000 -.4 2.95 48 7.25 - 13.58 1 1 33 -
Myanmar 2000 -1.3 - 100 7.68 - - - - - -
Namibia 2000 1.2 3.78 34 6.28 - 20.9 2 2 - 1
Nepal 2000 -.4 3.12 59 7.36 - 20.9 2 0 4053 -
Netherlands 2000 2.3 4.46 14 7.20 9.34 94.08 1 1 572 1
New Caledonia 2000 - 4.35 - 5.33 - - - - - -
New Zealand 2000 2.4 4.29 8 6.59 9.43 101 2 2 155 -
Nicaragua 2000 -.9 3.51 40 6.71 9.02 20.9 2 0 143 -
Niger 2000 -.9 2.87 62 7.03 - 13.28 - - 150 -
Nigeria 2000 -1.1 2.94 53 8.10 - 0 0 0 589 -
North Korea 2000 -1 - 100 7.35 - - 2 2 - -
Norway 2000 2.1 4.53 5 6.65 21.78 97.6 2 1 435 0
Oman 2000 .7 4.10 71 6.38 - - - 0 - -
Pakistan 2000 -.7 3.28 64 8.14 - - 1 1 5195 1
Panama 2000 -.4 3.80 30 6.46 2.60 38.54 1 1 - -
Papua N.
Guinea
2000 -1.1 3.37 28 6.71 - 22.75 2 2 284 -
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Paraguay 2000 -1 3.67 51 6.72 1.48 24.96 2 - 212 0
Peru 2000 -.1 3.68 67 7.41 6.54 - 1 0 1808 -
Philippines 2000 -.5 3.60 30 7.88 5.38 - 2 2 1541 0
Poland 2000 .5 4.02 19 7.59 15.42 26.12 1 1 2489 1
Portugal 2000 1.4 4.26 17 7.01 7.77 52.5 2 0 275 -
Qatar 2000 .7 - 62 5.77 - - - - - -
Romania 2000 -.5 3.78 44 7.35 7.98 20.9 2 1 2948 1
Russian Fed. 2000 -1.1 3.85 60 8.16 39.13 0 - - 2000 1
Rwanda 2000 .1 3.04 72 6.89 - - 1 0 143 -
Saudi Arabia 2000 .1 4.10 90 7.32 - - 0 0 - -
Senegal 2000 -.4 3.17 33 6.98 - 2 0 1 99 -
Serbia and M. 2000 - - 81 7.03 - - - - - -
Sierra Leone 2000 -.8 2.67 85 6.70 - - 0 0 204 -
Singapore 2000 2.5 4.37 66 6.60 - - 0 0 - -
Slovakia 2000 .3 4.05 30 6.73 6.81 15.44 2 2 2834 -
Slovenia 2000 1.1 4.23 27 6.30 9.06 19.1 2 - 192 -
Solomon Is. 2000 -.2 3.27 18 5.62 - 0 - 2 - -
Somalia 2000 -1.6 - 88 6.94 - - - - - -
South Africa 2000 .5 3.98 25 7.64 12.20 93.31 2 2 840 0
South Korea 2000 .5 4.21 27 7.67 - 39.44 1 1 204 -
Spain 2000 1.7 4.33 18 7.61 16.34 33.18 2 2 8082 1
Sri Lanka 2000 -.1 3.56 70 7.27 - 65.35 2 2 238 -
St. Lucia 2000 .6 3.75 13 5.19 - 39.38 2 2 - 0
Sudan 2000 -1.1 3.25 85 7.50 - - - 0 615 -
Suriname 2000 .2 - 31 5.63 - 28.4 - - - -
Swaziland 2000 -.2 3.64 77 6.02 - - - 0 - 0
Sweden 2000 2.5 4.41 11 6.95 31.19 100.1 2 1 286 -
Switzerland 2000 2.2 4.48 8 6.86 43.77 0 2 2 3000 1
Syria 2000 -.8 3.52 73 7.21 - - - 0 300 -
Taiwan 2000 .7 - 21 - - 17.28 1 - - 0
Tajikistan 2000 -1.2 2.90 94 6.79 27.79 - 0 1 41 -
Continued on next page
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Table B.5: (continued)
B.5  Continued from previous page
country year wbc gdp pss popul rev unitary muni state locj stconst
Tanzania 2000 -1 2.71 49 7.53 - - - 0 101 -
Thailand 2000 -.3 3.80 30 7.78 5.85 42.1 - 0 149 0
Togo 2000 -.7 3.20 74 6.66 - - 2 2 30 -
Trinidad and T. 2000 .4 3.95 28 6.11 4.42 63.18 2 - - 0
Tunisia 2000 .7 3.80 74 6.98 - - 2 1 257 -
Turkey 2000 -.3 3.81 58 7.83 - 72.58 2 1 2801 -
Turkmenistan 2000 -1.1 3.56 86 6.67 - - - - - -
Uganda 2000 -.9 3.11 40 7.37 - - 2 1 1040 -
Ukraine 2000 -1 3.61 60 7.69 - 19.1 2 - 619 -
U.A.E. 2000 .7 - 76 6.51 - - - - - -
United King-
dom
2000 2.2 4.43 20 7.77 8.76 101 2 2 319 0
United States 2000 1.8 4.53 13 8.45 42.03 0 2 2 70500 1
Uruguay 2000 .7 3.95 29 6.52 - 64.52 2 2 19 0
Uzbekistan 2000 -.8 3.18 83 7.39 - - 0 1 281 -
Vanuatu 2000 -.2 3.48 44 5.29 - 18.9 2 - - -
Venezuela 2000 -.6 3.75 34 7.39 - 0 2 1 330 -
Vietnam 2000 -.8 3.30 75 7.89 - - 0 - - -
Western Samoa 2000 .2 3.70 34 5.24 - 29.28 0 - - -
Yemen 2000 -.7 2.90 68 7.24 - - 0 - - -
Yugoslavia 2000 -1.1 - - - 78.12 - 2 - - -
Zambia 2000 -.9 2.89 62 7.00 - 19.1 - - 72 -
Zimbabwe 2000 -.9 3.41 67 7.10 13.89 - - 0 80 -
All the data are for year 2000. wbc is the World Bank Corruption index, gdp and popul are in logs,
pss is press freedom index, rev is the share of sub-national revenue in total revenues, unitary is the
index of unitary history, muni and state are categorical variable for municipal and state elections,
locj is the number of elected local jurisdictions, and stconst is a dummy for the provinces as the
senators constituencies.
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Table B.6: Rolling regressions - EXP and WBC
model beta t ci(low) ci(upp) sd var r2 obs
1 0.00 0.24 -0.02 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.78 30
2 0.00 0.01 -0.03 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.79 30
3 -0.01 -0.88 -0.04 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.78 30
4 -0.02 -1.35 -0.05 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.80 30
5 -0.03 -2.23 -0.06 -0.01 0.01 0.00 0.82 30
6 -0.03 -1.74 -0.05 -0.00 0.01 0.00 0.81 30
7 -0.02 -0.98 -0.04 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.81 30
8 -0.01 -0.44 -0.03 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.82 30
9 -0.01 -0.58 -0.03 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.83 30
10 -0.01 -0.97 -0.04 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.83 30
11 -0.00 -0.22 -0.03 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.84 30
12 -0.00 -0.22 -0.03 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.85 30
13 -0.01 -0.32 -0.03 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.86 30
14 -0.00 -0.23 -0.03 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.85 30
15 -0.00 -0.20 -0.04 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.85 30
16 0.01 0.32 -0.02 0.04 0.02 0.00 0.88 30
17 0.01 0.82 -0.01 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.89 30
18 0.02 1.32 -0.01 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.89 30
19 0.02 1.31 -0.01 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.89 30
20 0.02 1.68 -0.00 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.89 30
21 0.02 1.82 0.00 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.90 30
22 0.04 3.48 0.02 0.05 0.01 0.00 0.90 30
23 0.02 1.57 -0.00 0.05 0.01 0.00 0.88 30
24 0.02 1.56 -0.00 0.05 0.01 0.00 0.89 30
25 0.02 1.86 0.00 0.05 0.01 0.00 0.88 30
26 0.04 2.37 0.01 0.06 0.01 0.00 0.88 30
27 0.03 2.31 0.01 0.06 0.01 0.00 0.88 30
28 0.04 3.02 0.02 0.07 0.01 0.00 0.89 30
29 0.04 2.72 0.01 0.06 0.01 0.00 0.88 30
30 0.02 1.23 -0.01 0.06 0.02 0.00 0.86 30
31 0.02 1.30 -0.01 0.05 0.02 0.00 0.86 30
32 0.03 2.07 0.01 0.06 0.01 0.00 0.87 30
33 0.01 0.61 -0.02 0.04 0.02 0.00 0.85 30
34 0.01 0.79 -0.02 0.04 0.02 0.00 0.86 30
35 0.02 0.88 -0.02 0.05 0.02 0.00 0.85 30
36 0.02 0.83 -0.02 0.05 0.02 0.00 0.85 30
37 0.03 1.70 -0.00 0.05 0.02 0.00 0.87 30
38 0.03 2.04 0.00 0.05 0.01 0.00 0.86 30
39 0.03 2.46 0.01 0.05 0.01 0.00 0.87 30
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Table B.7: Rolling regressions - REV and WBC
model beta t ci(low) ci(upp) sd var r2 obs
1 0.05 1.17 -0.02 0.11 0.04 0.00 0.81 30
2 0.03 0.86 -0.03 0.09 0.04 0.00 0.81 30
3 0.01 0.48 -0.04 0.06 0.03 0.00 0.81 30
4 0.01 0.47 -0.04 0.06 0.03 0.00 0.80 30
5 -0.01 -0.22 -0.05 0.04 0.02 0.00 0.80 30
6 -0.01 -0.54 -0.05 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.83 30
7 -0.02 -1.02 -0.05 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.83 30
8 -0.01 -0.68 -0.05 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.83 30
9 0.00 0.22 -0.03 0.04 0.02 0.00 0.85 30
10 -0.02 -0.83 -0.05 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.83 30
11 -0.01 -0.34 -0.05 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.82 30
12 -0.01 -0.30 -0.04 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.82 30
13 -0.02 -0.79 -0.05 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.82 30
14 -0.01 -0.33 -0.04 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.83 30
15 -0.02 -0.73 -0.05 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.85 30
16 -0.02 -1.03 -0.06 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.85 30
17 -0.01 -0.64 -0.05 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.86 30
18 -0.03 -1.36 -0.06 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.86 30
19 -0.00 -0.26 -0.03 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.88 30
20 -0.00 -0.02 -0.03 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.87 30
21 0.00 0.21 -0.03 0.04 0.02 0.00 0.86 30
22 0.00 0.07 -0.03 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.87 30
23 0.02 0.96 -0.01 0.05 0.02 0.00 0.87 30
24 0.01 0.46 -0.02 0.04 0.02 0.00 0.87 30
25 -0.00 -0.11 -0.03 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.87 30
26 0.01 0.55 -0.02 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.87 30
27 0.03 2.08 0.00 0.05 0.01 0.00 0.89 30
28 0.04 2.85 0.01 0.06 0.01 0.00 0.90 30
29 0.03 3.03 0.01 0.05 0.01 0.00 0.90 30
30 0.03 3.11 0.02 0.05 0.01 0.00 0.91 30
31 0.03 3.03 0.01 0.05 0.01 0.00 0.91 30
32 0.04 3.54 0.02 0.06 0.01 0.00 0.90 30
33 0.03 1.50 -0.00 0.06 0.02 0.00 0.87 30
34 0.02 0.95 -0.01 0.05 0.02 0.00 0.83 30
35 0.02 0.90 -0.01 0.05 0.02 0.00 0.84 30
36 0.02 1.10 -0.01 0.04 0.02 0.00 0.84 30
37 0.02 1.48 -0.00 0.05 0.01 0.00 0.84 30
38 0.03 2.36 0.01 0.05 0.01 0.00 0.85 30
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Table B.8: Rolling regressions - UNITARYHIS and WBC
model beta t ci(low) ci(upp) sd var r2 obs
1 -0.01 -0.48 -0.03 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.69 45
2 -0.00 -0.30 -0.02 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.68 45
3 -0.01 -0.49 -0.03 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.68 45
4 -0.01 -0.94 -0.03 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.68 45
5 -0.01 -1.08 -0.04 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.65 45
6 -0.02 -1.60 -0.04 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.68 45
7 -0.03 -2.15 -0.05 -0.01 0.01 0.00 0.69 45
8 -0.03 -2.39 -0.06 -0.01 0.01 0.00 0.70 45
9 -0.03 -2.19 -0.05 -0.01 0.01 0.00 0.63 45
10 -0.04 -2.69 -0.06 -0.01 0.01 0.00 0.65 45
11 -0.03 -2.07 -0.05 -0.00 0.01 0.00 0.59 45
12 -0.02 -1.71 -0.05 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.60 45
13 -0.03 -2.41 -0.05 -0.01 0.01 0.00 0.63 45
14 -0.01 -0.53 -0.03 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.56 45
15 -0.02 -0.92 -0.05 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.55 45
16 -0.02 -0.95 -0.04 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.55 45
17 -0.03 -1.87 -0.05 -0.00 0.01 0.00 0.57 45
18 -0.02 -1.96 -0.05 -0.00 0.01 0.00 0.58 45
19 -0.03 -2.39 -0.05 -0.01 0.01 0.00 0.58 45
20 -0.02 -2.00 -0.04 -0.00 0.01 0.00 0.51 45
21 -0.01 -1.38 -0.03 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.53 45
22 -0.01 -1.22 -0.03 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.55 45
23 -0.01 -1.64 -0.03 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.59 45
24 -0.01 -0.72 -0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.61 45
25 -0.01 -0.97 -0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.65 45
26 -0.01 -0.91 -0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.67 45
27 -0.01 -1.11 -0.02 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.67 45
28 -0.01 -0.79 -0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.69 45
29 0.00 0.09 -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.66 45
30 -0.00 -0.18 -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.65 45
31 -0.00 -0.12 -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.66 45
32 -0.00 -0.14 -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.67 45
33 -0.00 -0.58 -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.67 45
34 -0.00 -0.07 -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.66 45
35 -0.00 -0.09 -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.67 45
36 -0.00 -0.61 -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.66 45
37 -0.00 -0.58 -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.65 45
38 -0.00 -0.49 -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.66 45
39 -0.00 -0.04 -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.65 45
40 0.00 0.02 -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.64 45
41 -0.00 -0.11 -0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.64 45
42 0.00 0.32 -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.62 45
43 0.00 0.15 -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.61 45
44 -0.00 -0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.64 45
45 0.00 0.21 -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.66 45
46 0.00 0.23 -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.66 45
47 0.00 0.60 -0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.69 45
48 0.00 1.12 -0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.73 45
49 0.00 1.10 -0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.73 45
50 0.00 0.97 -0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.74 45
51 0.00 1.12 -0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.76 45
52 0.01 2.22 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.81 45
53 0.01 2.42 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.82 45
54 0.01 2.32 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.81 45
55 0.01 2.37 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.81 45
56 0.01 2.50 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.82 45
57 0.01 2.69 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.83 45
58 0.01 3.06 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.83 45
59 0.02 4.59 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.85 45
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B.2 Additional graphs
Figure B.1: Rolling regression for exp and cpi
Figure B.2: Rolling regression for rev and cpi
Figure B.3: Rolling regression for unitaryhis and cpi
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Figure B.4: Rolling regression for exp and icrg
Figure B.5: Rolling regression for rev and icrg
Figure B.6: Rolling regression for unitaryhis and icrg
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